Home Army: Difference between revisions

*The Home Army*
The Home Army
Armia Krajowa
	Polish red-and-white flag with superposed Kotwica ("Anchor") emblem of the Polish Underground State and Home Army
Active	14 February 1942 – 19 January 1945
Country	Poland
Allegiance	Polish government-in-exile
Role	Armed forces of the Polish Underground State and the Polish government-in-exile
Size	400,000 (1944)
Engagements	World War II Polish resistance Warsaw Uprising; ;
Commanders
Notable; commanders	Tadeusz Komorowski; Stefan Rowecki; Leopold Okulicki; Emil August Fieldorf; Antoni Chruściel
Insignia
Identification; symbol	Kotwica

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The Home Army (Polish: Armia Krajowa, AK; Polish pronunciation: [ˈarmʲa kraˈjɔva]) was the dominant Polish resistance movement in Poland, occupied by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, during World War II. The Home Army was formed in February 1942 from the Związek Walki Zbrojnej (Armed Resistance). Some authors stress the continuity using acronym ZWZ/AK (or ZWZ-AK).^[1] Over the next two years, it absorbed most other Polish underground forces. Its allegiance was to the Polish government-in-exile, and it constituted the armed wing of what became known as the "Polish Underground State".

Estimates of the Home Army's 1944 strength range between 200,000 and 600,000, the most commonly cited number being 400,000. This last number would make the Home Army not only the largest Polish underground resistance movement but one of the three largest in Europe during World War II.^[a] The Home Army was disbanded on 19 January 1945, after the Soviet Red Army had largely cleared Polish territory of German forces.

The Home Army sabotaged German operations such as transports headed for the Eastern Front in the Soviet Union. It also fought several full-scale battles against the Germans, particularly in 1943 and in Operation Tempest in 1944. The Home Army tied down substantial German forces and destroyed much-needed German supplies.

The most widely known Home Army operation was the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. The partisans also defended Polish civilians against atrocities perpetrated by other military formations.

Because the Home Army was loyal to the Polish Government-in-Exile, the Soviet Union saw it as an obstacle to Communism in Poland. Consequently, over the course of the war, conflict grew between the Home Army and Soviet forces. During the Soviet occupation of Poland thousands of former Home Army operatives were deported to Gulags and Soviet prisons, while others - including senior commanders like Leopold Okulicki and Emil August Fieldorf - were executed.

Following the war, the view in communist Poland was that the Home Army was an oppressive and reactionary force. Following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe the image of the Home Army has been more positive.^[2]

History and operations

World War II

The Home Army originated in the Service for Poland's Victory (Służba Zwycięstwu Polski), which General Michał Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski set up on 27 September 1939, just as the coordinated German and Soviet invasions of Poland neared completion.^[3] Seven weeks later, on 17 November 1939, on the orders of General Władysław Sikorski, the Service for Poland's Victory was superseded by the Armed Resistance (Związek Walki Zbrojnej), which in turn, a little over two years later, on 14 February 1942, became the "Home Army".^[3]^[4] All the while, however, many other resistance organizations remained active in Poland.^[5] Most of them eventually merged with the Armed Resistance or with its successor, the Home Army, between 1939 and 1944, substantially augmenting the Home Army's numbers.^[4]^[5]

The Polish government-in-exile envisioned the Home Army as an apolitical, nationwide resistance organization.^[6] The supreme command defined the Home Army's chief tasks as partisan warfare against the German occupiers, re-creation of armed forces underground and, near the end of the German occupation, a general armed rising to be prosecuted until victory.^[3]^[4]^[6] Home Army plans envisioned, at war's end, the seizure of power in Poland by the Government Delegation for Poland (the Delegatura) and by the Government in Exile itself, which expected to return to Poland.

In addition to the Polish government in London, a political organization operated in Poland itself - a deliberative body of the resistance and of the Polish Underground State. The Political Consultative Committee (Polityczny Komitet Porozumiewawczy) formed in 1940 pursuant to an agreement between several major political parties: the Socialist Party, People's Party, National Party and Labor Party. In 1943 it was renamed to Home Political Representation (Krajowa Reprezentacja Polityczna) and in 1944 to Council of National Unity (Rada Jedności Narodowej).^[7]^{: 235–236}

The Home Army, though in theory subordinate to the civil authorities and to the Government in Exile, often acted somewhat independently, with neither the Home Army's commanders in Poland nor the "London government" fully aware of the others' situation.^[7]^{: 235–236}

After Germany started its invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the Soviet Union joined the Allies and signed an Anglo-Soviet Agreement on 12 July 1941. This put the Polish Government in a difficult position, since it had previously pursued a policy of "two enemies". Though a Polish-Soviet agreement was signed in August 1941, cooperation continued to be difficult and deteriorated further after 1943 when Nazi Germany publicized the Katyn massacre of 1940.^[8]

Until the major rising in 1944, the Home Army concentrated on self-defense (the freeing of prisoners and hostages, defense against German pacification operations) and on attacks against German forces. Home Army units carried out thousands of armed raids and intelligence operations, sabotaged hundreds of railway shipments, and participated in many partisan clashes and battles with German police and Wehrmacht units. The Home Army also assassinated prominent Nazi collaborators and Gestapo officials in retaliation against Nazi terror inflicted on Poland's civilian population; prominent individuals assassinated by the Home Army included Igo Sym (1941) and Franz Kutschera (1944).^[3]^[6]

Intelligence

The Home Army supplied valuable intelligence to the Allies; 43% of all reports received by the British secret services from continental Europe in between 1939 and 1945 came from Polish sources.^[9]

