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Bugesera invasion

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The Bugesera invasion (French: Invasion de Bugesera)

Background

Rwandan Revolution

Main article: Rwandan Revolution

In January 1961 thousands of Rwandan municipal officials gathered in Gitarama and, acting as a constituent assembly, voted to dissolve the monarchy and replace it with a presidential system. The proposed president then requested that Kayibanda form a new government.[1] In the September 1961 Rwandan parliamentary election, PARMEHUTU won an overwhelming majority of the seats in the Legislative Assembly. Concurrent to the elections was a referendum on the decision to abolish the monarchy; the population voted in favor of abolition.[2] In February 1962 the United Nations brokered a compromise, the New York Accord,[3] in attempt to ensure Rwandan politics remained inclusive. The agreement called for Kayibanda and PARMEHUTU to form a coalition government with UNAR. The accord split UNAR into an accommodationist faction committed to working through the coalition, and a restorationist faction intent on using armed force to attack the new government.[4] On 17 May 1962 Michel Rwagasana, a leader of UNAR's accommodationist faction, declared before the Legislative Assembly that UNAR was committed to working with the Rwandan government. The restorationists were deeply angered by this statement and it resulted in a total fracture in the party.[5]

Rwanda became independent as a republic later that year.[6] The UNAR restorationists formed a government-in-exile, with François Rukeba as Prime Minister.[7] Internal disagreements led to a reforming of the government in May 1963 with Michel Kayihura as Prime Minister and Rukeba retained as Minister of Defence.[7]

Inyenzi

Early UNAR Tutsi insurgent activity was confined to acts of terrorism against specific individuals and families. As more Tutsi refugees fled Rwanda, UNAR's exile ranks grew and more systematic attempts were made to raise bands of combatants to launch raids on targeted areas. Violence in Rwanda dramatically increased as Tutsis fled en masse in early 1960; the first acts of violence were retaliatory attacks by Tutsis against Hutu officials who had mistreated them, but by early 1962 planned raids had become predominant. These were intended to inflict maximum damage to the Hutu-dominated administration and were generally conducted without consideration for government reprisals on local Tutsis.[8] As the insurgents were known to attack at night, the Rwandan government began calling them Inyenzi, meaning "cockroaches". The Chinese government also provided the guerillas with training opportunities and financial support.[9] In February and March 1962 Inyenzi conducted two raids in the prefecture of Biumba, killing several Hutu policemen and civil servants. From 26–27 March the Hutu population of the prefecture retaliated by killing 1,000–2,000 Tutsi civilians, burning their homes, and looting their property.[10] To counter the Inyenzi, Rwandan field a 1,000-strong[11] Garde Nationale Rwandaise (GNR),[12] a force which was relatively poorly equipped and preoccupied with guarding the national borders.[11]

Prelude

The decision to mount a large attack against Rwanda in late 1963 was made by UNAR leaders in Burundi that November. In August communal elections had been held throughout Rwanda, and the campaign revealed significant internal disagreements in PARMEHUTU which allowed UNAR to consolidate its domestic support.[13] In October 1963 Kigeli gave $23,000—a portion of the money he had received from the Chinese government—to Papias Gatwa, his personal secretary, with instructions to pass it on to Rukeba, who was in the Congo at that moment.[14] This money enabled UNAR's exiled leaders to buy arms and ammunition.[13] There were rumours that Gatwa and Rukeba had actually embezzled the money given to them by Kigeli, and that Rukeba had ordered the subsequent attacks into Rwanda to "justify" the use of the funds.[14] [13] The Inyenzi also could rely upon a large amount of small arms seized from a police armoury in Ngara, Tanganyika earlier in the year. By November, Rukeba's headquarters in Bujumbara had also been able to establish effective communications between Tutsi refugee centres in Burundi and Tanzania. Academic René Lemarchand concluded, "if anyone can be said to bear responsibility for the raids that were launched from Burundi, it was Rukeba."[13]

