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The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power
How America's vulnerable frontier allies―and American power―are being targeted by rival nations
From the Baltic to the South China Sea, newly assertive authoritarian states sense an opportunity to resurrect old empires or build new ones at America's expense. Hoping that U.S. decline is real, nations such as Russia, Iran, and China are testing Washington's resolve by targeting vulnerable allies at the frontiers of American power. The Unquiet Frontier explains why the United States needs a new grand strategy that uses strong frontier alliance networks to raise the costs of military aggression in the new century.
Jakub Grygiel and Wess Mitchell describe the aggressive methods rival nations are using to test U.S. power in strategically critical regions throughout the world. They show how rising and revisionist powers are putting pressure on our frontier allies―countries like Poland, Israel, and Taiwan―to gauge our leaders' commitment to upholding the U.S.-led global order. To cope with these dangerous dynamics, nervous U.S. allies are diversifying their national-security "menu cards" by beefing up their militaries or even aligning with their aggressors. Grygiel and Mitchell reveal how numerous would-be great powers use an arsenal of asymmetric techniques to probe and sift American strength across several regions simultaneously, and how rivals and allies alike are learning from America's management of increasingly interlinked global crises to hone effective strategies of their own.
The Unquiet Frontier demonstrates why the United States must strengthen the international order that has provided greater benefits to the world than any in history.
From the Baltic to the South China Sea, newly assertive authoritarian states sense an opportunity to resurrect old empires or build new ones at America's expense. Hoping that U.S. decline is real, nations such as Russia, Iran, and China are testing Washington's resolve by targeting vulnerable allies at the frontiers of American power. The Unquiet Frontier explains why the United States needs a new grand strategy that uses strong frontier alliance networks to raise the costs of military aggression in the new century.
Jakub Grygiel and Wess Mitchell describe the aggressive methods rival nations are using to test U.S. power in strategically critical regions throughout the world. They show how rising and revisionist powers are putting pressure on our frontier allies―countries like Poland, Israel, and Taiwan―to gauge our leaders' commitment to upholding the U.S.-led global order. To cope with these dangerous dynamics, nervous U.S. allies are diversifying their national-security "menu cards" by beefing up their militaries or even aligning with their aggressors. Grygiel and Mitchell reveal how numerous would-be great powers use an arsenal of asymmetric techniques to probe and sift American strength across several regions simultaneously, and how rivals and allies alike are learning from America's management of increasingly interlinked global crises to hone effective strategies of their own.
The Unquiet Frontier demonstrates why the United States must strengthen the international order that has provided greater benefits to the world than any in history.
240 pages, Hardcover
First published February 22, 2016
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
May 24, 2016
This book which notes the U.S.' recent neglect of its networks of alliances. It takes an approach through geopolitics, and it draws from the 20th century theorists, Spykman and Mackinder, but also makes makes extended references to Thucydides.
In short, the United States has to deal with several 'revisionist' powers -China, Russia, and Iran. They don't really have much in common, except for the fact that they do not share many of the same interests as the United States and want to challenge its continued regional pre-eminence. This is accomplished through low-cost 'probing' actions, which test the limits of US capabilities and actions, and serve as the basis for a gradual buildup of military or political influence.
Of course, this is not a relationship between the US and a 'reivisionist' power alone. There are also multiple 'small and midsized' nations. which have to manage their relationship between the two larger powers. For China, that is Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Australia; For Russia, that is Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; for Iran, this means Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar (among others). The United States does not have ties with these countries entirely for sentimental reasons - they occupy some crucial land point, or have strong economic ties with the United States, or are near some crucial strait of water. In the worst case, neglecting the security of these other states leads to their being threatened by the 'revisionist' powers, either through military aggression or economic dependency.
Neglecting these allies would lead to US detriment. Any pennies saved from the closure of bases would be outweighed by global economic instability. Any military deployment, for any reason - even for humanitarian/rescue reasons, would be so much more expensive and slower without basing rights.
Some isolationists within the United States, because of its location and large size, can often make the assumption that it can drop out because we could be self-sufficient. If the US decides no longer guarantee the shipment of oil out of the Persian Gulf, a spike in prices from lack of security (should something bad happen) would torpedo any economic recovery for Western Europe or East Asia, which are more reliant on imports. On a different note, some other governments would act differently without military protection, and some could be more easily cowed. The alliance is itself a deterrent from coercion.
