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| date = 16 December 1944 – 28 January 1945{{sfn|Jones|2019|p=53}}<br>({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=12|day1=16|year1=1944|month2=01|day2=28|year2=1945}})
| place = The [[Ardennes]]: [[Belgium]], [[Luxembourg]], [[Germany]]
| coordinates = {{Coord|50|0|15|N|5|43|12|E|display=inline,title}}▼
| result = Allied victory
| combatant1 = {{plainlist |
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(U.S. Estimate: 103,900{{sfn|Pogue|1954|p=396}}{{efn| Pogue cites Allied estimates in excess of 24,000 killed and 16,000 prisoners.}} casualties)
* 527–554{{sfn|Bergström|2014|p=426|loc=including 20 [[Tiger II]] tanks, 194 [[Panther tank]]s, 158 [[Panzer IV]] tanks and 182 assault guns and tank destroyers}} tanks, tank destroyers and assault guns lost
* c. 800 aircraft lost, at least 500 in December and 280 during [[Operation Bodenplatte]]{{sfn|Parker|1991|p=339}}
}}
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]]
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The '''Battle of the Bulge''', also known as the '''Ardennes Offensive''', was
The Germans achieved a total surprise attack on the morning of 16 December 1944, due to a combination of Allied overconfidence, preoccupation with Allied offensive plans elsewhere
The Germans committed over 410,000 men, just over 1,400 tanks and [[armored fighting vehicles]], 2,600 artillery pieces, and over 1,000 combat aircraft.{{sfn|Dupuy|Bongard|Anderson|1994|p=18}} Between 63,000 and 104,000 of these men were [[Killed in action|killed]], [[Missing in action|missing]], [[wounded in action]], or [[Prisoner of war|captured]]. The battle severely depleted Germany's armored forces, which remained largely unreplaced throughout the remainder of the war. German [[Luftwaffe]] personnel, and later also Luftwaffe aircraft (in the [[Operation Bodenplatte|concluding stages of the engagement]]) also sustained heavy losses. In the wake of the defeat, many experienced German units were effectively out of men and equipment, and the survivors retreated to the [[Siegfried Line]].
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Model, commander of German Army Group B ({{lang|de|Heeresgruppe B}}), and von Rundstedt, overall commander of the German [[OB West|Army Command in the West]] ({{lang|de|OB West}}), were put in charge of carrying out the operation.
===Operation names===
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For these reasons Allied High Command considered the Ardennes a quiet sector, relying on assessments from their intelligence services that the Germans were unable to launch any major offensive operations this late in the war. What little intelligence they had led the Allies to believe precisely what the Germans wanted them to believe-–that preparations were being carried out only for defensive, not offensive, operations. The Allies relied too much on Ultra, not human reconnaissance. In fact, because of the Germans' efforts, the Allies were led to believe that a new defensive army was being formed around [[Düsseldorf]] in the northern Rhineland, possibly to defend against British attack. This was done by increasing the number of [[flak]] ({{lang|de|Flugabwehrkanonen}}, i.e., anti-aircraft cannons) in the area and the artificial multiplication of radio transmissions in the area. All of this meant that the attack, when it came, completely surprised the Allied forces. Remarkably, the U.S. Third Army intelligence chief, Colonel [[Oscar Koch]], the U.S. First Army intelligence chief and the SHAEF intelligence officer Brigadier General [[Kenneth Strong]] all correctly predicted the German offensive capability and intention to strike the U.S. VIII Corps area. These predictions were largely dismissed by the U.S. 12th Army Group.{{sfn|Dougherty|2002}} Strong had informed [[Walter Bedell Smith|Bedell Smith]] in December of his suspicions. Bedell Smith sent Strong to warn Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, the commander of the 12th Army Group, of the danger. Bradley's response was succinct: "Let them come."{{sfn|Pogue|1954|pp=362–366}} Historian Patrick K. O'Donnell writes that on 8 December 1944 U.S. Rangers at great cost took Hill 400 during the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest. The next day GIs who relieved the Rangers reported a considerable movement of German troops inside the Ardennes in the enemy's rear, but that no one in the chain of command connected the dots.{{sfn|O'Donnell|2012}}{{page needed|date=July 2021}}
Because the Ardennes was considered a quiet sector, considerations of [[economy of force]] led it to be used as a training ground for new units and a rest area for units that had seen hard fighting. The U.S. units deployed in the Ardennes thus were a mixture of inexperienced troops (such as the
Two major [[special operations]] were planned for the offensive. By October it was decided that [[Otto Skorzeny]], the German SS-commando who [[Gran Sasso raid|had rescued]] the former Italian dictator [[Benito Mussolini]], was to lead a task force of English-speaking German soldiers in [[Operation Greif]]. These soldiers were to be dressed in American and British uniforms and wear [[dog tag (identifier)|dog tags]] taken from corpses and prisoners of war. Their job was to go behind American lines and change signposts, misdirect traffic, generally cause disruption and seize bridges across the Meuse River. By late November another ambitious special operation was added: Col. [[Friedrich August von der Heydte]] was to lead a {{lang|de|[[Fallschirmjäger (Nazi Germany)|Fallschirmjäger]]-[[Kampfgruppe]]}} (paratrooper combat group) in [[Operation Stösser]], a night-time paratroop drop behind the Allied lines aimed at capturing a vital road junction near [[Malmedy]].{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|pp=86–89}}{{sfn|Toland|1999|pp=16, 19}}
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To preserve the quantity of armor available, the infantry of the 9th {{lang|de|Fallschirmjaeger}} Regiment, [[3rd Parachute Division (Germany)|3rd ''Fallschirmjaeger'' Division]], had been ordered to clear the village first. A single 18-man [[ISTAR|Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon]] from the [[99th Infantry Division (United States)#Most decorated platoon of World War II|99th Infantry Division]] along with four Forward Air Controllers held up the battalion of about 500 German paratroopers until sunset, about 16:00, causing 92 casualties among the Germans.