In late November the Inyenzi in Burundi were weakened after Rukeba was arrested by local authorities, who discovered a cache of weapons in his home—purportedly stolen from Congolese rebels—and after the government seized three truckloads of arms near Bujumbura. The first attempt by the Inyenzi in Burundi to invade Rwanda came shortly thereafter on 25 November 1963. Approximately 1,500 refugees from across Burundi mostly armed with spears and bows and arrows, began making the three-day journey towards the Rwandan border. Upon learning of this, United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) Representative in Bujumbura Jacques Cuenod and a group of Protestant missionaries alerted the Burundian government and franticly tried to persuade them to stop the attack. Cuenod pointed out that the GNR was probably waiting at the border for the Inyenzi and would certainly defeat them. After some hesitation, the Burundian government dispatched the gendarmerie to disarm the refugees and return them to their camps. One refugee later told UNCHR worker Francois Preziosi that Rukeba had ordered the attack after a meeting in Bujumbura during which Inyenzi leaders from other countries expressed their opposition. The refugee also stated that Kigeli had reportedly asked Rukeba not to launch any attacks in a letter.[12]

In early December the attitude of the Burundian authorities towards forestalling Inyenzi attacks on Rwandan changed, as a meeting between Rwandan and Burundian delegates in Gisenyi to resolve outstanding issues regarding the dissolution of the Rwanda-Burundi monetary and customs union fell apart due to disagreements. Burundian Vice Prime Minister Pié Masumbuko told a Rwandan official, "Recently we have arrested people who were about to attack you and now you decide to sever economic relations with us. Therefore you do not want collaboration."[15]

Invasion

On 21 December 1963 the Inyenzi initiated a better-coordinated invasion attempt.[12] According to "reliable sources", Inyenzi leaders hoped to orchestrate simultaneous attacks on Rwanda from four different regions: Kabare, Uganda; Ngara, Tanganyika; Goma, Congo; and Ngozi and Kayanza, Burundi.[12] At 04:30 that day 200–300 Inyenzi mostly armed with hand-made rifles, spears and arrows, crossed the Burundian border at Nemba. About an hour later they overran the Rwandan military in camp in Gako, Bugesera.[16] After ladening themselves with captured arms and ammunition, they went to the Tutsi displaced persons camp at Nyamata, where they were joyously received by the locals. According to some observers, the Inyenzi wasted their time by celebrating and drinking alcohol.[17] With their ranks now having grown to over 1,000, the Inyenzi force proceeded towards Kigali. They were stopped twelve miles south of the city at Kanzenze Bridge along the Nyabarongo River by multiple units of the GNR led by Belgian officers and equipped with mortars and semi-automatic weapons. In the ensuing battle the Inyenzi were defeated by the GNR's firepower, with several hundred Tutsis and several Congolese killed. It was reported that on one of the bodies of the Congolese the GNR found the Inyenzi's invasion plans and a list of ministers they wished to install upon overthrowing the government.[18]

From 21–22 December several small raids were launched by Inyenzi operating from Kivu, Congo across the Ruzizi plain towards Cyangugu. The GNR rebuffed them and executed about 90 prisoners. From Uganda, one group of Inyenzi led by Kibiro attempted to reach the Rwandan border but was stopped by the local authorities on 25 December. Two days later about 600 Inyenzi crossed into Rwanda at Kizinga but were almost immediately repelled by the GNR,[16] suffering 300 dead.[19] The survivors were placed in the custody of the Uganda Rifles.[a] The attacks from Tanganyika never occurred.[16]

Repression and atrocities

Purge of politicians

Shortly after the invasion, the Rwandan regime moved to purge moderate Hutu and leading Tutsi politicians.[21][18] Pierre Claver Karyabwite, vice president of the UNAR youth wing, was tipped off by a local official that UNAR's leadership was to be executed. He drove to Nyamirambo, where UNAR was headquartered and where Rwagasana and party president Joseph Rutsindintwarane lived to warn them of the danger. According to Karyabwite, the two refused to flee.[22] About 20 politicians associated with UNAR and RADER were incarcerated—some of them purportedly appeared on the list of the Inyenzis' desired ministers— and soon thereafter they were taken to Ruhengeri and executed[18] on Nyamagumba hill.[21][b] Among those killed were Rutsindintwarane, Rwagasana, as well as RADER president and vice-president Prosper Bwanakweli and Lazare Ndazaro. When asked by Lemarchand why the prisoners were killed in Ruhengeri and not Kigali, a Hutu official stated that Ruhengeri was "the safest spot" for the executions.[18] Most common UNAR sympathisers were arrested but not killed. Four Tutsi Catholic priests were detained for allegedly collaborating with the Inyenzi. The apostolic nuncio personally intervened to prevent the execution of several Bugesera Tutsis accused of helping the exiles.[24]