A lot of this book reminds me of the old Cold War policy of containment. I, for one, wonder what happens should the US attempt a return to Nixonian detente. Finding common ground through negotiation with these revisionist powers, and turning them to focus against each other.
All said and done, this is a dense and even-handed criticism about gradual retrenchment and the US' neglecting its allies and partners. What happens if we get a full-blown isolationist? The world wonders.
In short, the United States has to deal with several 'revisionist' powers -China, Russia, and Iran. They don't really have much in common, except for the fact that they do not share many of the same interests as the United States and want to challenge its continued regional pre-eminence. This is accomplished through low-cost 'probing' actions, which test the limits of US capabilities and actions, and serve as the basis for a gradual buildup of military or political influence.
Of course, this is not a relationship between the US and a 'reivisionist' power alone. There are also multiple 'small and midsized' nations. which have to manage their relationship between the two larger powers. For China, that is Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Australia; For Russia, that is Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; for Iran, this means Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar (among others). The United States does not have ties with these countries entirely for sentimental reasons - they occupy some crucial land point, or have strong economic ties with the United States, or are near some crucial strait of water. In the worst case, neglecting the security of these other states leads to their being threatened by the 'revisionist' powers, either through military aggression or economic dependency.
Neglecting these allies would lead to US detriment. Any pennies saved from the closure of bases would be outweighed by global economic instability. Any military deployment, for any reason - even for humanitarian/rescue reasons, would be so much more expensive and slower without basing rights.
Some isolationists within the United States, because of its location and large size, can often make the assumption that it can drop out because we could be self-sufficient. If the US decides no longer guarantee the shipment of oil out of the Persian Gulf, a spike in prices from lack of security (should something bad happen) would torpedo any economic recovery for Western Europe or East Asia, which are more reliant on imports. On a different note, some other governments would act differently without military protection, and some could be more easily cowed. The alliance is itself a deterrent from coercion.
A lot of this book reminds me of the old Cold War policy of containment. I, for one, wonder what happens should the US attempt a return to Nixonian detente. Finding common ground through negotiation with these revisionist powers, and turning them to focus against each other.
All said and done, this is a dense and even-handed criticism about gradual retrenchment and the US' neglecting its allies and partners. What happens if we get a full-blown isolationist? The world wonders.
February 25, 2018
This book suffers from a flawed premise - that America (primarily the Obama Administration) has “deprioritized” its alliances in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia, thereby allowing Russia, Iran and China to probe for weakness there and ultimately destabilize those regions.
The authors describe the goal of seeking global nuclear disarmament as “silly,” and claim that (as of publication in 2016) the “American alliance network is in a state of advanced crisis,” and that “allies see signs of advanced decay in the U.S.” They go on to make the outrageous claim that “American overseas commitments are not needed for the liberal vision.”
Finally, the authors claim that Russia, Iran and China are all locked in “zero-sum relationships” with the U.S., and that American attempts to negotiate with those powers have weakened our own allies.
It is hard to see how this kind of tendentious analysis is helpful to readers attempting to understand American foreign policy. In an interesting twist of fate, both authors now work for the Department of State, so they now have responsibility for trying to manage those “zero-sum relationships.” They also now have front row seats to the great pressure our relationship to NATO has come under due to reckless comments by the current U.S. president, who has questioned the U.S. commitment to the alliance.
The authors describe the goal of seeking global nuclear disarmament as “silly,” and claim that (as of publication in 2016) the “American alliance network is in a state of advanced crisis,” and that “allies see signs of advanced decay in the U.S.” They go on to make the outrageous claim that “American overseas commitments are not needed for the liberal vision.”
Finally, the authors claim that Russia, Iran and China are all locked in “zero-sum relationships” with the U.S., and that American attempts to negotiate with those powers have weakened our own allies.
It is hard to see how this kind of tendentious analysis is helpful to readers attempting to understand American foreign policy. In an interesting twist of fate, both authors now work for the Department of State, so they now have responsibility for trying to manage those “zero-sum relationships.” They also now have front row seats to the great pressure our relationship to NATO has come under due to reckless comments by the current U.S. president, who has questioned the U.S. commitment to the alliance.
May 4, 2024
Despite being published 7 years ago, Grygiel and Mitchell’s emphasis on the importance of U.S. alliances in a renewed era of great power competition rings truer than ever.
Especially prescient is the chapter that outlines the tactic of “probing” by aspiring revisionist actors (Russia, China, Iran). As the authors predicted we’ve seen these dramatically increase in the 2020s, transitioning closer to high intensity conflict as exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s direct attack on Israel.
