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Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind
How is life related to the mind? The question has long confounded philosophers and scientists, and it is this so-called explanatory gap between biological life and consciousness that Evan Thompson explores in Mind in Life.
Thompson draws upon sources as diverse as molecular biology, evolutionary theory, artificial life, complex systems theory, neuroscience, psychology, Continental Phenomenology, and analytic philosophy to argue that mind and life are more continuous than has previously been accepted, and that current explanations do not adequately address the myriad facets of the biology and phenomenology of mind. Where there is life, Thompson argues, there is mind: life and mind share common principles of self-organization, and the self-organizing features of mind are an enriched version of the self-organizing features of life. Rather than trying to close the explanatory gap, Thompson marshals philosophical and scientific analyses to bring unprecedented insight to the nature of life and consciousness. This synthesis of phenomenology and biology helps make Mind in Life a vital and long-awaited addition to his landmark volume The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (coauthored with Eleanor Rosch and Francisco Varela).
Endlessly interesting and accessible, Mind in Life is a groundbreaking addition to the fields of the theory of the mind, life science, and phenomenology.
568 pages, Hardcover
First published April 30, 2007
About the author
Evan Thompson
22 books110 followersEvan Thompson is a writer and professor of philosophy at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. He works on the nature of the mind, the self, and human experience. His work combines cognitive science, philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and cross-cultural philosophy, especially Asian philosophical traditions. He is the author of Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy (Columbia University Press, 2015); Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (Harvard University Press, 2007); and Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception (Routledge Press, 1995). He is the co-author, with Francisco J. Varela and Eleanor Rosch, of The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (MIT Press, 1991, revised edition 2016). Evan is an Elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.
Evan received his A.B. from Amherst College in 1983 in Asian Studies and his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto in 1990. He was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto from 2005 to 2013, and held a Canada Research Chair in Cognitive Science and the Embodied Mind at York University from 2002 to 2005. In 2014, he was the Numata Invited Visiting Professor at the Center for Buddhist Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He has also held invited visiting appointments at the Faculty of Philosophy, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, the Ecole Polytechnique (Paris), the Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen, and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder.
In 2012 he co-directed, with Christian Coseru and Jay Garfield, the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on Investigating Consciousness: Buddhist and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, and he will again be co-director, with Coseru and Garfield, of the 2018 NEH Summer Institute on Self-Knowledge in Eastern and Western Philosophies.
Evan is currently serving as the Co-Chair of the Steering Council of the Mind and Life Institute and is a member of the Dialogue and Education Working Circle of the Kalein Centre in Nelson, British Columbia.
Evan received his A.B. from Amherst College in 1983 in Asian Studies and his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto in 1990. He was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto from 2005 to 2013, and held a Canada Research Chair in Cognitive Science and the Embodied Mind at York University from 2002 to 2005. In 2014, he was the Numata Invited Visiting Professor at the Center for Buddhist Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He has also held invited visiting appointments at the Faculty of Philosophy, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, the Ecole Polytechnique (Paris), the Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen, and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder.
In 2012 he co-directed, with Christian Coseru and Jay Garfield, the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on Investigating Consciousness: Buddhist and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, and he will again be co-director, with Coseru and Garfield, of the 2018 NEH Summer Institute on Self-Knowledge in Eastern and Western Philosophies.
Evan is currently serving as the Co-Chair of the Steering Council of the Mind and Life Institute and is a member of the Dialogue and Education Working Circle of the Kalein Centre in Nelson, British Columbia.
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Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews
February 19, 2022
This book does a fantastic job at dissolving mind-body dualism in a way that is not only philosophically satisfying, but also scientifically so. In dissolving this dualism, it also succeeds at giving a rigorously naturalistic account of mind that supports phenomenological theories, especially those of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. These philosophers' existential claims about intersubjectivity, emotions, and culture might seem feathery and romantic, but Thompson gives them a new grounding in qualitative mathematical analyses of dynamical systems, as well as in biological accounts of self-organizational dynamical systems. With this grounding, these existential ideas are not romantic at all, but in fact seem necessary to an adequate scientific account of mind.
