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The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan
The Soviet war in Afghanistan was a grueling debacle that has striking lessons for the twenty-first century. In The Great Gamble, Gregory Feifer examines the conflict from the perspective of the soldiers on the ground. During the last years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union sent some of its most elite troops to unfamiliar lands in Central Asia to fight a vaguely defined enemy, which eventually defeated their superior numbers with unconventional tactics. Although the Soviet leadership initially saw the invasion as a victory, many Russian soldiers came to view the war as a demoralizing and devastating defeat, the consequences of which had a substantial impact on the Soviet Union and its collapse.
Feifer's extensive research includes eye-opening interviews with participants from both sides of the conflict. In gripping detail, he vividly depicts the invasion of a volatile country that no power has ever successfully conquered. Parallels between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq are impossible to ignore both conflicts were waged amid vague ideological rhetoric about freedom. Both were roundly condemned by the outside world for trying to impose their favored forms of government on countries with very different ways of life. And both seem destined to end on uncertain terms.
A groundbreaking account seen through the eyes of the men who fought it, The Great Gamble tells an unforgettable story full of drama, action, and political intrigue whose relevance in our own time is greater than ever.
326 pages, Hardcover
First published January 6, 2009
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April 22, 2023
“Soviet critics of [the decision to invade Afghanistan] could hardly believe the Kremlin’s refusal to remember the reasons for the American failure in Vietnam, a conflict Moscow itself had helped protract. But the Soviet leadership indeed ignored the lessons in its certainty that a quick invasion to prop up a friendly regime would not only increase its influence in Afghanistan but also send a message to all continents that Moscow remained a vital world power…The actual result was virtually opposite. The Red Army found itself pushed by circumstances and events it had failed to foresee into a brutal struggle against a population that refused to tolerate invaders no matter how friendly they declared themselves to be. The Brezhnev regime’s great gamble brought devastating consequences on an epic scale. While the official figure of Soviet war deaths is around 15,000, the real number is believed to be far higher, perhaps even as high as the 75,000 cited by many veterans. Conservative estimates put Afghan deaths at 1.25 million, or 9 percent of the population…”
- Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan
In many ways, the Soviet-Afghan War mimicked the American catastrophe in Vietnam. Both were fought in the context of the larger Cold War, and both involved a superpower attempting to prop up an unpopular government. Both consisted of innumerable small-unit and guerilla actions, and both lasted a very long time. Both were incredibly costly in lives, especially to those who lived there. Both wars saw the opposite superpower pumping money and weapons into the fight. Both wars left the invading soldiers with a lingering sense of deep moral injury.
There were many differences of course, in geography and geopolitics and tactics. One of the main differences is that the United States managed to keep limping forward after Vietnam, while the Soviet Union came apart.
Another big difference is that there are countless great books on the wars of Vietnam available for purchase in the English language. The same cannot be said for the Soviet-Afghan War.
This is all a way of saying that I picked up Gregory Feifer’s The Great Gamble as an expedient, having found nothing better. While it has its value – especially in the firsthand accounts Feifer has gathered – by and large it is a forgettable volume on what should be an unforgettable subject.
***
In the nonfiction history genre, I believe that the number of pages in a book says a lot about the book itself. The Great Gamble is less than 300 pages of text, all to cover a war that lasted over nine years. That is a lot of material to summarize, and even if done exceptionally well, the coverage will be inherently superficial.
That turned out to be the case here.
The Great Gamble opens with a mile-high overview of the origins and outbreak of the Soviet-Afghan War. In a series of quick chapters, Feifer briskly leads us through the failures of the pro-Soviet government of Nur Mohammad Taraki; the decision of the Soviet leadership – including an ailing Leonid Brezhnev – to deploy the 40th Army to support their Afghan client; the eventual Soviet assassination of Taraki, in a rather brutal coup; and the installation of Babrak Karmal as the new leader.
There is nothing glaringly wrong with this presentation. It is easy to follow, it lays out the context in an uncluttered fashion, and it tells you what you need to know.
It also fails to add anything you couldn’t get by reading the Wikipedia page. When I open a history book, I don’t want the bullet points. If I did, I wouldn’t shell out for a hardcover. I want to be immersed in the situation. I want to meet the people involved and get to know them. I want to understand their decisions as they understood them.
The Great Gamble’s opening is simply an elongated encyclopedia entry.
***
Interestingly, once the war starts, Feifer’s style does a one-eighty. He leaves behind the high-level, strategic overview, and dives down into the front lines to deliver what is – in essence – a series of unconnected war stories. He introduces us to a bunch of Russian soldiers – men who he interviewed at length – and then has us follow them throughout the years as they engage in combat, suffer wounds, receive promotions, and ultimately head back home to a country that cares little for their sacrifices.