Home Army intelligence provided the Allies with information on German concentration camps and on the V-1 flying bomb and V-2 rocket.^[3] In one Project Big Ben mission (Operation Wildhorn III;^[10] Polish cryptonym: Most III, "Bridge III"), a stripped-for-lightness RAF twin-engine Dakota flew from Brindisi in Italy to an abandoned German airfield in Poland to pick up intelligence prepared by Polish aircraft-designer Antoni Kocjan, including 100 lb (45 kg) of V-2 rocket wreckage from a Peenemünde launch, a Special Report 1/R, no. 242, photographs, eight key V-2 parts, and drawings of the wreckage.^[11]

Sabotage was coordinated by the Union of Retaliation and later by Wachlarz and Kedyw units.^[4]

The Home Army also conducted psychological warfare. Its "Operation N" created the illusion of a German movement of opposition to Hitler within Germany itself.^[3]

Information and propaganda

The Home Army published a weekly Biuletyn Informacyjny (Information Bulletin), with a top circulation (in November 1943) of 50,000.^[12]^[13]

Major operations

Major Home Army military and sabotage operations included:

the Zamość Rising of 1942–43, with the Home Army sabotaging German plans to expel Poles under Generalplan Ost^[4]
protection of the Polish population from the massacres of Poles in Volhynia in 1943–44^[4]
Operation Garland, in 1942, sabotaging German rail transport^[4]
Operation Belt in 1943, a series of attacks on German border outposts on the frontier between the General Government and the territories annexed by Germany
Operation Jula, in 1944, another rail-sabotage operation^[4]
most notably Operation Tempest, in 1944, a series of nationwide risings which aimed primarily to seize control of cities and areas where German forces were preparing defenses against the Soviet Red Army, so that Polish underground civil authorities could take power before the arrival of Soviet forces.^[14]

The largest and best-known of the Operation Tempest battles, the Warsaw Uprising, constituted an attempt, beginning on 1 August 1944, to liberate Poland's capital. Polish forces took control of substantial parts of the city and resisted the German-led forces until 2 October (a total of 63 days). With the Poles receiving no aid from the approaching Red Army, the Germans eventually defeated the insurrectionists and burned the city, finally quelling the Uprising on 2 October 1944.^[3] Other major Home Army city risings included Operation Ostra Brama, in Wilno, and the Lwów Uprising. The Home Army also prepared for a rising in Kraków, but due to various circumstances it was canceled. While the Home Army managed to liberate a number of places from German control—for example in the Lublin area, where regional structures were able to set up a functioning government—ultimately, due to Soviet hostility, the Home Army failed to secure sufficient territory to enable the Government in Exile to return to Poland.^[3]^[4]^[14]

The Home Army primarily focused on sabotage of German rail- and road-transports to the Eastern Front in the Soviet Union.^[15] It is estimated^{[by whom?]} that an eighth of all German transports to the Eastern Front were destroyed or substantially delayed due to Home Army operations.^[15]

Assassinations of Nazi leaders

The Polish resistance executed dozens of attacks on German commanders in Poland, the largest being a series of assassinations codenamed Operation Heads. Dozens more assassination attempts were carried out, the best-known being:^[16]

Operation Adolf Hitler (an attempt to blow up Hitler during his 5 October 1939 Warsaw victory parade) failed when the half-ton explosive charge failed to detonate.^[17]
Operation Kutschera—Franz Kutschera, SS-Brigadeführer and Generalmajor of Ordnungspolizei; SS and Police Leader of the Warsaw District, assassinated 1 February 1944.^[18]
Operation Bürkl—Franz Bürkl , SS-Oberscharführer, Gestapo officer, and commandant of the Pawiak prison, assassinated 7 September 1943.^[19]
Operation Freudenthal—Karl Freudenthal, SS officer who in 1941 had been made Kreishauptmann (District Head) of Garwolin County.^[20]
Operation Wilhelm Koppe failed.

Postwar

At the end of the war, the Home Army was dissolved by the London government in exile. However, some desperate units returned underground and conducted terrorist attacks against the Communist administration. In some parts of the country, this escalated to a civil war. Police, civilian officials, and Jewish survivors were killed. These terrorist attacks continued until 1948, and in fact served the goals of the Communists as they allowed the planned elections in Poland to be postponed.^[21]

Most Home Army soldiers were captured by the NKVD or by Poland's UB political police. They were interrogated and imprisoned on various charges such as "fascism".^[22]^[23] Many were sent to Gulags, executed or "disappeared."^[22] Thus, between 1944 and 1956 all the members of Batalion Zośka, which had fought in the Warsaw Uprising, were locked up in communist prisons.^[24] In 1956 an amnesty released 35,000 former Home Army soldiers from prisons.^[25]

Even then, however, some partisans remained in the countryside, unwilling or unable to rejoin the community; they became known as the cursed soldiers. Stanisław Marchewka "Ryba" was killed in 1957, and the last AK partisan, Józef Franczak "Lalek," was killed in 1963 – almost 2 decades after World War II had ended. It was only four years later, in 1967, that Adam Boryczka, a soldier of AK and a member of the elite, Britain-trained Cichociemny ("Silent Unseen") intelligence and support group, was released from prison. Until the end of the People's Republic of Poland, Home Army soldiers remained under investigation by the secret police, and it was only in 1989, after the fall of communism, that the sentences of Home Army soldiers were finally declared null and void by Polish courts.^[26]^{[better source needed]}

Many monuments to the Home Army have since been erected in Poland, including the Polish Underground State and Home Army Monument near the Sejm building in Warsaw, unveiled in 1999.^[27]^[28] The Home Army is also commemorated in the Home Army Museum in Kraków^[29] and in the Warsaw Uprising Museum in Warsaw.^[30]

Membership

File:1Comp obwSambor inspecDrohobycz Burza3.jpg

Soldiers of 1st Company of Sambor Command of Drohobycz Home Army (Obwód Sambor AK) inspectorate, armed with German-, Soviet-, and British-made arms and wearing captured German field uniforms. Soldier at lower left appears to be holding a Soviet-made PPSh-41, or some derivative thereof.