In brief, in the first half of the book Thompson shows how self-organizational dynamical systems (e.g. a single cell, a multicellular organ, a brain), by its material organization and processes, necessarily entails its own individuality situated against a niche, which is the external domain of all possible interactions given the current structure of its individuality. A self-organizational dynamical system, even in this most basic form, has sense-making capacities; the individual in opposition to its world seeks materials in the world relevant to its inner needs to sustain its organization. By seeking, it enacts meaning into its world. Environmental structures are relevant to the individual's existence and come into the individual's world with significance that guides the individual's behaviors. A bacteria, for example, will swim towards a concentrated area of sucrose molecules because these molecules stand as nourishment, given the bacteria's constitution as a self-organizational dynamical system that requires such nourishment to preserve its identity.
Human brains are much more complex than bacteria, but the overall structure of self-organizational dynamics is shared between the two. The greater complexity gives our cognition more intricate "needs" or structural features that correspond with more various kinds of meaning that environmental structures can take on. Temporality, affect, intersubjectivity, and culture are all primary structural features of human cognition which precede and determine all potential objects and events of the world. Thompson does a fantastic job in the second half of the book providing phenomenological accounts of these features and always grounding them in the scientifically rigorous framework of self-organizational dynamical systems theory.
Besides providing this illuminating naturalized account of existential phenomenology, I think Thompson gives wonderfully clear and thorough explications of major theories in cognitive science, the mathematics and physics of dynamical systems, and phenomenological traditions. I felt a good balance of providing a generous amount technical detail to these explications for understanding his arguments without overwhelming the reader.
I would strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in understanding the fundamental difference between life and inert matter, or the emergence of mind. This book would also be an edifying read for anyone interested in investigating whether current advances in AI could ever amount to a genuine general intelligence (the answer is no).
In brief, in the first half of the book Thompson shows how self-organizational dynamical systems (e.g. a single cell, a multicellular organ, a brain), by its material organization and processes, necessarily entails its own individuality situated against a niche, which is the external domain of all possible interactions given the current structure of its individuality. A self-organizational dynamical system, even in this most basic form, has sense-making capacities; the individual in opposition to its world seeks materials in the world relevant to its inner needs to sustain its organization. By seeking, it enacts meaning into its world. Environmental structures are relevant to the individual's existence and come into the individual's world with significance that guides the individual's behaviors. A bacteria, for example, will swim towards a concentrated area of sucrose molecules because these molecules stand as nourishment, given the bacteria's constitution as a self-organizational dynamical system that requires such nourishment to preserve its identity.
Human brains are much more complex than bacteria, but the overall structure of self-organizational dynamics is shared between the two. The greater complexity gives our cognition more intricate "needs" or structural features that correspond with more various kinds of meaning that environmental structures can take on. Temporality, affect, intersubjectivity, and culture are all primary structural features of human cognition which precede and determine all potential objects and events of the world. Thompson does a fantastic job in the second half of the book providing phenomenological accounts of these features and always grounding them in the scientifically rigorous framework of self-organizational dynamical systems theory.
Besides providing this illuminating naturalized account of existential phenomenology, I think Thompson gives wonderfully clear and thorough explications of major theories in cognitive science, the mathematics and physics of dynamical systems, and phenomenological traditions. I felt a good balance of providing a generous amount technical detail to these explications for understanding his arguments without overwhelming the reader.
I would strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in understanding the fundamental difference between life and inert matter, or the emergence of mind. This book would also be an edifying read for anyone interested in investigating whether current advances in AI could ever amount to a genuine general intelligence (the answer is no).
April 14, 2022
The questions being asked in this fascinating volume are "what kind of entity can be said to be a mental entity" or "what has a mind and what doesn't," but also "where is mind - where does it begin and end?" Evan Thompson sets out to show that living things are synonymous with mental things drawing from molecular biology, evolutionary theory, neuroscience, complex systems theory, psychology, phenomenology, and analytic philosophy.
Following Gregory Bateson, James Gibson, and Francisco Varela before him, Thompson argues that where there is life, there is mind. Minds are not a reflection or representation of a pre-specified, external realm, but rather "enacted or brought forth by a being's autonomous agency and mode of coupling with the environment." This is postmodern biology, the situating of mind, reason, and all products of the mind in bodies, environments, and worlds brought forth in co-construction of organism and environment. This is mind embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended and it is where cognitive science is currently heading. "Enactivism," "enaction," "enact," are the key terms to this embodied mind paradigm in cognitive science in which Evan Thompson is one of the leaders.