Though it’s not what I wanted, it’s effective storytelling. Feifer clearly went to a great deal of effort to find these veterans and learn what they had to say. Their accounts are especially meaningful now, since current events – this was published back in 2009 – make any such open east-west exchanges quite unlikely in the foreseeable future.
By focusing on these participants, Feifer definitely achieves a bracing kind of intimacy. We see these men in battle and in camp; we are with them as they endure harsh terrain, extreme weather, poor food, and insufficient equipment. Obviously, the Russians who agreed to speak with Feifer are a self-selected group, willing to eschew nationalist defensiveness and ideological rigidity to make some frank admissions about the Soviet conduct of the war, including the killing and wounding of noncombatants.
At the time he wrote this, Feifer was NPR’s Moscow correspondent. This explains why The Great Gamble is told mostly through former-Soviet eyes. Still, Feifer does try to include Afghan voices and perspectives, and to limn the tangled loyalties of Afghanistan’s inhabitants, who managed to successfully backburner ancient enmities – for a while, at least – to tackle the Red Army. If it’s not quite enough, that’s the trouble with The Great Gamble in general: it’s trying to cram too much into too few pages.
***
The Great Gamble doesn’t quite seem to know what it wants to be. Part of it tries to meaningfully outline an aggressively complicated and widespread war, which lasted almost a decade, and took place within a larger, just-as-complicated global struggle. Another part of it tries to be a grunt’s on-the-ground view of a nasty conflict, which is an entirely different approach.
It's possible to do both, I believe. Just not in the space provided.
- Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan
In many ways, the Soviet-Afghan War mimicked the American catastrophe in Vietnam. Both were fought in the context of the larger Cold War, and both involved a superpower attempting to prop up an unpopular government. Both consisted of innumerable small-unit and guerilla actions, and both lasted a very long time. Both were incredibly costly in lives, especially to those who lived there. Both wars saw the opposite superpower pumping money and weapons into the fight. Both wars left the invading soldiers with a lingering sense of deep moral injury.
There were many differences of course, in geography and geopolitics and tactics. One of the main differences is that the United States managed to keep limping forward after Vietnam, while the Soviet Union came apart.
Another big difference is that there are countless great books on the wars of Vietnam available for purchase in the English language. The same cannot be said for the Soviet-Afghan War.
This is all a way of saying that I picked up Gregory Feifer’s The Great Gamble as an expedient, having found nothing better. While it has its value – especially in the firsthand accounts Feifer has gathered – by and large it is a forgettable volume on what should be an unforgettable subject.
***
In the nonfiction history genre, I believe that the number of pages in a book says a lot about the book itself. The Great Gamble is less than 300 pages of text, all to cover a war that lasted over nine years. That is a lot of material to summarize, and even if done exceptionally well, the coverage will be inherently superficial.
That turned out to be the case here.
The Great Gamble opens with a mile-high overview of the origins and outbreak of the Soviet-Afghan War. In a series of quick chapters, Feifer briskly leads us through the failures of the pro-Soviet government of Nur Mohammad Taraki; the decision of the Soviet leadership – including an ailing Leonid Brezhnev – to deploy the 40th Army to support their Afghan client; the eventual Soviet assassination of Taraki, in a rather brutal coup; and the installation of Babrak Karmal as the new leader.
There is nothing glaringly wrong with this presentation. It is easy to follow, it lays out the context in an uncluttered fashion, and it tells you what you need to know.
It also fails to add anything you couldn’t get by reading the Wikipedia page. When I open a history book, I don’t want the bullet points. If I did, I wouldn’t shell out for a hardcover. I want to be immersed in the situation. I want to meet the people involved and get to know them. I want to understand their decisions as they understood them.
The Great Gamble’s opening is simply an elongated encyclopedia entry.
***
Interestingly, once the war starts, Feifer’s style does a one-eighty. He leaves behind the high-level, strategic overview, and dives down into the front lines to deliver what is – in essence – a series of unconnected war stories. He introduces us to a bunch of Russian soldiers – men who he interviewed at length – and then has us follow them throughout the years as they engage in combat, suffer wounds, receive promotions, and ultimately head back home to a country that cares little for their sacrifices.
Though it’s not what I wanted, it’s effective storytelling. Feifer clearly went to a great deal of effort to find these veterans and learn what they had to say. Their accounts are especially meaningful now, since current events – this was published back in 2009 – make any such open east-west exchanges quite unlikely in the foreseeable future.