In February 1942, when the Home Army was formed from the Armed Resistance, it numbered some 100,000 members.^[6] Less than a year later, at the start of 1943, it had reached a strength of some 200,000.^[6] In the summer of 1944, when Operation Tempest began, the Home Army reached its highest membership.^[6] Estimates of membership in the first half and summer of 1944 range from 200,000,^[7]^: 234 through 300,000,^[31] 380,000^[6] and 400,000 to^{[citation needed]} 450,000–500,000.^[32] Most estimates average at about 400,000. The strength estimates vary due to the constantly ongoing integration of other resistance organizations into the Home Army; and due to the fact that, while the number of members was high and that of sympathizers was much higher still, the number of armed members participating in operations was smaller due to insufficient number of weapons.^[6]^[33]^[7]^: 234

Home Army numbers in 1944 included a cadre of over 10,000–11,000 officers, 7,500 officers-in-training (singular: podchorąży) and 88,000 non-commissioned officers (NCOs).^[6] The officer cadre was formed from prewar officers and NCOs, graduates of underground courses, and elite operatives usually parachuted in from the West (the Silent Unseen).^[6] The basic organizational unit was the platoon, numbering 35–50 people, with a skeleton unmobilized version of 16–25; in February 1944 the Home Army had 6,287 regular and 2,613 skeleton platoons operational.^[6] Such numbers made the Home Army not only the largest Polish resistance movement, but one of the two largest in World War II Europe ^[a]. Casualties during the war are estimated at about 34,000^[31]-100,000,^[6] plus some 20,000^[31]–50,000^[6] after the war (casualties and imprisonment).

Within the framework of the entire enemy intelligence operations directed against Germany, the intelligence service of the Polish resistance movement assumed major significance. The scope and importance of the operations of the Polish resistance movement, which was ramified down to the smallest splinter group and brilliantly organized, have been in [various sources] disclosed in connection with carrying out of major police security operations. — Heinrich Himmler, 31 December 1942 ^[34]

The Home Army was intended as a mass organization, founded by a core of prewar officers.^[6] Home Army soldiers fell into three groups. The first two consisted of "full-time members": undercover operatives, living mostly in urban settings under false identities (most senior Home Army officers belonged to this group); and uniformed (to a certain extent) partisans, living in forested regions (see "forest people"), who openly fought the Germans (the forest people are estimated at some 40 groups, numbering 1,200–4,000 persons in early 1943, but their numbers grew substantially during Operation Tempest).^[7]^{: 234–235} The third, largest group were "part-time members": sympathizers who led "double lives" under their real names in their real homes, received no payment for their services, stayed in touch with their undercover unit commanders but were seldom mustered for operations, as the Home Army planned to use them only during a planned nationwide rising.^[7]^{: 234–235}

The Home Army was intended to be representative of the Polish nation, its members being recruited from all parties and social classes (the only notable exception being communists sent by the Soviets, and the Soviet-created People's Army).^[7]^{: 235–236} The Home Army's growth was largely based on integrating, into its ranks, scores of smaller resistance organizations. Most other Polish underground armed organizations were incorporated into the Home Army (though they retained varying degrees of autonomy).^[4] The largest organization merged into the Home Army was the leftist Bataliony Chłopskie (Peasants' Battalions), about 1943-44.^[35] Parts of the Narodowe Siły Zbrojne (National Armed Forces) also came to be subordinated to the Home Army.^[36] As a result, individual Home Army units varied substantially in their political outlooks (notably in their attitudes toward ethnic minorities and toward the Soviets).^[7]^{: 235–236} The largest group that completely refused to join the Home Army was the pro-Soviet, communist People's Army, which at its height in 1944 numbered 30,000 people.^[37]

Women in the Home Army

Dysk ("Discus") was a female sabotage unit which killed female Gestapo informants.^[38]

Elżbieta Zawacka was the only female Cichociemna.^[39]

Grażyna Lipińska organised an intelligence network in German-occupied Belarus in 1942-44.^[40]

Female couriers transported guns and explosives, illegal printings, and messages. The service was very dangerous; hardly any of the female couriers survived longer than three months.^[41]

Many female nurses died in the Warsaw Uprising.^[42]

Structure

Home Army Headquarters was divided into five sections, two bureaus and several other specialized units:^[3]^[6]

Section I: Organization – personnel, justice, religion
Section II: Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Section III: Operations and Training – coordination, planning, preparation for a nationwide uprising
Section IV: Logistics
Section V: Communication – including with the Western Allies; air drops
Bureau of Information and Propaganda (sometimes called "Section VI") – information and propaganda
Bureau of Finances (sometimes called "Section VII") – finances
Kedyw (acronym for Kierownictwo Dywersji, Polish for "Directorate of Diversion") – special operations
Directorate of Underground Resistance

The Home Army's commander was subordinate in the military chain of command to the Polish Commander-in-Chief (General Inspector of the Armed Forces) of the Polish Government in Exile^[6] and answered in the civilian chain of command to the Government Delegation for Poland.

The Home Army's first commander, until his arrest by the Germans in 1943, was Stefan Rowecki (nom de guerre "Grot", "Spearhead").

Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski (Tadeusz Komorowski, nom de guerre "Bór", "Forest") commanded from July 1943 until his surrender to the Germans, upon the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, in October 1944.

Leopold Okulicki, nom de guerre "Niedzwiadek" ("Bear"), led the Home Army in its final days.^[3]

**Home Army commanders**^[3]
	Name	Codename	Period	Replaced because	Fate
1.	General Michał Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski Technically, commander of Służba Zwycięstwu Polski and Związek Walki Zbrojnej as AK was not named such until 1942	Torwid	27 September 1939 – March 1940	Arrested by the Soviets	Joined the Anders Army, fought in the Polish Armed Forces in the West. Emigrated to the United Kingdom.
2.	General Stefan Rowecki	Grot	18 June 1940 – 30 June 1943	Discovered and arrested by German Gestapo	Imprisoned in Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Executed by personal decree of Heinrich Himmler after Warsaw Uprising has started.
3.	General Tadeusz Komorowski	Bór	July 1943 – 2 September 1944	Surrendered after the end of Warsaw Uprising.	Emigrated to United Kingdom.
4.	General Leopold Okulicki	Niedźwiadek	3 October 1944 – 17 January 1945	Dissolved AK trying to lessen the Polish-Soviet tensions.	Arrested by the Soviets, sentenced for imprisonment in the Trial of the Sixteen. Likely executed in 1946.

Regions

The Home Army was divided geographically into regional branches or areas (obszar).^[3] Below the branches or areas were subregions or subareas (podokręg) or independent areas (okręgi samodzielne). Smaller organizational units were 89 inspectorates (inspektorat) and 280 (as of early 1944) districts (obwód).^[6] Overall, the Home Army regional structure largely resembled Poland's interwar administration division, with an okręg being similar to a voivodeship (see Administrative division of Second Polish Republic).^[6]

There were three to five areas: Warsaw (Obszar Warszawski, with some sources differentiating between left- and right-bank areas – Obszar Warszawski prawo- i lewobrzeżny), Western (Obszar Zachodni, in the Pomerania and Poznań regions), Southeastern (Obszar Południowo-Wschodni, in the Lwów area); sources vary on whether there was a Northeastern Area (centered in Białystok – Obszar Białystocki) or whether Białystok was classified as an independent area (Okręg samodzielny Białystok).

Area	Districts	Codenames	Units (re)created during the reconstruction of the Polish Army in Operation Tempest
Warsaw area Codenames: Cegielnia (Brickworks), Woda (Water), Rzeka (River) Warsaw Col. Albin Skroczyński Łaszcz	Eastern Warsaw-Praga Col. Hieronim Suszczyński Szeliga	Struga (stream), Krynica (source), Gorzelnia (distillery)	10th Infantry Division
	Western Warsaw Col. Franciszek Jachieć Roman	Hallerowo (Hallertown), Hajduki, Cukrownia (Sugar factory)	28th Infantry Division
	Northern Warsaw Lt. Col. Zygmunt Marszewski Kazimierz	Olsztyn, Tuchola, Królewiec, Garbarnia (tannery)	8th Infantry Division
South-Eastern area Codenames: Lux, Lutnia (lute), Orzech (nut) Lwów Col. Władysław Filipkowski Janka	Lwów Lwów – divided into two areas Okręg Lwów Zachód (West) and Okręg Lwów Wschód (East) Col. Stefan Czerwiński Luśnia	Dukat (ducat), Lira (lire), Promień (ray)	5th Infantry Division
	Stanisławów Stanisławów Capt. Władysław Herman Żuraw	Karaś (crucian carp), Struga (stream), Światła (lights)	11th Infantry Division
	Tarnopol Tarnopol Maj. Bronisław Zawadzki	Komar (mosquito), Tarcza (shield), Ton (tone)	12th Infantry Division
Western area Codename: Zamek (Castle) Poznań Col. Zygmunt Miłkowski Denhoff	Pomerania Gdynia Col. Janusz Pałubicki Piorun	Borówki (berries), Pomnik (monument)
	Poznań Poznań Col. Henryk Kowalówka	Pałac (palace), Parcela (lot)
Independent areas	Wilno Wilno Col. Aleksander Krzyżanowski Wilk	Miód (honey), Wiano (dowry) (subunit "Kaunas Lithuania")
	Nowogródek Nowogródek Lt.Col. Janusz Szlaski Borsuk	Cyranka (garganey), Nów (new moon)	Zgrupowanie Okręgu AK Nowogródek
	Warsaw Warsaw Col. Antoni Chruściel Monter	Drapacz (sky-scraper), Przystań (harbour), Wydra (otter), Prom (shuttle)
	Polesie Pińsk Col. Henryk Krajewski Leśny	Kwadra (quarter), Twierdza (keep), Żuraw (crane)	30th Infantry Division
	Wołyń Równe Col. Kazimierz Bąbiński Luboń	Hreczka (buckwheat), Konopie (hemp)	27th Infantry Division
	Białystok Białystok Col. Władysław Liniarski Mścisław	Lin (tench), Czapla (aigrette), Pełnia (full moon)	29th Infantry Division
	Lublin Lublin Col. Kazimierz Tumidajski Marcin	Len (linnen), Salon (saloon), Żyto (rye)	3rd Legions' Infantry Division 9th Infantry Division
	Kraków Kraków various commanders, incl. Col. Julian Filipowicz Róg	Gobelin, Godło (coat of arms), Muzeum (museum)	6th Infantry Division 106th Infantry Division 21st Infantry Division 22nd Infantry Division 24th Infantry Division Kraków Motorized Cavalry Brigade
	Silesia Katowice various commanders, incl. Col. Zygmunt Janke Zygmunt	Kilof (pick), Komin (chimney), Kuźnia (foundry), Serce (heart)
	Kielce-Radom Kielce, Radom Col. Jan Zientarski Mieczysław	Rolnik (farmer), Jodła (fir)	2nd Legions' Infantry Division 7th Infantry Division
	Łódź Łódź Col. Michał Stempkowski Grzegorz	Arka (ark), Barka (barge), Łania (bath)	25th Infantry Division 26th Infantry Division
Foreign areas	Hungary Budapest Lt.Col. Jan Korkozowicz	Liszt
Foreign areas	Reich Berlin	Blok (block)

In 1943 the Home Army began recreating the organization of the prewar Polish Army, its various units now being designated as platoons, battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, and operational groups.^[6]

Weapons and equipment

As a clandestine army operating in an enemy-occupied country, and separated by over a thousand kilometers from any friendly territory, the Home Army faced unique challenges in acquiring arms and equipment.^[43] It was able to overcome these difficulties to some extent and to field tens of thousands of armed soldiers. Nevertheless, the difficult conditions meant that only infantry forces armed with light weapons could be fielded. Any use of artillery, armor or aircraft was impossible (except for a few instances during the Warsaw Uprising, such as the Kubuś armored car).^[43] Even these light-infantry units were as a rule armed with a mixture of weapons of various types, usually in quantities sufficient to arm only a fraction of a unit's soldiers.^[33]^[7]^: 234^[43]

Home Army arms and equipment came mostly from four sources: arms that had been buried by the Polish armies on battlefields after the 1939 invasion of Poland; arms purchased or captured from the Germans and their allies; arms clandestinely manufactured by the Home Army itself; and arms received from Allied air drops.^[43]

From arms caches hidden in 1939, the Home Army obtained: 614 heavy machine guns, 1,193 light machine guns, 33,052 rifles, 6,732 pistols, 28 antitank light field guns, 25 antitank rifles, and 43,154 hand grenades.^[44] However, due to their inadequate preservation, which had had to be improvised in the chaos of the September Campaign, most of the guns were in poor condition. Of those that had been buried in the ground and had been dug up in 1944 during preparations for Operation Tempest, only 30% were usable.^{[citation needed]}

Sometimes arms were purchased on the black market from German soldiers or their allies, or stolen from German supply depots or transports.^[43] Purchases were made by individual units and sometimes by individual soldiers. As Germany's prospects for victory diminished and the morale in German units dropped, the number of soldiers willing to sell their weapons correspondingly increased and thus made this source more important.^{[citation needed]} All such purchases were highly risky, as the Gestapo was well aware of this black market in arms and tried to check it by setting up sting operations. For the most part this trade was limited to personal weapons, but occasionally light and heavy machine guns could also be purchased. It was much easier to trade with Italian and Hungarian units stationed in Poland, which more willingly sold their arms to the Polish underground as long as they could conceal this trade from the Germans.^{[citation needed]}

Efforts to capture weapons from the Germans also proved highly successful. Raids were conducted on trains carrying equipment to the front, as well as on guardhouses and gendarmerie posts. Sometimes weapons were taken from individual German soldiers accosted in the street. During the Warsaw Uprising, the Home Army even managed to capture several German armored vehicles.^{[citation needed]}

Arms were clandestinely manufactured by the Home Army in its own secret workshops, and also by Home Army members working in German armaments factories.^[43]^{[citation needed]} In this way the Home Army was able to procure submachine guns (copies of British Stens, indigenous Błyskawicas and KIS), pistols (Vis), flamethrowers, explosive devices, road mines, and Filipinka and Sidolówka hand grenades.^[43] Hundreds of people were involved in the manufacturing effort. The Home Army did not produce its own ammunition, but relied on supplies stolen by Polish workers from German-run factories.^[43]

The final source of supply was Allied air drops. This was the only way to obtain more exotic, highly useful equipment such as plastic explosives and antitank weapons such as the British PIAT. During the war, 485 air-drop missions from the West (about half of them flown by Polish airmen) delivered some 600 tons of supplies for the Polish resistance.^[45] Besides equipment, the planes also parachuted in highly qualified instructors (Silent Unseen), 316 of whom^[31] were inserted into Poland during the war.^[44]

But the air drops were too little, too late. Air deliveries from the west were limited by Stalin's refusal to let the planes land on Soviet territory; by the low priority placed by the British on flights to Poland; and by extremely heavy losses sustained by Polish Special Duties Flight personnel. Especially after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the Soviets joined the Western Allies in the war against Germany, Britain and the United States attached more importance to not antagonizing Stalin than they did to the aspirations of the Poles to regain their national sovereignty.^[46]

In the end, despite all the efforts, most Home Army forces had inadequate weaponry. In 1944, when the Home Army was at its peak strength (200,000–600,000, according to various estimates), the Home Army had enough weaponry for only some 32,000 soldiers."^[7]^: 234 On 1 August 1944, when the Warsaw Uprising began, only a sixth of Home Army fighters in Warsaw were armed.^[7]^: 234

Relations with other groups

Relations with Jews

Home Army members' attitudes toward Jews varied widely from unit to unit, and the topic remains controversial.^[47]^[48]^[49]

Daily operations

A Jewish partisan detachment served in the Warsaw Uprising,^[50]^[51] and another one in Hanaczów [pl].^[52]^[53]^: 317 Home Army provided training and supplies to Warsaw Ghetto's Jewish Combat Organization.^[52]

According to Timothy Snyder, thousands of Jews joined or claimed they joined the Home Army in order to survive while hiding. Synder says this strategy was only employed only by the minority of Jews who could pass themselves off as Poles, as they would've been certainly denounced if they could not.^[54]^: 275 The Home Army answered to the National Council of the Polish Government in Exile, where some Jews served in leadership positions (e.g. Ignacy Schwarzbart and Szmul Zygielbojm)^[55] (though there were no Jewish representatives in the Government Delegation for Poland).^[56]^{: 110–114} Jewish historians have asserted that the main cause for the low survival rates of escaping Jews was the antisemitism of the Polish population.^[57]

In February 1942, the Home Army Operational Command's Office of Information and Propaganda set up a Section for Jewish Affairs, directed by Henryk Woliński.^[58] This section collected data about the situation of the Jewish population, drafted reports, and sent information to London. It also centralized contacts between Polish and Jewish military organizations. The Home Army also supported the Relief Council for Jews in Poland (Żegota) as well as the formation of Jewish resistance organizations.^[59]^[60]

The Holocaust

In 1942 the Home Army sent Jan Karski to personally deliver the first eyewitness account of the Holocaust to the Western powers, after having personally visited the Warsaw Ghetto and a Nazi concentration camp.^[56]^{: 110–114}^[61]

Witold Pilecki, a member of the Home Army, was the only person to volunteer to be imprisoned at Auschwitz. The information that he gathered proved crucial in convincing the Western Allies about the fate of the Jewish population.

Starting in May 1943 the Home Army started carrying out death sentences for szmalcowniks in Warsaw.^[62] According to Władysław Bartoszewski, despite the fact that the Home Army carried out more death sentences on blackmailers than any other resistance organization in occupied Europe, these death sentences did not have a significant effect on the scale of blackmail and denunciation because of the difficulty of tracking down extortionists.^[63]

Home Army reports from March 1943 described atrocities committed by the Germans against the Jewish populace. General Rowecki estimated that 640,000 people had perished in Auschwitz between 1940 and March 1943, including 66,000 ethnic Poles and 540,000 Jews from various countries(this figure was revised later to 500,000)^[53]^: 188.

The Barwy Białe detachment, commanded by Lieutenant Kazimierz Olchowik “Zawisza”, murdered defenseless Jews on a number of occasions in 1944.^[64]

Antony Polonsky observed that "the attitude of the military underground to the genocide is both more complex and more controversial [than its approach towards szmalcowniks]. Throughout the period when it was being carried out, the Home Army was preoccupied with preparing for ... [the moment when] Nazi rule in Poland collapsed. It was determined to avoid premature military action and to conserve its strength (and weapons) for the crucial confrontation that, it was assumed, would determine the fate of Poland... [However] to the Home Army, the Jews were not a part of 'our nation' and ... action to defend them was not to be taken if it endangered [the Home Army's] other objectives." He continues to observe that "it is probably unrealistic to have expected the Home Army - which was neither as well armed nor as well organized as its propaganda claimed - to have been able to do much to aid the Jews. The fact remains that its leadership did not want to do so."^[65]^: 68 General Rowecki's attitudes shifted in the following months as the brutal reality of the Holocaust became more apparent, and the Polish public support for the Jewish resistance increased. Rowecki was willing to provide Jewish fighters with aid and resources when it contributed to "the greater war effort", but had (apparently) concluded that providing large quantities of supplies to the Jewish resistance would be futile. This reasoning was the norm among the Allies, who believed that the Holocaust could only be halted by a significant military action.^[56]^: 110-122

The Warsaw ghetto uprising

The Home Army provided the Warsaw Ghetto with firearms, ammunition and explosives.^[47] but only after it was convinced of the Jewish Combat Organization's eagerness to fight,^[65]^: 67 and after intervention by Władysław Sikorski on the organization's behalf.^[66] Zimmerman describes the supplies as "limited but real".^[56]^: 121-122 Jewish fighters of the Jewish Military Union received from the Home Army, among other things: 2 heavy machine guns, 4 light machine guns, 21 submachine guns, 30 rifles, 50 pistols, and over 400 grenades.^[67] Jewich Combat Organization received from AK: 10 pistols, 3 light machine gun, 10 rifles, 50 pistols - all with ammunition, 600 grenades, 150 kilograms of explosives as well as potassium and nitrate for their production. For comparison, AK before the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising had in the District of Warsaw some 25 heavy machine guns, 62 lights machine guns, 1,182 rifles, 1,099 pistols, 51 submachine guns, 2 cannons 75, 3 anti-tank cannons, 3 anti-tank guns and 11,007 hand grenades.^[68] According to that the limited assistance given by AK's to the Jewish resistance organization stemmed from its inability to arm its own troops, from the view that any wide-scale uprising in 1943 would be futile, and from the pro-Soviet attitude of the ŻOB.^[69] During the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Home Army units twice tried to blow up the Ghetto wall, carried out diversionary actions outside the Ghetto walls, and attacked German sentries sporadically near the Ghetto walls. The Security Cadre (Kadra Bezpieczeństwa, or K.B.), an organization subordinate to the Home Army, commanded by Henryk Iwański, took part in the fighting inside the Ghetto together with Jewish fighters of the Jewish Military Union (Żydowski Związek Walki, or Ż.Z.W.)^[47]. According to Marian Fuks, the Ghetto uprising would not have been possible without supplies from the Polish Home Army.^[70]^{[better source needed]}

Jürgen Stroop, in charge of the German efforts to liquidate the Warsaw Ghetto, wrote in his report:

When we invaded the Ghetto for the first time, the Jews and the Polish bandits succeeded in repelling the participating units, including tanks and armored cars, by a well-prepared concentration of fire. [...] The main Jewish battle group, mixed with Polish bandits, had already retired during the first and second day to the so-called Muranowski Square. There it was reinforced by a considerable number of Polish bandits. Its plan was to hold the Ghetto by every means in order to prevent us from invading it. [...] Time and again Polish bandits found refuge in the Ghetto and remained there undisturbed, since we had no forces at our disposal to comb out this maze. [...] One such battle group succeeded in mounting a truck by ascending from a sewer in the so-called Prosta [Street], and in escaping with it (about 30 to 35 bandits). ... The bandits and Jews – there were Polish bandits among these gangs armed with carbines, small arms, and in one case a light machine gun – mounted the truck and drove away in an unknown direction.
— Jürgen Stroop, Stroop Report, 1943^[71]^[72]

A year later, during the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, the Zośka Battalion liberated hundreds of Jewish inmates from the Gęsiówka section of the Warsaw Concentration Camp.^[54]^: 275

Attitude towards fugitives

According to Antony Polonsky the AK saw Jewish fugitives as security risks.^[65]^: 66 At the same time, AK's "paper mills" supplied forged identification documents to many Jewish fugitives, enabling them to pass as Poles.^[54]^: 275 Home Army published leaflet in 1943 stating that "Every Pole is obligated to help those in hiding. Those who refuse them aid will be punished on the basis of...treason to the Polish Nation".^[53]^: 194

Attitudes towards Jews in the Home Army were mixed.^[53]^: 418 A few AK units actively hunted down Jews.^[73]^: 238^[74] In particular, two district commanders in the east of Poland — Władysław Liniarski of Białystok and Janusz Szlaski of Nowogródek — openly and routinely persecuted Jewish partisans and fugitives.^[53]^{: 267–298} The extent of such behaviors in the Home Army overall has been disputed;^[75]^: 88–90^[76] some historians claim that the bulk of the Home Army's antisemitic behavior can be ascribed to a small minority of members,^[75]^: 88–90 often affiliated with the far-right National Democracy (N.D., or "endecja") party, whose National Armed Forces organization was mostly integrated into the Home Army in 1944.^[77]^: 17^[77]^: 45 It has been suggested that some of these incidents are better understood in the context of the Polish-Soviet conflict, as some of the Soviet-affiliated partisan units that AK units attacked or was attacked by had a sizable Jewish presence.^[52] In general, AK units in the east were more likely to be hostile towards Jewish partisans, who in turn were more closely associated with the Soviet underground, while AK units in the west were more helpful towards the Jews.^[53] Further, AK had a more favorable attitude towards Jewish civilians, and was more hesitant or hostile towards independent Jewish partisans, whom it suspected of pro-Soviet sympathies.^[53]^: 299 General Rowecki believed that antisemitic attitudes were related to Jewish involvement with Soviet partisans.^[53]^: 189 Some Home Army units were friendly to Jews,^[53]^: 346 and in Hanaczow Home Army officers hid and protected an entire 250 persons Jewish community, and supplied a Jewish Home Army platoon.^[53]^{: 314–318}

The Home Army leadership punished perpetrators of antisemitic violence in its ranks, in some cases sentencing them to death.^[75]^: 88–90

Most of underground press was sympathetic towards Jews,^[53]^: 188 and the Home Army's Bureau of Information and Propaganda was led by operatives who were pro-Jewish and represented the liberal wing of Home Army.^[53]^: 188 However, the bureau's Anti-Communist sub-division^[53]^: 188 ("Antyk"; see also Operation Antyk), created as a response to Communist propaganda,^[78] was led by operatives who held strong anti-communist and anti-Jewish views, including the zydokomuna stereotype.^[53]^: 188 The perceived association between Jews and communists was actively reinforced by Antyk, whose initial reports "tended to conflate communists with Jews, dangerously disseminating the notion that Jewish loyalties were to Soviet Russia and communism rather than to Poland," and which repeated the notion that anti-Semitism was a "useful tool in the struggle against Soviet Russia."^[53]^: 208^[53]^: 357 However, the belief that communism "depended in large part on a Jewish element" was not limited to Antyk.^[53]^: 358

Recognition

Members of the Home Army that were named Righteous Among the Nations include Jan Karski, Aleksander Kamiński, Stefan Korboński, Henryk Woliński, Jan Żabiński, Władysław Bartoszewski, Mieczysław Fogg, Henryk Iwański, Witold Bieńkowski and Jan Dobraczyński.^[79]^[80]

Relations with Lithuanians

Though the Lithuanian and Polish resistance movements had common enemies—Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union—they began working together only in 1944–45, after the Soviet reoccupation, when both fought the Soviet occupiers.^[81] The main obstacle to forming an alliance earlier was a long-standing territorial dispute over Vilnius (see "Żeligowski's Mutiny").^[82]

The Lithuanian Activist Front (Lietuvos Aktyvistų Frontas, or LAF)^[75]^: 163 had collaborated cooperated with Nazi operations against Poles during the German occupation. In autumn 1943 the Home Army opened retaliatory operations against the Nazis' Lithuanian supporters, mainly the Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft battalions, the Lithuanian Territorial Defense Force, and the Lithuanian Secret Police,^[83] and killed hundreds of mostly Lithuanian policemen and other collaborators during the first half of 1944. In response, the Lithuanian police, who had already killed hundreds of Polish civilians since 1941 (see "Ponary massacre"),^[75]^{: 168–169} intensified their operations against the Poles.

In April 1944 the Home Army in the Vilnius Region attempted to open negotiations with Povilas Plechavičius, commander of the Lithuanian Territorial Defense Force, proposing a nonaggression pact and cooperation against Nazi Germany.^[84] The Lithuanian side refused and demanded that the Poles either leave the Vilnius region (disputed between Poles and Lithuanians) or subordinate themselves to the Lithuanians' struggle against the Soviets.^[84] In the May 1944 Battle of Murowana Oszmianka, the Home Army dealt a substantial blow to the Lithuanian Nazi auxiliaries of the Lithuanian Territorial Defense Force.^[75]^{: 165–166}^[85] This resulted in a low-level civil war between anti-Nazi Poles and pro-Nazi Lithuanians, encouraged by the German authorities,^[83] culminating in June 1944 massacres of Polish and Lithuanian civilians, respectively, in the villages of Glitiškės (Glinciszki) and Dubingiai (Dubinki).^[75]^{: 168–169}

Postwar assessments of the Home Army's activities in Lithuania have been controversial. In 1993 the Home Army's activities there were investigated by a special Lithuanian government commission. Only in recent years have Polish and Lithuanian historians been able to approach consensus, though still differing in their interpretations of many events.^[86]^[87]

Relations with the Soviets

Home Army relations with the Soviet Red Army became increasingly poor over the course of the war. Not only had the Soviet Union invaded Poland on 17 September 1939, following the German invasion beginning 1 September 1939, but even after the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 the latter saw Polish partisans loyal to the Polish Government in Exile more as a potential obstacle to Soviet plans to take control of postwar Poland, than as a potential ally.^[88] On orders from the Soviet Stavka (high command), issued on 22 June 1943,^[75]^: 98–99 Soviet partisans engaged Polish partisans in combat, and it has been claimed that they attacked the Poles more often than they did the Germans.^[88]