Killings of Tutsis

In the aftermath of the invasion, Kayibanda hurriedly assigned ministers in his government to each of the ten prefectures—dubbed "emergency regions"—and granted them emergency powers to defend them, including the responsibility of organising Hutu "self-defence" militias.[25] Burgomasters and the prefects were heavily involved in the creation of the militias. Radio Kigali made repeated broadcasts warning the population to be "constantly on the alert" for Tutsi terrorists.[18] Many Hutus feared that the invasion would restore Tutsi rule over Rwanda.[26]

Killings of Tutsis began on 23 December. Hutu militias killed 98 Tutsis in Cyangugu and 100 in Kibungo.[27] Massacres in the prefecture of Gikongoro occurred at the initiative of Prefect André Nkeramugaba.[18] Addressing a meeting of burgomasters and PARMEHUTU activists, he reportedly said, "We are expected to defend ourselves. The only way to go about it is to paralyze the Tutsi. How? They must be killed."[28] The Gikongoro killings began in earnest on 25 December,[27] as Hutus equipped with clubs, spears, and machetes systematically killed about thousands of Tutsis throughout the prefecture.[29][c] Thousands more sought refuge at the Catholic missions in Kaduha and Cyanika.[27] Minister of Agriculture Damien Nkezobera was assigned to Gikongoro and also helped direct the reprisals. At one point he requested that the missionaries in Kaduha and Cyanika to turn over the Tutsis who were hiding in their missions, but the priests refused to accede to his wishes.[30] They requested that the massacres be brought to an end, but the authorities did not stop them until 29 December.[27]

The violence quickly spread to other areas, and included acts of extreme brutality; one missionary reported that a group of Hutus "hacked the breasts off a Tutsi woman, and as she lay dying forced the dismembered parts down the throats of her children, before her eyes."[29] At one village it was reported that 100 Tutsi women and children chose to drown themselves in the Nyabarongo River rather than be murdered by Hutu mobs.[29] Some prefects and PARMEHUTU leaders exploited the situation for political gain; realising that by killing Tutsis they could make land "available" to Hutus, they encouraged the massacres to build their political prospects.[31] Sporadic killings lasted through the first two weeks of January 1964.[27] More Tutsis fled Rwanda to escape the violence.[32]

Aftermath

Death toll

In its first reports on the killings, Radio Rwanda, the state broadcaster, said 750 people had been killed. The Rwandan government later issued a white paper in March 1964 which listed 870 deaths. Lemarchand characterised these figures as "patently inaccurate"[33] and estimated that at least 10,000 Tutsis died in the reprisals.[34] The World Council of Churches suggested that between 10,000–14,000 Tutsis were killed.[34] Estimates of the death toll of civilians in the repression reach as high as 20,000–35,000.[35][19]

Public criticism and national impact

The Rwandan government heavily censored the media to prevent word of the atrocities from spreading. News of the Rwandan reprisals reached the international community about a month and a half after their inception, in February 1964, provoking reactions of surprise and disgust.[33] The British press reported that British nationals visiting Rwanda from Kenya accused the Rwandan government of being "engaged in a deliberate policy of genocide against the country's former rules."[32] An article published in Le Monde on 6 February by British philosopher Bertrand Russel described the situation as a "holocaust...not seen since the extermination of the Jews".[36] On 10 February, Vatican Radio labeled the killings "the most systematic genocide since the genocide of the Jews by Hitler."[29] Catholic Archbishop André Perraudin defended the Rwandan government, saying that the use of the word "genocide" was "deeply insulting for a Catholic head of state."[37] The Catholic Rwandan newspaper, Kinyamateka, also denounced the genocide accusations as "false rumours."[21] Historian Margery Perham advocated for Rwanda's expulsion from the United Nations, saying it had conducted "an appalling breach of the convention on human rights and genocide."[32] Kayibanda's government accused its critics of defamation and pushing neocolonial agendas.[32] In March Kayibanda delivered a speech in which he said of the attacks, "Assuming the impossible, that you eventually take over Kigali, how can you measure the chaos of which you will be the first victims? Understand this: it would be the total and precipitated end of the Tutsi race. Who is genocide?"[35] Burundi was the only state to openly condemn the killings.[38] Burundian Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe attempted to convince the Organisation of African Unity to convene a meeting on the affair, but called Russel's allegations an "inaccurate generalization" and claimed "that while the majority of those being killed were Watutsi, many Wahutu had also been killed because the massacres were directed primarily at the opposition UNAR party".[39]