By focusing on these participants, Feifer definitely achieves a bracing kind of intimacy. We see these men in battle and in camp; we are with them as they endure harsh terrain, extreme weather, poor food, and insufficient equipment. Obviously, the Russians who agreed to speak with Feifer are a self-selected group, willing to eschew nationalist defensiveness and ideological rigidity to make some frank admissions about the Soviet conduct of the war, including the killing and wounding of noncombatants.
At the time he wrote this, Feifer was NPR’s Moscow correspondent. This explains why The Great Gamble is told mostly through former-Soviet eyes. Still, Feifer does try to include Afghan voices and perspectives, and to limn the tangled loyalties of Afghanistan’s inhabitants, who managed to successfully backburner ancient enmities – for a while, at least – to tackle the Red Army. If it’s not quite enough, that’s the trouble with The Great Gamble in general: it’s trying to cram too much into too few pages.
***
The Great Gamble doesn’t quite seem to know what it wants to be. Part of it tries to meaningfully outline an aggressively complicated and widespread war, which lasted almost a decade, and took place within a larger, just-as-complicated global struggle. Another part of it tries to be a grunt’s on-the-ground view of a nasty conflict, which is an entirely different approach.
It's possible to do both, I believe. Just not in the space provided.
June 3, 2021
This was a very good historical account on the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Focuses on the military, various Afghan figures, and the aftermath of both Afghanistan and the bankrupt Soviet Union. This overall is a better book on the subject than other books I've read. Thanks!
October 24, 2012
A very vivid account of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Obviously they knew very little of this poor and primitive country prior to sending their troops in. Afghanistan was and is still today a collection of tribal warlords vying for control of their territory.
What is surprising is how ill-fed and badly clothed the Soviet troops were. They would raid and steal food and clothing from the Afghans. They were also insufficiently paid. They would even sell their own munitions to the Afghans. It is unclear to this day how many Soviet troops were killed in Afghanistan.
It also exposes the canard that U.S. aid was instrumental in the Soviet collapse. It was the Mujahideen warrior, followed by thousands of Arab jihadis in the mid-eighties who were doing the fighting. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia gave far more direct aid than the U.S.
There are obviously many parallels with the U.S. invasion of Iraq – particularly deceit and an inability to end a war, and more importantly an inability to spread democracy or communism to a country ill-suited to the modern world.
When the Soviets pulled out, Afghanistan was left with very little – most of its basic infrastructure was shattered – roads, schools, farms… The warlords started fighting each other. The Afghan war imploded in New York on September 11,2001.
What is surprising is how ill-fed and badly clothed the Soviet troops were. They would raid and steal food and clothing from the Afghans. They were also insufficiently paid. They would even sell their own munitions to the Afghans. It is unclear to this day how many Soviet troops were killed in Afghanistan.
It also exposes the canard that U.S. aid was instrumental in the Soviet collapse. It was the Mujahideen warrior, followed by thousands of Arab jihadis in the mid-eighties who were doing the fighting. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia gave far more direct aid than the U.S.
There are obviously many parallels with the U.S. invasion of Iraq – particularly deceit and an inability to end a war, and more importantly an inability to spread democracy or communism to a country ill-suited to the modern world.
When the Soviets pulled out, Afghanistan was left with very little – most of its basic infrastructure was shattered – roads, schools, farms… The warlords started fighting each other. The Afghan war imploded in New York on September 11,2001.
March 27, 2017
Its impossible to read this book and not see similarities in our own invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. This book in its own right and its own subject matter is an incredibly informative and easy to read book on the Soviet involvement, invasion, and occupation of Afghanistan. The book flows excellently from each subject and transitions easily from political, world, and individual accounts. Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it, and sadly it would appear that those who orchestrated the Coalition invasion of Afghanistan didnt bother to read up on their Soviet history.
March 14, 2009
A solid history of the subject, focusing on the experiences of individual Soviet soldiers and some mujahedin leaders, while painting in the background of the larger cultural and political/economic events in both Afghanistan and the USSR. Gregory Feifer also provides an excellent overview of the past invasions of Afghanistan and their outcomes back to the Persian Empire, along with the involvement of the US and other countries in support of the mujahedin either to create the worst possible problem for the Soviets or to support fellow Moslems being oppressed by the Soviets and the homegrown communist government they sponsored.