The book drags a little in Chapters 4-5 as the content is rehashed. And the “recommendations” portion lacks teeth, defaulting to a hollow approach of emphasizing periphery alliances.
Overall, this book is a great reminder of the importance of bilateral and multinational relationships. We should keep these in mind as neo-isolationism and “America First” sentiments gain traction heading into an election year.
Especially prescient is the chapter that outlines the tactic of “probing” by aspiring revisionist actors (Russia, China, Iran). As the authors predicted we’ve seen these dramatically increase in the 2020s, transitioning closer to high intensity conflict as exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s direct attack on Israel.
The book drags a little in Chapters 4-5 as the content is rehashed. And the “recommendations” portion lacks teeth, defaulting to a hollow approach of emphasizing periphery alliances.
Overall, this book is a great reminder of the importance of bilateral and multinational relationships. We should keep these in mind as neo-isolationism and “America First” sentiments gain traction heading into an election year.
September 17, 2019
Ennek a kötetnek a megfizethetetlen értéke, hogy nem értek egyet vele, de nagyon jó érveket hoz fel az igaza mellett. Felettébb meggyőző érveket. Grygiel és Mitchell évekig tartó (és igen részletesen kibontott) kutatásai tulajdonképpen Obama külpolitikai doktrínájának pengeéles kritikájává álltak össze – az előző elnök ugyanis azt vallotta, hogy a világrend tagjai érdekeltté tehetőek a globális egyensúly fenntartásában, egyfajta win-win szituáció kiépítésében, ahol a globalizáció áldásai mindannyiukra háramlanak*. Ehhez pedig nem kell mást tenni, mint engedményeket tenni nekik, például azzal, hogy csökkentjük a katonai jelenlétet határaik közelében, engedékenyek vagyunk velük szemben, és akkor ők ezt majd meg fogják hálálni. Szóval lesz világbéke, örök élet, ingyen sör, meg amit akartok. Számomra is szimpatikus hozzáállás ez. A szerzők szerint viszont lópikulát van így. Merthogy a revizionista hatalmak (konkrétan: Irán, Kína és Oroszország) nem így gondolkodnak. Nekik igenis fontos, hogy átrajzolják a térképet (elég csak Putyin krími kalandját felidézni), mert nem elégszenek meg a jelenlegi világrendben betöltött szerepükkel – új világrendet akarnak kiépíteni, és ez csak a hegemón hatalom kárára lehetséges. A háborút persze nem szívesen kockáztatnák meg, mert tudják, a hegemón hatalom (az USA) jelen pillanatban erősebb náluk, de egyéb eszközeik is vannak. Ezek közül is a legfontosabb a szondázás, vagyis az alacsony kockázatú behatolás az USA hatalmának peremvidékén – ilyen például egy katonai repülőgép demonstratív berepülése idegen légtérbe, vagy félkatonai szervezetek átdobása az ukrán határon. Ezek az események nem válthatnak ki azonnali, durva reakciót, hisz könnyű belőlük visszatáncolni (legrosszabb esetben tagadjuk, hogy bármi közünk lenne hozzá), de remekül le lehet mérni rajtuk a hegemón hatalom elszántságát, hogy mennyire képes kiállni szövetségesei mellett. És a szerzők megállapítják, hogy Amerika ezen a téren egyre gyengébben teljesít, ezzel pedig elbizonytalanítja partnereit. Amivel nem csak az a baj, hogy agresszívebb lépésekre csábíthatja kihívóit (lásd Hitlert és Chamberlaint a harmincas évek végén), vagy végső soron meggyengíti saját erejét szövetségesei várható elpártolásával, hanem számos egyéb másodlagos probléma is felmerülhet – például a magukra hagyott szövetségesek úgy dönthetnek, stratégiai partnerük elbizonytalanodását saját támadó potenciájuk fejlesztésével ellensúlyozzák, ami kontrollálhatatlan fegyverkezési spirált indíthat be. Ráadásul, bár a kivonulás első blikkre költséghatékony** (ennek is köszönheti népszerűségét), valójában nem feltétlenül az, hiszen ha mégis szükségessé válik a beavatkozás, hihetetlenül drágán lehet csak felépíteni újra azt, amit azelőtt viszonylag olcsón birtokoltunk.