Finally we are approaching an understanding that can ground or situate mental phenomena in the living bodies and environments that have always produced them rather than attribute them to disembodied transcendent-metaphysical realms or to see them as equivalent to electronic processing machines. Gone here are the brain-bound views "mind solely inside the head."
If you're interested in learning more about embodied cognition, here's my list on GoodReads: https://www.goodreads.com/list/show/7....
Edited 2-18-22
Following Gregory Bateson, James Gibson, and Francisco Varela before him, Thompson argues that where there is life, there is mind. Minds are not a reflection or representation of a pre-specified, external realm, but rather "enacted or brought forth by a being's autonomous agency and mode of coupling with the environment." This is postmodern biology, the situating of mind, reason, and all products of the mind in bodies, environments, and worlds brought forth in co-construction of organism and environment. This is mind embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended and it is where cognitive science is currently heading. "Enactivism," "enaction," "enact," are the key terms to this embodied mind paradigm in cognitive science in which Evan Thompson is one of the leaders.
Finally we are approaching an understanding that can ground or situate mental phenomena in the living bodies and environments that have always produced them rather than attribute them to disembodied transcendent-metaphysical realms or to see them as equivalent to electronic processing machines. Gone here are the brain-bound views "mind solely inside the head."
If you're interested in learning more about embodied cognition, here's my list on GoodReads: https://www.goodreads.com/list/show/7....
Edited 2-18-22
July 31, 2013
Thompson argues against “genocentrism” and also against those cognitive scientists who overly separate the mind from the body. In the former perspective, life is more or less a passive vehicle, acted upon by forces outside the “self.” Behavior is determined by random mutation and natural selection, and information related to the outside world is encoded genetically. In the latter, the self is isolated from “intersubjectivity” and culture.
In contrast to this implicit determinism, Thompson stresses self-organization and self-determination (“autopoiesis”). Life is engaged in a dialectical relationship with its surroundings and actively uses feedback to adjust its actions so that there is circular causality and interdependence with the world. “Brain, body, and environment” are tightly interconnected at multiple levels,” he says. Life is goal-oriented, teleological. “Concern, want, need, appetition, desire” are “forward-looking,” pushing life outward into the world. “The organism’s ‘concern,’ its ‘natural purpose,’’’ Thompson writes, “is to keep on going, to continue living, to affirm and reaffirm itself in the face of imminent non-being.” Cognition, he argues, is “the exercise of skillful know-how,” which is present at the most elementary level – metabolism – and involves the organism taking an active role to create and maintain itself. “Genocentrism holds that the gene is the fundamental unit of life and the primary unit of selection in evolution,” Thompson writes, but this “genocentric doctrine,” the “received view,” is wrong. Rather, Thompson argues, life forms “propagate from one generation to the next by constructing and reconstructing themselves (like a path laid down in walking),..instead of unfolding according to any transmitted, genetic blueprint or program.” Continuing, Thompson states that, “If one must have a ‘unit’ of evolution, it would be the interactive developmental system.”
Thompson is excellent in describing life as a force in its own right, with a considerable power to ensure its survival and well-being. Life starts with motivation, with emotion (“emovere” means “outward movement;” “Emotion is the welling up of an impulse within that tends toward outward expression and action,” which is something quite different than reflex and reaction). Emotion is need (want/don’t want) and “mind” actively engages the world, seeking to satisfy need. Need prompts action and the environment signals whether that action will work or not. If it does not, the organism has a degree of freedom to modify its behavior as a result.
Where Thompson may go astray is that “autopoiesis” seems to blend into mystery, as some sort of vital life force or “end” that accounts for self-organization. This may have something to do with how one is to understand teleology. Rather than some “end” pulling life in a certain direction, could it be that a certain suite of characteristics came together in certain ways (which natural selection and mutation subsequently refined) to function, necessarily, in the autopoietic ways that Thompson sees? If so, it may not be that much different than what Dawkins and others have argued. Also, in discounting the role of genes, Thompson seems to allow a strong role for the generational transfer of acquired experience along the lines of Lamarck. But, even with increasing evidence for epigenetic influence, the power of genetic influences over the generations is striking and strong. Of the gene-centric position, Thompson says that it’s “informational idolatry and superstition, not science.” That seems harsh. The organism can be seen as more active and open than what the neo-Darwinians put forward without tossing out the fixed role of genes. Instructive, perhaps, is LeDoux who sees two systems at work, at least for fear. One is instinctive and disposes us to act in fixed ways without consciousness; the other is consciousness, which follows our initial disposition and places a context around the situation that allows for corrective actions. The latter complements the former and this feature of being is likely present in varying degrees with life forms other than humans.