This created a bottleneck in the German advance. {{lang|de|Kampfgruppe}} Peiper did not begin
===Malmedy massacres===
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To protect the river crossings on the Meuse at Givet, Dinant and Namur, Montgomery ordered those few units available to hold the bridges on 19 December. This led to a hastily assembled force including rear-echelon troops, military police and [[United States Army Air Force|Army Air Force]] personnel. The [[29th Armoured Brigade (United Kingdom)|British 29th Armoured Brigade]] of [[11th Armoured Division (United Kingdom)|British 11th Armoured Division]], which had turned in its tanks for re-equipping, was told to take back their tanks and head to the area. [[XXX Corps (United Kingdom)|British XXX Corps]] was significantly reinforced for this effort. Units of the corps which fought in the Ardennes were the [[51st (Highland) Division|51st (Highland)]] and [[53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division|53rd (Welsh) Infantry]] Divisions, the [[6th Airborne Division (United Kingdom)|British 6th Airborne Division]], the 29th and [[33rd Armoured Brigade (United Kingdom)|33rd Armoured Brigades]], and the [[34th Armoured Brigade (United Kingdom)|34th Tank Brigade]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.battleofthebulgememories.be/fr/stories/armeebritanique/203-the-british-in-the-battle-of-the-ardennes.html |title=The British in the Battle of the Ardennes |first=Guy |last=Blockmans |date=6 May 2002 |access-date=10 July 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120823183012/http://www.battleofthebulgememories.be/fr/stories/armeebritanique/203-the-british-in-the-battle-of-the-ardennes.html |archive-date=23 August 2012 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
Unlike the German forces on the northern and southern shoulders who were experiencing great difficulties, the German advance in the center gained considerable ground. The Fifth Panzer Army was spearheaded by the 2nd Panzer Division while the Panzer Lehr Division (Elite Armored
On 22/23 December German forces reached the woods of [[Foy-Nôtre-Dame]], only a few kilometers ahead of Dinant. The narrow corridor caused considerable difficulties, as constant flanking attacks threatened the division. On 24 December, German forces made their furthest penetration west. The Panzer Lehr Division took the town of [[Celles, Houyet|Celles]], while a bit farther north, parts of 2nd Panzer Division were in sight of the Meuse near Dinant at Foy-Nôtre-Dame. A hastily assembled British blocking force on the east side of the river prevented the German Battlegroup Böhm from approaching the Dinant bridge. The 29th Armoured Brigade ambushed the Germans knocking out three Panthers and a number of vehicles in and around Foy-Nôtre-Dame.{{sfn|Cole|1964|p=568}} By late Christmas Eve the advance in this sector was stopped, as Allied forces threatened the narrow corridor held by the 2nd Panzer Division.{{sfn|Zaloga|2004|pp=76–83}}
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Senior Allied commanders met in a bunker in [[Verdun-sur-Meuse|Verdun]] on 19 December. By this time, the town of Bastogne and its network of 11 hard-topped roads leading through the widely forested mountainous terrain with deep river valleys and boggy mud of the Ardennes region was under severe threat. Bastogne had previously been the site of the [[VIII Corps (United States)|VIII Corps]] headquarters. Two separate westbound German columns that were to have bypassed the town to the south and north, the [[2nd Panzer Division]] and [[Panzer-Lehr-Division]] of XLVII Panzer Corps, as well as the Corps' infantry ([[26th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|26th Volksgrenadier Division]]), coming due west had been engaged and much slowed and frustrated in outlying battles at defensive positions up to {{convert|10|mi|order=flip|sp=us}} from the town proper, but these defensive positions were gradually being forced back onto and into the hasty defenses built within the municipality. Moreover, the sole corridor that was open (to the southeast) was threatened and it had been sporadically closed as the front shifted, and there was expectation that it would be completely closed sooner than later, given the strong likelihood that the town would soon be surrounded.{{citation needed|date=August 2010}}
Gen. Eisenhower, realizing that the Allies could destroy German forces much more easily when they were out in the open and on the offensive than if they were on the defensive, told his generals, "The present situation is to be regarded as one of opportunity for us and not of disaster. There will be only cheerful faces at this table." Patton, realizing what Eisenhower implied, responded, "Hell, let's have the guts to let the bastards go all the way to Paris. Then, we'll really cut 'em off and chew 'em up." Eisenhower, after saying he was not that optimistic, asked Patton how long it would take to turn his Third Army, located in northeastern France, north to counterattack. To the disbelief of the other generals present, Patton replied that he could attack with two divisions within 48 hours. Unknown to the other officers present, before he left, Patton had ordered his staff to prepare three contingency plans for a northward turn in at least corps strength. By the time Eisenhower asked him how long it would take, the movement was already underway.{{sfn|Ambrose|1998|p=208}} On 20 December, Eisenhower removed the First and Ninth U.S. Armies from Gen. Bradley's [[12th Army Group]] and placed them under Montgomery's [[British 21st Army Group|21st Army Group]].{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|p=422}}
