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== Negotiations ==
=== German plans and expectations ===
Germany needed more of an economic alliance for raw materials than the economic partnership that [[German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1939)|the August 19, 1939 agreement provided]].<ref name="ericson61">{{Harvnb|Ericson|1999|p=61}}</ref> At the same time, the Soviet demands for manufactured goods, such as German machines, was increasing while its ability to import those goods decreased because many countries ceased trading relations after the Soviet entry into the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.<ref name="ericson66">{{Harvnb|Ericson|1999|p=66}}</ref> The Soviet Union could offer precious little technology, while Germany possessed the technology the Soviet Union required to build a blue-water fleet.<ref name="philbin82">{{Harvnb|Philbin III|1994|p=82}}</ref> Accordingly, for the six weeks following the Soviet and German invasions of Poland, Germany pressed hard for an additional agreement.<ref name="ericson61"/><ref name="philbin75">{{Harvnb|Philbin III|1994|p=75-6}}</ref>
On September 14 and 15 1939, German foreign minister [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] outlined a program for his negotiations in Moscow.<ref="Rib914">DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1918-1945 SERIES D (1937-1945) VOLUME VIII THE WAR YEARS September 4, 1939-March 18, 1940 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON * 1954</ref> It included attempting to obtain 180 million additional Reichsmarks in raw material and discovering whether the Soviet Union "could and would compensate for the loss in Imports by sea" following the British blockade.<ref="Rib914"/> Ribbentrop foresaw the negotiation as "a test of whether and how far Stalin is prepared to draw practical conclusions from the new political course."<ref="Rib914"/> Ribbentrop concluded that "The raw materials deliveries requested by us can only be carried out, in view of the unsatisfactory domestic supply situation of Russia, at the expense of their own Russian consumption."<ref="Rib914"/>
▲<!-- Hitler's pressing for a German invasion of Poland in 1939 placed tremendous strain on the German war machine, which had been gradually gearing up after the [[Treaty of Versailles]] restrictions for total war in 1942 or 1943.<ref name="ericson63">{{Harvnb|Ericson|1999|p=63-4}}</ref> The German navy was critically short of maritime and military assets and did not achieve full mobilization until 1942.<ref name="philbin130">{{Harvnb|Philbin III|1994|p=130}}</ref> Even Germany's quick victory in Poland strained its 1939 military resources, as Germany possessed only six weeks of munitions supplies and no considerable manpower reserve.<ref name="ericson61">{{Harvnb|Ericson|1999|p=67}}</ref> Germany's lack of raw materials meant that it had to seek increased supply from outside.<ref name="ericson63"/> However, the British blockade left Germany increasingly desperate for materials.<ref name="ericson63"/> The only remaining state capable of supplying Germany with the oil, rubber, manganese, grains, food fats and platinum it needed was the Soviet Union.<ref name="ericson63"/>
▲Germany needed more of an economic alliance for raw materials than the economic partnership that [[German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1939)|the August 19, 1939 agreement provided]].<ref name="ericson61">{{Harvnb|Ericson|1999|p=61}}</ref> At the same time, the Soviet demands for manufactured goods, such as German machines, was increasing while its ability to import those goods decreased because many countries ceased trading relations after the Soviet entry into the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.<ref name="ericson66">{{Harvnb|Ericson|1999|p=66}}</ref> The Soviet Union could offer precious little technology, while Germany possessed the technology the Soviet Union required to build a blue-water fleet.<ref name="philbin82">{{Harvnb|Philbin III|1994|p=82}}</ref> Accordingly, for the six weeks following the Soviet and German invasions of Poland, Germany pressed hard for an additional agreement.<ref name="ericson61"/><ref name="philbin75">{{Harvnb|Philbin III|1994|p=75-6}}</ref>
▲=== After the division of Poland ===
[[Image:Ribbentrop-Molotov.svg|right|thumb|Planned and actual territorial changes in Central Europe 1939–1940]]
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However, following the conclusions of the successful Polish invasions by both countries, German planners estimated that, as feared, they lacked the oil and rubber stockpiles necessary for a western offensive.<ref name="ericson71"/> It had imported 140.8 million Reichsmarks in Polish goods in 1938, and half of that territory was now held by the Soviet Union.<ref name="hehn212">{{Harvnb|Hehn|2005|p=212}}</ref> This included fields amounting to seventy per cent of Poland's oil production.<ref name="ericson71"/> Stalin at the time agreed in vague terms to supply Germany with additional oil equal to that produced by now Soviet-occupied Polish oil fields at [[Drohobych]] and [[Boryslav]] in exchange for hard coal and steel tubing.<ref name="ericson71">{{Harvnb|Ericson|1999|p=71}}</ref>
Within one month, the countries began a regular exchange of goods by rail lines through Poland.<ref name="ericson80">{{Harvnb|Ericson|1999|p=80}}</ref> At the same time, it was already clear that Germany could not meet the 1940 self-sufficiency targets that it had set forth in Hitler's 1936 [[Four Year Plan]].<ref name="wegner99">{{Harvnb|Wegner|1997|p=99-100}}</ref
=== 28th of September 1939 agreement ===
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