The story is a warning to American leaders about some of the dangers to the success of their own war in that country. Mr. Feifer notes that there are differences - the US is leading a coalition, and has not engaged in the kinds of brutal and rapacious behavior that became a norm for the Soviet troops, who routinely killed Afghans to steal their farm products or other products or even just for target practice. Nonetheless, he correctly notes that as time goes on the American and other coalition troops are becoming more brutal toward the general population - behaving aggressively in house searches, invading women's living quarters, making growing use of air strikes and artillery fire missions to fight the Taliban, and as these changes take place our people are starting to look more and more like the Soviets to the Afghan people.
As a retired Marine I understand why our troops are doing the things that are alienating the population, and how much harder and more dangerous it will be if they swear off using them, but I can also see that in the long run that harder course is the best as well as being the right thing to do.
The story is a warning to American leaders about some of the dangers to the success of their own war in that country. Mr. Feifer notes that there are differences - the US is leading a coalition, and has not engaged in the kinds of brutal and rapacious behavior that became a norm for the Soviet troops, who routinely killed Afghans to steal their farm products or other products or even just for target practice. Nonetheless, he correctly notes that as time goes on the American and other coalition troops are becoming more brutal toward the general population - behaving aggressively in house searches, invading women's living quarters, making growing use of air strikes and artillery fire missions to fight the Taliban, and as these changes take place our people are starting to look more and more like the Soviets to the Afghan people.
As a retired Marine I understand why our troops are doing the things that are alienating the population, and how much harder and more dangerous it will be if they swear off using them, but I can also see that in the long run that harder course is the best as well as being the right thing to do.
August 4, 2015
(Audiobook). I decided to read this book after many years being surrounded by those who spent time in Afghanistan and having supported the missions in Afghanistan. I had read some works on Afghanistan, particularly the CIA operations against the Soviet invasion, but I had not read near as much about the Soviet side of things, how they viewed the war, and the impact of the war on their soldiers and their populace. This work pulls from Soviet archives and accounts from Afghan veterans. Their military action in some ways mirrored America's, whereby the conquest was accomplished relatively quickly and easily. However, it was in the occupation where the problems began, as a long occupation of a diverse population went from simple to brutal. The Soviet population, kept more in the dark than the American public, eventually turns on the war, holding less and less support for the conflict. The Soviets would resort to more and more brutal tactics, making nowhere near the effort the Americans did to mitigate civilian casualties. The US certainly played a major role in helping to bring the Soviet conquest to an end. For the Americans, there was no major world player per se that wrecked havoc on their occupations/efforts, but Pakistan certainly was not exactly a solid ally. Overall, there are some parallels between the Soviet and American actions in Afghanistan, there were both very different experiences/actions and must be considered in that manner. A must read for the scholar of modern Afghanistan. The reader for the audiobook was okay, neither too boring nor too exciting. The actual book might be better, but still, it would be worth checking out.
March 10, 2015
While it is undeniably well-written and informative book, its somewhat peculiar structure and author's focus on predictable side-issues leave me somewhat disapointed with this book. I am unable to shake of the feeling that it was written by a Western author unintentionally falling into the trap of giving the book's intended, western audience exactly what it wanted to hear, thereby missing the opportunity to provide a more objective analysis of the conflict.
July 24, 2009
Sobering, depressing book describing the machiavelian calculations of the Politburo resulting in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. It follows that country's disintegration amid the brutality and savagery of the resistance, and reprisals over the next decade until the Soviet withdrawal, leaving behind chaos and ruin. Reading this book should make it clear that the seeds of ruthless Islamic fundamentalism, always present, took root during this decade watered by the Cold War mentality and jockeying of the West and the Soviet Union, as well as the country's neighbors, Iran and Pakistan in particular.
The author, NPR's Moscow correspondent, also traces the impact of this particular decade in Southern Asia through to September 11, 2001 as well as to the brutal war in Chechnya beginning in 1994.
The author, NPR's Moscow correspondent, also traces the impact of this particular decade in Southern Asia through to September 11, 2001 as well as to the brutal war in Chechnya beginning in 1994.
September 27, 2016
Solid and well-written account of primarily the Soviet invasion based on numerous accounts of both Soviet and Afghan participants.
November 17, 2019
I really wanted to like this book. My Afghanistan geography is ok, so I could mostly place where the various events were taking place, but this wasn't really an overview as a series of vignettes. The initial political and military movements that snarled the USSR into Afghanistan was somewhat well covered, but everything seemed so unintentional, ill-planned, and ineffective by the Soviet side (which might be true) while the various Afghan leaders didn't seem to have much of an idea of why they where fighting, but that they wanted to. I believe everything the author said, but I'm still not sure any of my "why" questions were answered.