[[File:German soldier Ardennes 1944.jpeg|thumb|upright|A German machine gunner marching through the Ardennes in December 1944]]
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[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-J28477, Ardennenoffensive, Lagebesprechnung.jpg|thumb|German field commanders plan the advance]]
After officers of the regular German Army attempted to assassinate him, Hitler had increasingly trusted only the Nazi Party SS and its armed branch, the Waffen-SS. He entrusted them with carrying out his decisive counterattack.{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|pp=21–22}} But following the Allied Normandy invasion, the SS armored units had suffered significant leadership casualties. This included SS-{{lang|de|Brigadeführer}} (Brigadier general) [[Kurt Meyer]], commander of the 12th SS Panzer (Armor) Division, captured by Belgian partisans on 6 September 1944.{{sfn|Mitcham|2006|p=10}}{{sfn|Meyer|2005|p=308}} Thus Hitler gave responsibility for the key right flank of the assault to the best SS troops and a few {{lang|de|Volksgrenadier}} units under the command of "Sepp" (Joseph) Dietrich, a fanatical political disciple of Hitler, and a loyal follower from the early days of the rise of [[National Socialism]] in Germany. The leadership composition of the Sixth Panzer
Despite their loyalty, none of the German field commanders entrusted with planning and executing the offensive believed it was possible to capture Antwerp. Even Dietrich believed the Ardennes was a poor area for armored warfare and that the inexperienced and badly equipped {{lang|de|Volksgrenadier}} soldiers would clog the roads the tanks needed for their rapid advance. In fact, their horse-drawn artillery and rocket units became a significant obstacle to the armored units.{{sfn|Astor|1992|p=113}} Other than making futile objections to Hitler in private, Dietrich generally stayed out of planning the offensive. Model and Manteuffel, technical experts from the eastern front, told Hitler that a limited offensive with the goal of surrounding and crushing the American 1st Army would be the best goal their offensive could hope to achieve. Their ideas shared the same fate as Dietrich's objections.{{sfn|Eisenhower|1969|p=224}}
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Bradley and Patton both threatened to resign unless Montgomery's command was changed. Eisenhower, encouraged by his British deputy [[Arthur Tedder]], had decided to sack Montgomery. Intervention by Montgomery's and Eisenhower's [[Chief of Staff|Chiefs of Staff]], Guingand, and Walter Smith, moved Eisenhower to reconsider and allowed Montgomery to apologize.{{citation needed|date=September 2014}}
After the war Manteuffel, who commanded the 5th Panzer Army in the Ardennes, was imprisoned awaiting trial for war crimes. During this period he was interviewed by [[B. H. Liddell Hart]], a British author who has since been accused of putting words in the mouths of German generals, and attempting to "rewrite the historical record".<ref>{{cite book |title=In Pursuit of Military Excellence; The Evolution of Operational Theory |first=Shimon |last=Naveh |pp=108–109 |location=London |publisher=Francass |date=1997|isbn=0-7146-4727-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Liddell Hart and the Weight of History |first=John |last=Mearsheimer |pp=8–9, 203–204 |publisher=Cornell University Press |date=2010 |isbn=978-0-8014-7631-0}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |title=A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament, 1945–1953 |first=Alaric |last=Searle |journal=War in History |date=1998 |volume=5 |issue=3 |pp=327–357 |doi=10.1177/096834459800500304 |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/096834459800500304 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210924135850/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/096834459800500304 |archive-date=24 September 2021 |issn = 0968-3445 }}</ref><ref>{{citation |title=Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A 'Pupil's' Retrospective |publisher=Strategic Studies Institute |first=Jay |last=Luvaas |date=1990 |pp=12–13}}</ref> After conducting several interviews via an interpreter, Liddell Hart in a subsequent book attributed to Manteuffel the following statement about Montgomery's contribution to the battle in the Ardennes:
{{blockquote|The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough.{{sfn|Delaforce|2004|p=318}}}}
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==External links==
{{Sister project links|auto=y}}
* [http://www.army.mil/botb Battle of the Bulge] – Official webpage of the United States Army.
* [https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo46222 The Battle of the Bulge: Battlebook] [[United States Army Europe|U.S. Army Europe]]
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{{Tank battles|style=wide}}
{{Authority control}}
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Bulge 1944, Battle Of}}
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