Thompson is thoughtful in his argument, but his presentation suffers from heavy jargon (e.g., “protention,” “primordial dynamism,” “embodied dynamism,” “enactive approach”), including the terms taken from phenomenology (e.g., “Husserlian phenomenology,” “experimental neurophenomenology,” “geneticphenomnology,” “generative phenomenology”). Can’t a strong argument be made in simpler English? This book would have benefited significantly by packing all the phenomenology into an appendix or a few footnotes, and concentrating instead on what the (alternative) science says about the organism. Mind in life can be discussed well enough, biologically, without the emphasis Thompson provides with his phenomenological perspective.
In contrast to this implicit determinism, Thompson stresses self-organization and self-determination (“autopoiesis”). Life is engaged in a dialectical relationship with its surroundings and actively uses feedback to adjust its actions so that there is circular causality and interdependence with the world. “Brain, body, and environment” are tightly interconnected at multiple levels,” he says. Life is goal-oriented, teleological. “Concern, want, need, appetition, desire” are “forward-looking,” pushing life outward into the world. “The organism’s ‘concern,’ its ‘natural purpose,’’’ Thompson writes, “is to keep on going, to continue living, to affirm and reaffirm itself in the face of imminent non-being.” Cognition, he argues, is “the exercise of skillful know-how,” which is present at the most elementary level – metabolism – and involves the organism taking an active role to create and maintain itself. “Genocentrism holds that the gene is the fundamental unit of life and the primary unit of selection in evolution,” Thompson writes, but this “genocentric doctrine,” the “received view,” is wrong. Rather, Thompson argues, life forms “propagate from one generation to the next by constructing and reconstructing themselves (like a path laid down in walking),..instead of unfolding according to any transmitted, genetic blueprint or program.” Continuing, Thompson states that, “If one must have a ‘unit’ of evolution, it would be the interactive developmental system.”
Thompson is excellent in describing life as a force in its own right, with a considerable power to ensure its survival and well-being. Life starts with motivation, with emotion (“emovere” means “outward movement;” “Emotion is the welling up of an impulse within that tends toward outward expression and action,” which is something quite different than reflex and reaction). Emotion is need (want/don’t want) and “mind” actively engages the world, seeking to satisfy need. Need prompts action and the environment signals whether that action will work or not. If it does not, the organism has a degree of freedom to modify its behavior as a result.
Where Thompson may go astray is that “autopoiesis” seems to blend into mystery, as some sort of vital life force or “end” that accounts for self-organization. This may have something to do with how one is to understand teleology. Rather than some “end” pulling life in a certain direction, could it be that a certain suite of characteristics came together in certain ways (which natural selection and mutation subsequently refined) to function, necessarily, in the autopoietic ways that Thompson sees? If so, it may not be that much different than what Dawkins and others have argued. Also, in discounting the role of genes, Thompson seems to allow a strong role for the generational transfer of acquired experience along the lines of Lamarck. But, even with increasing evidence for epigenetic influence, the power of genetic influences over the generations is striking and strong. Of the gene-centric position, Thompson says that it’s “informational idolatry and superstition, not science.” That seems harsh. The organism can be seen as more active and open than what the neo-Darwinians put forward without tossing out the fixed role of genes. Instructive, perhaps, is LeDoux who sees two systems at work, at least for fear. One is instinctive and disposes us to act in fixed ways without consciousness; the other is consciousness, which follows our initial disposition and places a context around the situation that allows for corrective actions. The latter complements the former and this feature of being is likely present in varying degrees with life forms other than humans.
Thompson is thoughtful in his argument, but his presentation suffers from heavy jargon (e.g., “protention,” “primordial dynamism,” “embodied dynamism,” “enactive approach”), including the terms taken from phenomenology (e.g., “Husserlian phenomenology,” “experimental neurophenomenology,” “geneticphenomnology,” “generative phenomenology”). Can’t a strong argument be made in simpler English? This book would have benefited significantly by packing all the phenomenology into an appendix or a few footnotes, and concentrating instead on what the (alternative) science says about the organism. Mind in life can be discussed well enough, biologically, without the emphasis Thompson provides with his phenomenological perspective.