February 2, 2022
A thorough if a bit meandering history of one of the stupidest wars in history. Folks we all know the Soviet Union as "the good guys of history" but the whole Afghanistan thing? Bad idea. Good thing everyone learned that lesson and no one ever repeated this mistake.
March 11, 2024
This book had the ingredients of a microhistory, but the author failed to put it all together. As a result, the writing was disjointed and unorganized, not unlike the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At least it was on theme in that sense.
November 1, 2021
For someone who knew almost nothing about this conflit, it was very useful and interesting.
It was obvious the USSR was in bad economic situation in the 80's. Ideology versus reality.
It was obvious the USSR was in bad economic situation in the 80's. Ideology versus reality.
October 11, 2012
This is a slightly hard book to review as on the one hand I did enjoy reading it, and yet on the other it wasn't all that fulfilling.
It was enjoyable as it opened a door to knowledge about a part of the world I know little about other than a broad overview. The first person accounts from both Soviet soldiers/politicians and spy's as well as Afghan soldiers/politicians/Mujaheddin as well as the story of the cloak and dagger aspect operated by both the US and Pakistan against the Soviets was very interesting. The human story of the war was told very well.
On the other hand, however, it was a little disappointing. I was reading the book as I believe we (the US) are making all the mistakes the Soviets did in the region and more. After reading this book that belief is reinforced. However it was lacking in depth. I thoroughly enjoyed the stories of Massoud, Vostrotin and the other main characters brought out in the story, but I wanted to know a little more about the strategic and geo-political context. Had the author went further into the command decisions made by Moscow and the headquarters of their 40th Army and its operational conduct of the conflict I think this would have greatly enhanced the book. Since the author was able to interview many former Mujaheddin (many had formed the Northern Alliance against the Taliban) I was hoping for more on the command decisions of Massoud and his confederates and the other tribal groups who waged unrelenting war on the Soviet forces. Also delving deeper into the shadow war waged against the Soviets by both Pakistan and the United States would have provided better context for the authors conclusion where he discusses the rise of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.
This was a terrible war, well over a million Afghans lost their lives in a brutal and horrible conflict where quarter and mercy were concepts rarely used by either side. I think it's telling when the author relates talks with the Afghan people now who admit that they preferred it under the Soviets than us...such information is revealing in the least. Overall I think that this book would have been recommended reading as a way to visualize, through the experiences of another, the mistakes made by ones own nation in a war that is simply unwinnable. (Bringing a foreign philosophy and enforcing its sway by force of arms) But the book just doesn't go into the detail needed to bring this out. Regardless it is a good book, for a primer on the Soviet War in Afghanistan as well as a primer on why the US' own mission is faltering (we're making the same damn mistakes) then this is a good read. At the very least, you'll come to sympathize with both Soviets and Afghans caught up in a terrible situation and with the Soviet soldiers whose post war stories are eerily similar to the stories told by US Vietnam veterans.
It was enjoyable as it opened a door to knowledge about a part of the world I know little about other than a broad overview. The first person accounts from both Soviet soldiers/politicians and spy's as well as Afghan soldiers/politicians/Mujaheddin as well as the story of the cloak and dagger aspect operated by both the US and Pakistan against the Soviets was very interesting. The human story of the war was told very well.
On the other hand, however, it was a little disappointing. I was reading the book as I believe we (the US) are making all the mistakes the Soviets did in the region and more. After reading this book that belief is reinforced. However it was lacking in depth. I thoroughly enjoyed the stories of Massoud, Vostrotin and the other main characters brought out in the story, but I wanted to know a little more about the strategic and geo-political context. Had the author went further into the command decisions made by Moscow and the headquarters of their 40th Army and its operational conduct of the conflict I think this would have greatly enhanced the book. Since the author was able to interview many former Mujaheddin (many had formed the Northern Alliance against the Taliban) I was hoping for more on the command decisions of Massoud and his confederates and the other tribal groups who waged unrelenting war on the Soviet forces. Also delving deeper into the shadow war waged against the Soviets by both Pakistan and the United States would have provided better context for the authors conclusion where he discusses the rise of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.
This was a terrible war, well over a million Afghans lost their lives in a brutal and horrible conflict where quarter and mercy were concepts rarely used by either side. I think it's telling when the author relates talks with the Afghan people now who admit that they preferred it under the Soviets than us...such information is revealing in the least. Overall I think that this book would have been recommended reading as a way to visualize, through the experiences of another, the mistakes made by ones own nation in a war that is simply unwinnable. (Bringing a foreign philosophy and enforcing its sway by force of arms) But the book just doesn't go into the detail needed to bring this out. Regardless it is a good book, for a primer on the Soviet War in Afghanistan as well as a primer on why the US' own mission is faltering (we're making the same damn mistakes) then this is a good read. At the very least, you'll come to sympathize with both Soviets and Afghans caught up in a terrible situation and with the Soviet soldiers whose post war stories are eerily similar to the stories told by US Vietnam veterans.