Persze ez teljességgel amerikai megközelítés, amit az amerikai dominancia csökkenése miatt érzett aggodalom hívott életre. A független szemlélő tamáskodhat – megkérdezheti például, vajon nem jogosak-e a felemelkedő hatalmak bizonyos igényei? Nem azért indult el az egész konfliktus, mert az USA annak idején megjelent a térségben – és, mint a második Öbölháború esetében, úgy viselkedett, mint egy részeg disznópásztor? És hogy fér össze az USA demokratikus értékeivel, hogy egyes szövetségesei (pl. Szaúd-Arábia) semmivel sem emberségesebb diktatúrák, mint azok, akiktől állítólag megvédené a világrendet? És ezek tényleg fontos kérdések. Csak épp abban nem vagyok biztos, hogy én tudok-e független szemlélő lenni. Magyarként ugyanis pont abban a Baltikumtól a Fekete-tengerig húzódó hatalmi sávban élek, ami az amerikai befolyás egyik peremvidéke, és egyben a legagresszívabb*** revizionista hatalom, Oroszország behatolásának célpontja. És az világosan látszik, hogy éppen mi vagyunk az egyik pont, amin keresztül ez a hatalom megpróbál nyomást gyakorolni az EU-ra (és ezáltal közvetve az USA-ra) – amire kormányunk az úgynevezett „alkalmazkodó” stratégiával reagál (ezt úgy fordíthatnánk le emberi nyelvre, hogy országunk a hátára fekszik, és nyüszögve kéri, hogy Putyin vakarja meg a hasikáját, de azért Merkeltől is elfogadja a jutalomfalatokat). Hogy ez a stratégia hová vezet, azt nem lehet megmondani – mindenesetre ha a politikai rendszerünk is elkezd hasonulni a putyini rendszerhez (vannak erre utaló jelek), akkor az nem lesz egy vidám játszma. Úgyhogy lehet nem szeretni az USA-t (Trumppal vagy anélkül), el lehet ítélni a gazdasági beidegződéseit, nyomásgyakorlási módszereit (sőt! kell is), de a nyakunkba lihegő orosz medvéhez képest szerény véleményem szerint még mindig ők a jobb opció.
(Mondjuk azt nem értem, hogy a címlapon látható mérleg egyik serpenyőjébe az oroszokat és a kínaiakat szimbolizáló súlyocskák mellé miért egy EU-s zászló került iráni helyett…)
* Ez az alapvetően demokrata krédó érdekes módon találkozik egyes izolacionizmus-hívő republikánusok elképzeléseivel – ugyanis mindkét csoport amellett kardoskodik, hogy Amerikának csökkentenie kell a világban katonai jelenlétét.
** Legalábbis az USA számára. A faképnél hagyott szövetséges viszont kénytelen lesz akár drasztikusan is megnövelni katonai kiadásait. És itt felmerülhet a kérdés, hogy vajon a japán, a dél-koreai vagy a nyugat-német gazdasági csoda bekövetkezett volna-e, ha az ott állomásozó amerikai haderő nem teszi feleslegessé, hogy az említett államok a fegyverkezésre fordítsák bevételeik jelentős részét.
*** Agresszív, mert az idő nem neki dolgozik. Az oroszok hatalma folyamatosan csökkenő tendenciát mutat, aminek gazdasági és demográfiai okai is vannak. Ráadásul ha az amerikai palagáz-termelés (illetve az EU átállása megújuló energiákra) olyan ütemben folytatódik, ahogy azt prognosztizálják, lassan csak korlátozott lehetősége lesz az energiahordozók megvonásával zsarolni ellenfeleit. Úgyhogy addig kell ütnie a vasat, amíg meleg.