April 23, 2018
Excellent book offering detailed accounts of an embodied and enactive mind. Thompson brings to life his theory of autopoeisis and combines it with a dynamical systems view which coupled to our environment, brings mind to life as a coupled experience. Truly revolutionary thought, insights and explanations.
January 10, 2020
I have read a handful of books regarding the study of mind, brain, body and their interactions. This one was unique. It was academic, well structured, comprehensive and ambitious. I can't say I understood it all, but I'm glad that I read it as it exposed me to a comprehensive way of looking at consciousness.
August 1, 2019
Phenomenal book, though difficult, about mind, consciousness and awareness. It covers the philosophical tradition of phenomenology dominant before computers, and the latest in computer-intensive modern neuroscience, with its reliance on MRI and fMRI.
This covers an area that I have studied for years, so I have a background in much of the science, but it was slow reading, though rewarding. I've never had anyone explain phenomenology in an understandable way, indicating that they don't really understand it themselves, but this is clear.
Worth the read, if this is your bailiwick.
This covers an area that I have studied for years, so I have a background in much of the science, but it was slow reading, though rewarding. I've never had anyone explain phenomenology in an understandable way, indicating that they don't really understand it themselves, but this is clear.
Worth the read, if this is your bailiwick.
October 23, 2019
It is almost if Merleau-Ponty had taken his phenomenology and mixed in more biology, you would get this book! A fantastic philosophy of mind/cognitive science book for anyone wanting a book that doesn't just touch on the typical anayltic philosophy of mind topics but also delves into the world of biology/neuroscience and phenomenology!
August 12, 2020
Intellectual Thunderbolt
August 29, 2021
This is a followup to "The Embodied Mind." This book lacks the beauty of Varela's writing, and swings to the highly technical side versus the merely technical side. This increase in technical language is necessary due to the purpose of the book, to try to summarize and integrate enactive cognitive science with phenomenological and other current cognitive/neuroscienctific pursuits. Many of the chapters devote dense arguments against other contemporary positions while articulating the clarifications enactive cognitive science provides. As a psychotherapist, the final chapter on intersubjectivity is my favorite, but wouldn't resonate as much without the buildup from the other chapters.
At the end of the day, even the most analytic of psychotherapists probably would find this book far too technical, but I really enjoyed putting in the effort.
At the end of the day, even the most analytic of psychotherapists probably would find this book far too technical, but I really enjoyed putting in the effort.
July 8, 2014
Fascinating subject, tortuous writing. Admittedly, I don't care for the way systems thinkers present their thoughts. I prefer Neurophilosophy by Patricia Churchland.
January 3, 2024
Good book that grounds phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, emotion, perception in biological science. It shows that phenomenology is perhaps less abstract than some analytical philosophers might suggest.
The first chapters are a good introduction into the metaphysics or science of embodied cognition, the latter work out how this alligns with phenomenological accounts.
For me, the first chapters were the most interesting. There Thompson rejects mind/body dualism by arguing that mind is an emergent property of dynamic autonomous material systems, which are systems that maintain themselves through interaction with their environment, and thereby create/experience their environments on their own sensorimotoric terms. This is true for cellular organisms, but the human body and the brain are shaped in the same logic. We are structurally coupled to our environments, and our nervous system can be seen as the relay system between our sense organs and our effectors. This does not imply an input-processing-output relationship, but rather a dynamic complex interaction between sensing and acting.
This implies that cognitive processes cannot be found somewhere inside the brain (or any local level), but are distributed across the dynamic network of brain, body, and environment.
It is fascinating how phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty were already onto this decades before (some) science would agree with them. For instance, how we experience intersubjectivity (the other as subject) agrees more with an embodied account of dynamic co-emergence then with the traditional representationalist theory of mind explanations.
I am reminded of Varela, who once wrote that our minds are not inside our heads, but our heads are inside our mind.
The first chapters are a good introduction into the metaphysics or science of embodied cognition, the latter work out how this alligns with phenomenological accounts.