In January two UN officials in Rwanda resigned from their posts, saying they could not work in a country "which is practicing genocide".[32] In February the head of the Swiss government's technical assistance team in Rwanda, Auguste Lindt, told Kayibanda that Switzerland would terminate its bilateral aid unless the government conducted an investigation into the killings. A commission of inquiry was subsequently established under the leadership of Procureur de la République Tharcisse Gatwa. The commission's findings implicated at least 89 people in the killings, including two ministers and some prefects and burgomasters. Kayibanda rejected the results and ordered a new commission to investigate the killings. It released its conclusions in a white paper in March 1964, resulting in much fewer incriminations. Most of those implicated received light prison sentences and afterwards the matter was effectively dropped by the Rwandan government. Nkeramugaba launched a candidacy for a seat in the Legislative Assembly in 1965 and won an overwhelming majority of the votes in Gikongoro.[31] To protest his actions during the repression, Catholic priest Stany de Jamblinne refused to serve Nkeramugaba communion.[21]

In response to the killings, the United Nations Secretary General dispatched Special Representative Max Dorinsville to Rwanda on two fact-finding missions.[40] He concluded that "these brutal acts were in no sense dictated by the government in Kigali, but rather took place in areas over which the government had little control due to lack of troops. In such areas a popular militia took reprisals on some of the Batutsi populations as a result of the raids of December 20–21 and the fear and panic which they inspired in the Bahutu population."[41] He then sent a letter to Kayibanda, "expressing the hope that his government would do its utmost to clam and pacify ethnic rivalries resulting from the events of December 20–21."[38] No further action was taken by the UN.[38]

Politically, the invasion and subsequent reprisals boosted the popular support of the Rwandan government[38] and heightened the status of the GNR.[32] In turn, UNAR's domestic bases of support were destroyed.[38] By late 1964 UNAR's government-in-exile, undermined by internal disagreement and disorganisation, had mostly ceased to exist.[42] Foreign-based Inyenzi attacks continued until 1966, when they faded due to military failure and government reprisals.[36] Kayibanda's regime imposed ethnic quotas based on proportional representation, thus allowing Tutsis to occupy 9 percent of civil service positions, but they were excluded from the political sphere.[43]

Academic analysis

Lemarchand wrote that it was "not accidental" that most of the killings took place in Gikongoro, as it was a base of Tutsi political opposition to the government.[29] He noted that in October 1961 the Belgian Resident in Rwanda had predicted that a major UNAR attack on the country would provoke the government into committing massive reprisals against Tutsis, and the resident stated that the Tutsi population was generally conscious of this. Lemarchand concluded that the leaders behind the invasion were fanatical in their cause to restore UNAR and the monarchy to power and thus blind to the possible outcomes of their actions.[44] Catholic historian J. J. Carney questioned the validity of the supposed list of the Inyenzi's desired ministers found on the dead Congolese, particularly its inclusion of domestic UNAR and RADER leaders, writing, "It seems more likely that PARMEHUTU fabricated the document and used it as a pretext to eliminate any remaining political rivals...there was no love lost between UNAR exiles and internal UNAR leaders...RADER leaders like Bwanakweli and Ndazaro never developed close relations with their rivals in UNAR."[23]

There is disagreement over whether the reprisals and killings of Tutsis constituted genocide.[32] Lemarchand wrote "it would be...misleading to speak of genocide."[29] According to political scientist Deborah Mayersen, "Despite the many risk factors for genocide...the crisis abated relatively quickly."[11] Carney charcterised the reprisals as a "genocidal event".[37] Historian Timothy J. Stapleton wrote, "In retrospect, the massacres of Tutsi in 1963–1964 would seem to correspond to the international legal definition of genocide; they were intentional and aimed at the extermination of at least part of a group defined along racial lines."[32]

Notes

  1. ^ While the Inyenzi had initially cultivated support in Uganda through Tutsi refugee communities and the sympathies of the government of the subnational Kingdom of Buganda, Ugandan Prime Minister Milton Obote and his government cracked down on their efforts, as he distrusted Buganda authorities and sought to avoid increasing tensions with neighbouring states.[20]
  2. ^ There is disagreement over how soon the Rwandan authorities rounded up the politicians and when they were executed. Catholic historian J. J. Carney wrote that the GNR arrested "hundreds" of Tutsi leaders on 21 and that the politicians were taken to Ruhengeri that evening, put through a secret tribunal overnight—through which over 20 were found guilty of treason, and executed the following day under the alleged instructions of a Belgian military attaché.[23] According to journalist Vincent Gasana, they were arrested on 23 December, taken to Ruhengeri and tortured, and executed the following morning under the supervision of a Belgian major, Turpin.[21] Lemarchand wrote that the politicians were arrested on 23 December and executed at Ruhengeri "less than a week later".[18]
  3. ^ Lemarchand listed 5,000 Tutsis killed in prefecture,[29] whereas historian Timothy J. Stapleton estimated 5,000–8,000 deaths,[19] and Carney estimated 8,000–14,000 deaths.[27]

References

  1. ^ Mamdani 2002, p. 124.
  2. ^ Harroy 1989, p. 475.
  3. ^ Mushemeza 2007, p. 65.
  4. ^ Mamdani 2020, pp. 126–128.
  5. ^ Lemarchand 1970, pp. 202–203.
  6. ^ Mamdani 2002, p. 126.
  7. ^ a b Lemarchand 1970, p. 203.
  8. ^ Lemarchand 1970, p. 217.
  9. ^ Stapleton 2017, pp. 39–40.
  10. ^ Lemarchand 1970, pp. 217, 219.
  11. ^ a b c Rosenberg et al. 2016, p. 287.
  12. ^ a b c d Lemarchand 1970, p. 220.
  13. ^ a b c d Lemarchand 1970, p. 219.
  14. ^ a b Lemarchand 1970, p. 206.
  15. ^ Lemarchand 1970, p. 221.
  16. ^ a b c Lemarchand 1970, p. 222.
  17. ^ Lemarchand 1970, pp. 222–223.
  18. ^ a b c d e f g Lemarchand 1970, p. 223.
  19. ^ a b c Stapleton 2017, p. 40.
  20. ^ Lemarchand 1970, pp. 206–207.
  21. ^ a b c d e Gasana, Vincent (26 December 2018). "The massacre of innocents, Rwanda 1963". The New Times. Retrieved 28 April 2021.
  22. ^ Kimenyi, Felly (31 January 2013). "The life and times of Michel Rwagasana". The New Times. Retrieved 28 April 2021.
  23. ^ a b Carney 2014, pp. 177–178.
  24. ^ Carney 2014, p. 177.
  25. ^ Lemarchand 1970, pp. 223, 225.
  26. ^ Rosenberg et al. 2016, p. 286.
  27. ^ a b c d e f Carney 2014, p. 178.
  28. ^ Lemarchand 1970, pp. 223–224.
  29. ^ a b c d e f g Lemarchand 1970, p. 224.
  30. ^ Lemarchand 1970, pp. 225–226.
  31. ^ a b Lemarchand 1970, p. 226.
  32. ^ a b c d e f g h Stapleton 2017, p. 41.
  33. ^ a b Lemarchand 1970, pp. 224, 226.
  34. ^ a b Lemarchand 1970, p. 216.
  35. ^ a b Kimonyo, Jean-Paul (24 March 2014). "'Qui est génocide?' or 'Who is genocide?'". The New Times. Retrieved 28 April 2021.
  36. ^ a b Waugh 2013, p. 28.
  37. ^ a b Carney, J. J. (7 April 2014). "A brief history of ethnic violence in Rwanda and Africa's Great Lakes region". OUPBlog. Oxford University Press. Retrieved 6 June 2021.
  38. ^ a b c d e Lemarchand 1970, p. 227.
  39. ^ Stapleton 2017, pp. 41–42.
  40. ^ Lemarchand 1970, pp. 225, 227.
  41. ^ Lemarchand 1970, p. 225.
  42. ^ Lemarchand 1970, pp. 204–205.
  43. ^ Stapleton 2017, p. 42.
  44. ^ Lemarchand 1970, pp. 216–217.

Works cited

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