Persze ez teljességgel amerikai megközelítés, amit az amerikai dominancia csökkenése miatt érzett aggodalom hívott életre. A független szemlélő tamáskodhat – megkérdezheti például, vajon nem jogosak-e a felemelkedő hatalmak bizonyos igényei? Nem azért indult el az egész konfliktus, mert az USA annak idején megjelent a térségben – és, mint a második Öbölháború esetében, úgy viselkedett, mint egy részeg disznópásztor? És hogy fér össze az USA demokratikus értékeivel, hogy egyes szövetségesei (pl. Szaúd-Arábia) semmivel sem emberségesebb diktatúrák, mint azok, akiktől állítólag megvédené a világrendet? És ezek tényleg fontos kérdések. Csak épp abban nem vagyok biztos, hogy én tudok-e független szemlélő lenni. Magyarként ugyanis pont abban a Baltikumtól a Fekete-tengerig húzódó hatalmi sávban élek, ami az amerikai befolyás egyik peremvidéke, és egyben a legagresszívabb*** revizionista hatalom, Oroszország behatolásának célpontja. És az világosan látszik, hogy éppen mi vagyunk az egyik pont, amin keresztül ez a hatalom megpróbál nyomást gyakorolni az EU-ra (és ezáltal közvetve az USA-ra) – amire kormányunk az úgynevezett „alkalmazkodó” stratégiával reagál (ezt úgy fordíthatnánk le emberi nyelvre, hogy országunk a hátára fekszik, és nyüszögve kéri, hogy Putyin vakarja meg a hasikáját, de azért Merkeltől is elfogadja a jutalomfalatokat). Hogy ez a stratégia hová vezet, azt nem lehet megmondani – mindenesetre ha a politikai rendszerünk is elkezd hasonulni a putyini rendszerhez (vannak erre utaló jelek), akkor az nem lesz egy vidám játszma. Úgyhogy lehet nem szeretni az USA-t (Trumppal vagy anélkül), el lehet ítélni a gazdasági beidegződéseit, nyomásgyakorlási módszereit (sőt! kell is), de a nyakunkba lihegő orosz medvéhez képest szerény véleményem szerint még mindig ők a jobb opció.
(Mondjuk azt nem értem, hogy a címlapon látható mérleg egyik serpenyőjébe az oroszokat és a kínaiakat szimbolizáló súlyocskák mellé miért egy EU-s zászló került iráni helyett…)
* Ez az alapvetően demokrata krédó érdekes módon találkozik egyes izolacionizmus-hívő republikánusok elképzeléseivel – ugyanis mindkét csoport amellett kardoskodik, hogy Amerikának csökkentenie kell a világban katonai jelenlétét.
** Legalábbis az USA számára. A faképnél hagyott szövetséges viszont kénytelen lesz akár drasztikusan is megnövelni katonai kiadásait. És itt felmerülhet a kérdés, hogy vajon a japán, a dél-koreai vagy a nyugat-német gazdasági csoda bekövetkezett volna-e, ha az ott állomásozó amerikai haderő nem teszi feleslegessé, hogy az említett államok a fegyverkezésre fordítsák bevételeik jelentős részét.
*** Agresszív, mert az idő nem neki dolgozik. Az oroszok hatalma folyamatosan csökkenő tendenciát mutat, aminek gazdasági és demográfiai okai is vannak. Ráadásul ha az amerikai palagáz-termelés (illetve az EU átállása megújuló energiákra) olyan ütemben folytatódik, ahogy azt prognosztizálják, lassan csak korlátozott lehetősége lesz az energiahordozók megvonásával zsarolni ellenfeleit. Úgyhogy addig kell ütnie a vasat, amíg meleg.
January 8, 2019
Extrem de repetitivă și, prin consecință, arareori punctuală, ”Frontiera Neliniștită” prezintă perioada pre-Trump din punctul de vedere geopolitic al SUA, al intereselor lor atât regionale cât și globale. Argumentele sunt puternice și scăldate în realism. Totuși, trebuie să remarc faptul că administrația Trump lucrează, întrucâtva la implementarea câtorva dintre propunerile prezente în carte. Nu atribui autorilor acest merit, ci atribui veridicitate analizei destul de rece făcute de autori.
O lectură bună când vine vorba de geopolitică, dar care ar fi putut fi restrânsă la jumătate din spațiul dedicat și ar fi putut include mult mai mult exemple punctuale.
O lectură bună când vine vorba de geopolitică, dar care ar fi putut fi restrânsă la jumătate din spațiul dedicat și ar fi putut include mult mai mult exemple punctuale.
February 14, 2018
A nice primer on current international relations and the challenges that the United States is facing, and is likely to face, in the coming decades. The book is a cautionary tale against disengagement and isolationism and the importance of maintaining alliances. The discussion of probing by revisionist powers (i.e., Russia, China, and Iran) was very timely in light of activity in the Ukraine and Baltics by Russia, the South China Sea by China, and Syria and Yemen by Iran. I would strongly suggest the book to those interested in international relations.
October 23, 2018
Great read to help us reset our understanding and context for great power conflict and competition coming out of an era of strategic atrophy. A bit light on examples at the start, but it got better in the last half. Seems like the authors could have made their points in about 100 pages, but not saying the whole book was not worth reading, it definitely was. This should be a primer for new strategic thinkers and a refresher for old hands.