For me, the first chapters were the most interesting. There Thompson rejects mind/body dualism by arguing that mind is an emergent property of dynamic autonomous material systems, which are systems that maintain themselves through interaction with their environment, and thereby create/experience their environments on their own sensorimotoric terms. This is true for cellular organisms, but the human body and the brain are shaped in the same logic. We are structurally coupled to our environments, and our nervous system can be seen as the relay system between our sense organs and our effectors. This does not imply an input-processing-output relationship, but rather a dynamic complex interaction between sensing and acting.
This implies that cognitive processes cannot be found somewhere inside the brain (or any local level), but are distributed across the dynamic network of brain, body, and environment.
It is fascinating how phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty were already onto this decades before (some) science would agree with them. For instance, how we experience intersubjectivity (the other as subject) agrees more with an embodied account of dynamic co-emergence then with the traditional representationalist theory of mind explanations.
I am reminded of Varela, who once wrote that our minds are not inside our heads, but our heads are inside our mind.
June 9, 2024
This book promised a lot. It is extensive. The author is well-informed and provides insights into many theories of life, evolution, cognition, and consciousness. But...
Unfortunately, he misinterprets some theories, misses certain important neuroscientific insights, and ignores large parts of contemporary investigations.
a. When discussing dualism and Descartes, in chapter eight, he talks about a dualism of mind and life, while Descartes, who the author refers to, talks about body-mind duality. And so do other authors to whom Thompson refers. It is a huge difference and an elementary mistake.
b) It is impossible to talk about conscious life without considering the difference between precepts and concepts. Thompson does not even mention concepts. One cannot build a theory of consciousness without concepts.
c) It is amazing how talking about enculturation, consciousness, and other stuff that define humans without memes is possible. Should he abandon his devotion to Varella (nothing wrong with Varella) and also check memetic theory, his book would be different, and mistakes a and b would have been avoided.
Unfortunately, he misinterprets some theories, misses certain important neuroscientific insights, and ignores large parts of contemporary investigations.
a. When discussing dualism and Descartes, in chapter eight, he talks about a dualism of mind and life, while Descartes, who the author refers to, talks about body-mind duality. And so do other authors to whom Thompson refers. It is a huge difference and an elementary mistake.
b) It is impossible to talk about conscious life without considering the difference between precepts and concepts. Thompson does not even mention concepts. One cannot build a theory of consciousness without concepts.
c) It is amazing how talking about enculturation, consciousness, and other stuff that define humans without memes is possible. Should he abandon his devotion to Varella (nothing wrong with Varella) and also check memetic theory, his book would be different, and mistakes a and b would have been avoided.
March 11, 2022
A scientific essay against reductionism, selfish gene theory and Dennet's excesses.
What I dislike is that Mr. Thompson relies heavily in phenomenology (a very interesting trend, indeed), but he doesn't really manage well enough with its posibilites. And sometimes, I wondered if the phenomenological comments were reallly necessary to develop Maturama and Varela's insights.
Anyway, Evam Thompson is more accurate than Dennet or Dawkings when giving a precise account of what life is.
What I dislike is that Mr. Thompson relies heavily in phenomenology (a very interesting trend, indeed), but he doesn't really manage well enough with its posibilites. And sometimes, I wondered if the phenomenological comments were reallly necessary to develop Maturama and Varela's insights.
Anyway, Evam Thompson is more accurate than Dennet or Dawkings when giving a precise account of what life is.
April 28, 2020
This is an amazing book for everyone interested in consciousness, biology, dynamic systems, and the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. Very well explained and detailed, but still a philosophy book with big words. Anyone concerned with duality and the explanatory/consciousness gap will be rewarded.
November 9, 2012
Very intense, scholarly work. At times, I was completely lost in analysis of philosophers and philosophies that I thought I knew. A number of times I simply moved on. Can't recommend it more highly, simply because I feel I did not grasp many of the finer points that true students of philosophy probably got on first reading.
Read
August 22, 2009An excellent compilation and review of the latest thinking and literature on phenomenology, consciousness. Possibly panpsychist?
Want to read
April 6, 2010great think on consciousness and embodiment; recommended by John Kowalko
Currently reading
July 24, 2011so far, really great!
Shelved as 'did-not-finish'
January 18, 2013Little bit too academic in tone, couldn't hold my attention, though the subject matter is definitely intriguing.
February 7, 2014
Wide ranging, large in scope, richly supported,rigorous. I was delighted with it and will be likely to refer to it again.
Read
July 18, 2018While not quite informative of the net rate I was still pleasantly informed.
Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews