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Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations
Physicalism is a program for building a unified system of knowledge about the world on the basis of the view that everything is a manifestation of the physical aspects of existence. Jeffrey Poland presents a systematic and comprehensive exploration of the philosophical foundations of this program. He investigates the core ideas, motivating values, and presuppositions of physicalism; the constraints upon an adequate formulation of physicalist doctrine; the epistemological and modal status, the scope, and the methodological roles of physicalist principles. He reviews and evaluates major objections to the program, and considers its significance for philosophy, science, society, and individual persons. He also examines the relations between physicalism and other philosophical positions, such as realism, empiricism, and relativism, and suggests that physicalism is compatible with a tolerant pluralism in the philosophical, cultural, and personal domains.
- GenresPhilosophy
392 pages, Hardcover
First published March 10, 1994
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April 4, 2018
It remains rare to come across a work defending physicalism in a cautious, and modest fashion which doesn't assume that the prevalence of the doctrine rests on its obviousness in light of scientific developments. Poland's book offers precisely that, and I must admit that while being generally dismissive of the doctrine myself, I was quite pleased with and occasionally tested by the quality of the argumentation found here. Of course, as much of contemporary philosophical literature demands, detailed case-studies of science are almost entirely absent. For a book discussing physicalism and the prospects of at least a mild form of ontological, vertical unity of nature I consider this to be quite unacceptable. Secondly, and despite a noble final chapter, the fact that this is another defence of physicalism that completely neglects the historical components of the doctrine further adds to the detachment of philosophy from the rest of culture. This is perhaps another sad testament to the specialisation and fragmentation of the discipline.
Despite these clear worries, I think that Poland's book deserves 3/5 stars for the main reason that it consists of an exhaustive examination of almost all contemporary issues in the physicalist literature. Poland's positive argument is a structural defence of physicalism, which helps circumvent Hempel's dilemma, and, thus, detach the doctrine from the identification of the concept of the physical with the content of a current, or future physics. Subsequently, Poland's physicalism simply demands that some form of ontological privilege must be given to physics, defined in minimalistic ontological terms (the study of composition and dynamics within a spatio-temporal causal structure), where the predicates of all other disciplines are ultimately realised (again, a rather open attribute which enables numerous explanatory relations to obtain) by a number of fundamental physical predicates. Within such picture, Poland even allows, albeit after serious theoretical considerations, the possibility of downward-integration of currently higher-level predicates to the predicates of physics. It should be clear that Poland's book clearly anticipates (the book was published in 1994) contemporary grounding conceptions of physicalism which abstract from the details of the empirical sciences and emphasise structure.
I am still not convinced by Poland's structural account, despite its potential advantages and obvious insights. My main problem is that, despite its initially harmless nature, the structural account can reinforce the system-building aspirations of metaphysicians, seriously constraining empirical and philosophical developments. Certainly, the fact that Poland's book -- despite Poland's other work in the philosophy of psychology -- rarely discusses the history and actual practice of scientists is a clear indicator of a step towards such dire direction. Inevitably, if history is to be our guide in these matters, a detachment of philosophy from the rest of inquiry will lead to further metaphysical extravaganza. Perhaps, much of the recent relevant literature suggests that such extravaganza is already upon us. In fact, I think one ought to write a proper sequel titled Physicalism: The Historical and Scientific Foundations in the hope of avoiding, or alleviating the present (sad) state of affairs.
Despite these clear worries, I think that Poland's book deserves 3/5 stars for the main reason that it consists of an exhaustive examination of almost all contemporary issues in the physicalist literature. Poland's positive argument is a structural defence of physicalism, which helps circumvent Hempel's dilemma, and, thus, detach the doctrine from the identification of the concept of the physical with the content of a current, or future physics. Subsequently, Poland's physicalism simply demands that some form of ontological privilege must be given to physics, defined in minimalistic ontological terms (the study of composition and dynamics within a spatio-temporal causal structure), where the predicates of all other disciplines are ultimately realised (again, a rather open attribute which enables numerous explanatory relations to obtain) by a number of fundamental physical predicates. Within such picture, Poland even allows, albeit after serious theoretical considerations, the possibility of downward-integration of currently higher-level predicates to the predicates of physics. It should be clear that Poland's book clearly anticipates (the book was published in 1994) contemporary grounding conceptions of physicalism which abstract from the details of the empirical sciences and emphasise structure.
I am still not convinced by Poland's structural account, despite its potential advantages and obvious insights. My main problem is that, despite its initially harmless nature, the structural account can reinforce the system-building aspirations of metaphysicians, seriously constraining empirical and philosophical developments. Certainly, the fact that Poland's book -- despite Poland's other work in the philosophy of psychology -- rarely discusses the history and actual practice of scientists is a clear indicator of a step towards such dire direction. Inevitably, if history is to be our guide in these matters, a detachment of philosophy from the rest of inquiry will lead to further metaphysical extravaganza. Perhaps, much of the recent relevant literature suggests that such extravaganza is already upon us. In fact, I think one ought to write a proper sequel titled Physicalism: The Historical and Scientific Foundations in the hope of avoiding, or alleviating the present (sad) state of affairs.
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