July 30, 2022
Excelente libro de geopolítica
Excelente libro que explica con gran claridad la necesidad de los Estados Unidos, como nación "insular", tener una activa presencia en Eurasia a través de la conformación de una red de alianzas, con características específicas que respondan a los requerimientos de cada país en relación a la influencia que ejercen las potencias emergentes.
Excelente libro que explica con gran claridad la necesidad de los Estados Unidos, como nación "insular", tener una activa presencia en Eurasia a través de la conformación de una red de alianzas, con características específicas que respondan a los requerimientos de cada país en relación a la influencia que ejercen las potencias emergentes.
July 13, 2018
Our adversaries have been continually probing our defenses for the last 20 years. We haven't responded appropriately. Our political atmosphere is one where we think alliances are not needed. We couldn't be any more wrong.
May 11, 2020
TL/DR version: The US should
1. Continue to maintain alliances in a post-Breton Woods world
2. Place more emphasis on our alliances that are most in danger from revanchist powers
3. Rather than ask our allies with modest means to assist in the global operations, empower them to maintain order in their backyard, and restructure FMS to emphasize this ( JLTVs and OA-Xs instead of M1s and F35s)
1. Continue to maintain alliances in a post-Breton Woods world
2. Place more emphasis on our alliances that are most in danger from revanchist powers
3. Rather than ask our allies with modest means to assist in the global operations, empower them to maintain order in their backyard, and restructure FMS to emphasize this ( JLTVs and OA-Xs instead of M1s and F35s)
February 16, 2018
An interesting look at the future of American power in a world where revisionist powers have been emboldened to chip away at the frontiers.
May 3, 2018
Excellent book summarizing the current political and military climate.
May 23, 2018
First 3 pages gets the point across, I recommend reading the book description and your good.
December 15, 2018
A well laid out argument for maintaining our alliances in the face of rising rivals.
November 21, 2019
Very knowledgeable.
I recommend this book to anyone who thinks deeply about U.S. relations with the world. I wish Trump would read it.
I recommend this book to anyone who thinks deeply about U.S. relations with the world. I wish Trump would read it.
August 12, 2022
Good read. Recommended by bunch of serious guys and scholars.
July 7, 2018
This book is an evaluation and recommendation for the US alliances and partnerships across the globe. Focusing on the probing efforts of Iran, Russia and China; the authors define probing and use historical examples of alliances that worked, those that failed, and those that were dropped because of costs. History has shown repeatedly that broken alliances are more costly to renegotiate and even more costly when the larger power tries to go it alone.
Why I started this book: This month, my goal is to listen to everything that I have already downloaded to my phone. It's a random selection of professional titles and sale books.
Why I finished it: Fascinating to see the historical parallels between Great Britian's alliances from 1500s-1900s and America's current political choices. This book was a very military-centric argument for diplomacy. And it was depressing as it was written during Obama's tenure... before the great Orange wrecker. The last couple of books that I grabbed have been about the importance of diplomacy and alliances. Here's looking at you War on Peace: The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence. I had no intention of scaring myself like this... Time to read something cheerful and completely make-believe.
Why I started this book: This month, my goal is to listen to everything that I have already downloaded to my phone. It's a random selection of professional titles and sale books.
Why I finished it: Fascinating to see the historical parallels between Great Britian's alliances from 1500s-1900s and America's current political choices. This book was a very military-centric argument for diplomacy. And it was depressing as it was written during Obama's tenure... before the great Orange wrecker. The last couple of books that I grabbed have been about the importance of diplomacy and alliances. Here's looking at you War on Peace: The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence. I had no intention of scaring myself like this... Time to read something cheerful and completely make-believe.
September 10, 2016
4.5 stars. I've been waiting to read this for several months. Recent travel gave me the opportunity I was looking for. Eminently timely and relevant as the U.S. faces presidential and congressional elections. Grygiel's and Mitchell's book analyzes the extrinsic value of the U.S.'s global array of alliances in deterring revisionist powers bent on undoing the international security and economic orders that have been the foundation of seven decades of relative progress and stability. The authors offer that now is the time to shore up U.S. credibility and reinvest in the security of and relationships with our smaller, but strategic allies that rim Russia, China, and Iran. They provide concrete policy recommendations for political and military leaders in both America and in the countries of our allies and partners (who make up the "unquiet frontier" of America's rivals).
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