May 22, 2009
Like a lot of people, I’ve always thought of the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan as the “Soviet’s Vietnam”, but as The Great Gamble describes, this is a far too simplistic view of the conflict. Afghanistan then bordered three Soviet republics (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) and served critically as a buffer from Pakistan and the Middle East, and so you can understand why involvement in Afghanistan—propping-up the Soviet-friendly Afghani government—was absolutely irresistible for Moscow.
Religious fanaticism, guerilla-friendly terrain, and the United States’ extremely deep pockets; these were some of the forces arrayed against the Soviets, and while not ultimately as protracted or bloody as Vietnam, Afghanistan was terribly costly for the Soviets, definitely an early symptom of—possibly also a contributing factor in—the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Fiefer’s history of the war is extremely readable and nicely stitched together by eyewitness accounts from Afghanistan. The intrigue leading up the Soviet invasion (political fumbling, bungled assassination attempts, the KGB's storming of the presidential palace) was particularly fascinating. When writing the book, Fiefer no doubt had best access to Soviet sources (documents and interviews with former military officers) but some of the most moving reminiscences come from the Afghani survivors.
Late in the book, Fiefer falls prey to the seemingly irresistible urge to reflect on similarities between the Soviet’s nine year debacle and the United States’ own invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and then Iraq, but he wisely steers clear of judgments or recommendations for the current conflicts.
Religious fanaticism, guerilla-friendly terrain, and the United States’ extremely deep pockets; these were some of the forces arrayed against the Soviets, and while not ultimately as protracted or bloody as Vietnam, Afghanistan was terribly costly for the Soviets, definitely an early symptom of—possibly also a contributing factor in—the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Fiefer’s history of the war is extremely readable and nicely stitched together by eyewitness accounts from Afghanistan. The intrigue leading up the Soviet invasion (political fumbling, bungled assassination attempts, the KGB's storming of the presidential palace) was particularly fascinating. When writing the book, Fiefer no doubt had best access to Soviet sources (documents and interviews with former military officers) but some of the most moving reminiscences come from the Afghani survivors.
Late in the book, Fiefer falls prey to the seemingly irresistible urge to reflect on similarities between the Soviet’s nine year debacle and the United States’ own invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and then Iraq, but he wisely steers clear of judgments or recommendations for the current conflicts.
April 2, 2010
I tried to dislike this book. I thought it poorly written, and I found in it some of the most unusual use of punctuation I've ever come across. Mis-punctuation, I called it. The maps are so detailed with terrain features and lacking in graphic representation of military operations that they're not helpful at all, a serious fault in a book of military history. I tried hard to be contemputuous and dismissive of the author's emphasis on describing the Soviet experience in Afghanistan through the experiences of individuals rather than a more measured and studied presentation of facts and interpretation of military operations and political objectives. I tried to poof away Feifer's breezy skeleton of narration. I tried to throw the book across the room in a conscious imitation of Dorothy Parker. But the deeper into it I read the more interested I became. Feifer's book isn't a history of the military operations there. Though it touches on the military causes and effects during the course of the war, it's more an account of policy and international relations and societies, both Soviet and Afghan. Its picture is big. It's my opinion, though, that in telling the history of the war at this level Feifer needed to add more detail about the issues he believes profoundly affected the war, Soviet corruption, for instance, or the nature of Afghan tribal society. To pass over fundamental details such as these makes a book like this seem superficial. Despite all this, as I say, it's the first history of the conflict I'd read, and Feifer did touch all the bases, however lightly, and came, at last, to some interesting conclusions.
March 11, 2013
In The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan, Gregory Feifer talks about The Soviet Union's misadventure in Afghanistan from approx. 1979-1989.
He's interviewed military figures from both the Soviet and Afghan sides to give the reader a picture of the military environment that both sides faced as the war ebbed from a quick Soviet occupation, to an increasingly brutal stalemate, and finally the withdraw of the Soviet Union, leaving Afghanistan in the state of civil war that the United States found when they invaded following 9-11.
I thought the military portion of this book was done quite well.
Where Feifer stumbles is his intended effort to link the mistakes the Soviet military made in 1979 and illustrate how the United States is heading down a similar ill-fated path in Afghanistan.
This might seem intuitive in some respects like certain overconfidence among the leadership in Washington D.C. and The Kremlin, an improper military force to complete the job (as of 2006), and a general misunderstanding of the complex challenge that is Afghanistan.
Though he makes a valiant effort in the epilogue, I feel like he should've connected the dots sooner because it just sort of comes across as "Here's the Soviet War in Afghanistan, it's kinda like the current U.S. war there.
He's interviewed military figures from both the Soviet and Afghan sides to give the reader a picture of the military environment that both sides faced as the war ebbed from a quick Soviet occupation, to an increasingly brutal stalemate, and finally the withdraw of the Soviet Union, leaving Afghanistan in the state of civil war that the United States found when they invaded following 9-11.
I thought the military portion of this book was done quite well.
Where Feifer stumbles is his intended effort to link the mistakes the Soviet military made in 1979 and illustrate how the United States is heading down a similar ill-fated path in Afghanistan.
This might seem intuitive in some respects like certain overconfidence among the leadership in Washington D.C. and The Kremlin, an improper military force to complete the job (as of 2006), and a general misunderstanding of the complex challenge that is Afghanistan.
Though he makes a valiant effort in the epilogue, I feel like he should've connected the dots sooner because it just sort of comes across as "Here's the Soviet War in Afghanistan, it's kinda like the current U.S. war there.
December 8, 2013
This book starts out reminiscent of a mafia story; alliances, corruption, backstabbing, then dives into the military and political history. I found the story to be interesting and compelling if a bit disjointed. Mr. Feifer jumps a round a lot. Other reviewers have lamented the odd use of punctuation and I concur and would add there are several spelling errors, odd for a book written by a reporter and published by a major house.
The punctuation and minor errors aren't so terrible that I would completely reject the book. The story is interesting and worth a read to find out what it was like on the ground and in the capitols and back alleys during the Russian-Afghan War. However; that's where Mr. Feifer should have ended. The book wraps up with gratuitous criticisms and comparisons to George W. Bush and American involvement in general. The book is titled Great Gamble, but Great Blunder would be more apt given the corrupt and bizarre manner in which it all began (see mafia story comparison.)
I considered giving the book three stars as the meat of it is actually pretty good, but an error in referring to an "AC-130 helicopter gunship" was simply too egregious and actually had me questioning some of the other military attack / equipment history. A simple Google search could have solved this issue and nobody did it.
Overall a decent read but take it with a grain of salt.
The punctuation and minor errors aren't so terrible that I would completely reject the book. The story is interesting and worth a read to find out what it was like on the ground and in the capitols and back alleys during the Russian-Afghan War. However; that's where Mr. Feifer should have ended. The book wraps up with gratuitous criticisms and comparisons to George W. Bush and American involvement in general. The book is titled Great Gamble, but Great Blunder would be more apt given the corrupt and bizarre manner in which it all began (see mafia story comparison.)
I considered giving the book three stars as the meat of it is actually pretty good, but an error in referring to an "AC-130 helicopter gunship" was simply too egregious and actually had me questioning some of the other military attack / equipment history. A simple Google search could have solved this issue and nobody did it.
Overall a decent read but take it with a grain of salt.
October 20, 2017
An all-too-brief look at the circumstances leading up to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. With great details and many first-hand accounts of the trials and tribulations of both Soviet soldiers, many of whom were green recruits, and their mujahidin opponents, Feifer paints a picture of chaos, bloodshed, toil and horror. From the indiscriminate killing of civilians by the Russians to the brutal beheadings of Soviet soldiers by the mujahidin their heads impaled on spikes outside their camps, this is not a book for the weak of stomach.
But the insights into the almost accidental way the war began to the failure of the Russians to learn from America's counterinsurgency war in Vietnam makes for a disturbing story of history repeating itself. Reflections back on the 19th century British invasion which ended nearly the same way and the 21st century US invasion make it clear that Afghanistan is the place where empires go to die.
But the insights into the almost accidental way the war began to the failure of the Russians to learn from America's counterinsurgency war in Vietnam makes for a disturbing story of history repeating itself. Reflections back on the 19th century British invasion which ended nearly the same way and the 21st century US invasion make it clear that Afghanistan is the place where empires go to die.
March 21, 2009
The Soviet Union's invasion and "occupation" (can any country truly occupy Afghanistan?) is detailed here, and is eerily similar to Vietnam. The Russians are ill-equipped and commit routine atrocities everywhere they go and Soviet troops are shocked to find Afghan markets better supplied with consumer goods than back home. As year after bloody year goes by and casualties mount, with Red Army troops getting hooked on the local narcotics and being unable to leave their bases for fear of ambush, even the most fanatical communist realizes that the war in Afghanistan had been a mistake. Soviet casualities in the west were always listed at 15,000 killed, but the author makes the case that they were actually far higher. The war in Afghanistan was instrumental in the collapse of the U.S.S.R. just a few years after they left.
June 18, 2013
This is a single volume primer on the Soviet war in Afghanistan which looks at both the big political picture as well as anecdotes and stories from participants involved.
The author presents his material mainly from the Soviet perspective although there is some from mujahideen and CIA scources. Having little knowledge on the subject I found the book quite interesting, the lack of coordination by the Soviet command, the poor logistical arrangements and the sheer hopelessness of the struggle are woven together in a tight narrative.
The anecdotes and stories help to maintain interest and to present a personal experience of the conflict. The authors' style has similarities to Beevor or Atkinson and although not at that level it nevertheless is a reasonable read on a rarely touched conflict.
The author presents his material mainly from the Soviet perspective although there is some from mujahideen and CIA scources. Having little knowledge on the subject I found the book quite interesting, the lack of coordination by the Soviet command, the poor logistical arrangements and the sheer hopelessness of the struggle are woven together in a tight narrative.
The anecdotes and stories help to maintain interest and to present a personal experience of the conflict. The authors' style has similarities to Beevor or Atkinson and although not at that level it nevertheless is a reasonable read on a rarely touched conflict.
January 8, 2013
Great, short history of the Soviets in Afghanistan. Feifer identifies the major problems with the Soviet effort and why they pulled out in 1989. Much like the American experience in Vietnam, the Soviets spent a disparate amount of men and money on a country that they never were really able to control beyond the cities. The weakness of the DRA from the outset also hurt the entire effort. When Soviet funding ceased, the DRA's downfall was only a matter of time. Highly recommended, especially if you're interested in the ISAF experience and the future of Afghanistan after 2014.
August 11, 2015
An impressively thorough book on the Soviet Afghan war, which does a great job of summarizing the conflict, as well as showing many moments through the eyes of individuals caught up in the conflict. In recent years I've found the topic of warfare in Afghanistan interesting, the region seems tailor made for savage guerilla warfare, from the days of Alexander the Great to modern US conflict there, and this book highlights a war in which locals managed to repel a main superpower in the world at the time! Interesting stuff, history folks!
January 24, 2009
Very interesting history of the war in Afghanistan and a highly readable narrative. It's compelling reading, but after the first year of the war it becomes more of an anecdotal history following individual combatants than a "big picture" history, and never fully explains why the Soviets made some of the decisions they did. Highly recommended for readers interested in Soviet history, as well as those seeking context for the US successes and failures in Afghanistan and Iraq.
July 26, 2013
solid Harper-Collins ebook without superb distinguishing characteristics. consistent narrative voice with balance of description and event, blending together historical research, interviews with government officials on all side, and established facts of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. perhaps not a must-read, but professionally written and one cannot find anything to contradict Feifer's presentation of events (Feifer was an NPR correspondent in Moscow) 4/5
February 11, 2010
Very interesting documentary of Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from strategic to tactical level. Helps distinguish the vastly different motives and approaches the Soviets took from US and NATO in Afghanistan. Enjoyed right up to the Epilogue, which in my view is a rambling and amateurish attempt at comparing Soviet experience to US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.
July 1, 2010
The book has many revealing anecdotes from the former Soviet soldiers. After the first few chapters, it does not have much in the way of behind the scenes politics, strategy, etc. While it hints at some of the disconnects and problems politically and strategically, these are never explored. It is therefore harder to draw conclusions or lessons that we can chew on for today.
December 30, 2010
A good general history of the conflict. I liked the way the author mildly corrects some cold war assumptions of the relative importance of the Afghanistan campaigns for the downfall of the Soviet Union. I also liked that the book is not written as a political statement or armchair generalship on the current American led war, no matter how looming the parallels are.
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July 30, 2011Not a bad book but more as a set of interviews with Soviet Afgan vets rather than as an analysis of the causes and effects of the war. He spends about a chapter on those and the rest is more a set of boots on the ground reminiscences. I was looking for more of an overview on the entire war, causes and effects
May 1, 2013
A decent introductory read to the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, it doesn't get too bogged down in the specifics and concentrates on the broad strokes and the experiences of the Soviet soldiers. If you want something more in depth and exploring the issues at a more strategic levels, this isn't the book for you but it does serve well as an introduction to the far more wieghtier issues.
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