In late 1943 the actions of Soviet partisans, who had been ordered to destroy Home Army forces,^[75]^: 98–99 even resulted in limited uneasy cooperation between some Home Army units and German forces.^[75]^: 88–90 While the Home Army still treated the Germans as the enemy and conducted operations against them,^[75]^: 88–90 when the Germans offered arms and supplies to the Home Army, to be used against the Soviet partisans, some Polish units in the Nowogródek and Wilno areas accepted them. However, such arrangements were purely tactical and indicated no ideological collaboration such as was shown by France's Vichy regime or Norway's Quisling regime.^[75]^: 88–90 The Poles' main motive was to acquire intelligence on the Germans and to obtain much-needed equipment.^[48] There were no known joint Polish-German operations, and the Germans were unsuccessful in recruiting the Poles to fight exclusively against the Soviet partisans.^[75]^: 88–90 Furthermore, most such cooperation by local Home Army commanders with the Germans was condemned by Home Army headquarters.^[75]^: 88–90 Tadeusz Piotrowski quotes Joseph Rothschild as saying that "The Polish Home Army was by and large untainted by collaboration", and as adding that "the honor of the AK as a whole is beyond reproach."^[75]^: 88–90

With the Eastern Front entering Polish territories in 1944, the Home Army established an uneasy truce with the Soviets. Even so, the main Red Army and NKVD forces conducted operations against Home Army partisans, including during or directly after Poland's Operation Tempest, which the Poles had envisioned to be a joint Polish-Soviet operation against the retreating Germans which would also establish Polish claims to those territories.^[26]^{[better source needed]} The Home Army helped Soviet units with scouting assistance, uprisings, and assistance in liberating some cities (e.g., Operation Ostra Brama in Vilnius, and the Lwów Uprising), only to find that immediately afterwards Home Army troops were arrested, imprisoned –even executed.^[15] Unknown to the Poles, their Operation Tempest had been fatally flawed from the start due to Joseph Stalin's intention of ensuring that an independent Poland would never re-emerge after the war.^[89]

Long after the war, Soviet forces continued engaging elements of the Home Army. Many Home Army soldiers continued their war in an anti-Soviet Polish underground known as the "cursed soldiers".^[26]^{[better source needed]}

Relations with Ukrainians

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a Ukrainian nationalist force and the military arm of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN),^[90] which some historians consider fascist,^[91] decided in 1943 - while fighting the Germans, Soviets and Poles, who they saw as occupiers of the future ethnically-pure Ukrainian state^[92] - to direct most of its attacks against Poles and Jews.^[92] One of UPA's leaders, Stepan Bandera, and his followers, concluded that the war would end in the exhaustion of both Germany and the Soviet Union, leaving only the Poles - who laid claim to East Galicia (viewed by the Ukrainians as Western Ukraine, and by the Poles as Eastern Poland) - as a significant force, and therefore had to be weakened before Poland rose again.^[93] Poland's plans to restore its prewar borders were opposed by the Ukrainians, and some Ukrainian groups' collaboration with Nazi Germany had discredited their partisans as potential Polish allies.^[93]

The OUN decided to attack Polish civilians, who constituted about a third of the population of the disputed territories.^[93] The OUN equated Ukrainian independence with ethnic homogeneity; the Polish presence had to be removed completely.^[93] By February 1943 the OUN began a deliberate campaign of killing Polish civilians.^[93] OUN forces targeted Polish villages, prompting the formation of Polish self-defense units (e.g., the Przebraże Defence) and fights between the Home Army and the OUN.^[93] The Germans encouraged both sides against each other; Erich Koch said: "We have to do everything possible so that a Pole, when meeting a Ukrainian, will be ready to kill him, and conversely, a Ukrainian will be ready to kill the Pole." A German commissioner from Sarny, when local Poles complained about massacres, answered: "You want Sikorski, the Ukrainians want Bandera. Fight each other."^[94] In massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, beginning in the spring of 1943 100,000 Poles were killed.^[95]^[96]^[97]

The Polish Government-in-Exile, in London, was taken by surprise; it had not expected Ukrainian anti-Polish actions of such magnitude.^[93] There is no evidence that the Polish Government-in-Exile contemplated a general policy of revenge against the Ukrainians, but local Poles, including Home Army commanders, engaged in retaliatory actions.^[93] Polish partisans attacked the OUN, assassinated Ukrainian commanders, and carried out operations against Ukrainian villages.^[93] The Home Army command tried to limit operations against Ukrainian civilians to a minimum.^[98] According to Grzegorz Motyka, the Polish operations resulted in 10,000 to 15,000 Ukrainian deaths in 1943-47,^[99] including 8,000-10,000 on territory of post-war Poland.^[100]^[101] By winter 1943 and spring 1944 the Home Army was preparing for Operation Tempest, one of whose goals was strengthening the Polish position in Volhynia. In January 1944 the 27th Home Army Infantry Division was formed, numbering 7,000 men, purposed to defend Polish civilians and engage the OUN and German forces.^[93]

By mid-1944, the region was occupied by the Soviet Red Army. Polish partisans disbanded or went underground, as did most Ukrainian partisans. Both the Poles and the Ukrainians would increasingly concentrate on the Soviets as their primary enemy – and both would ultimately fail.^[93]

Volhynia

After the first killings, the Polish underground began organizing self-defense.^[102] The commander of the Home Army Wołyń District, Col. Kazimierz Bąbiński, "Luboń", forbade reprisals against Ukrainians.^[103] On 10 July 1943, Zygmunt Rumel was sent to talk with local Ukrainians, with the goal of ending the massacres. The mission was unsuccessful; the Banderites killed the Polish delegation.^[104] On 15 July 1943 the Home Army planned to carry out an operation to assassinate the OUN-B members and thus thwart anti-Polish actions. However, it was incorrectly assumed that the action was planned for 20 July.^[105] On 20 July the Home Army command decided to establish partisan units in Volhynia. Nine troops were created, numbering about a thousand soldiers.^[106] The Home Army also executed individual Ukrainians who were suspected of sympathizing with the Ukrainian nationalists.^[107]

In January 1944 the 27th Home Army Infantry Division was formed in Volhynia. Between January and March 1944, the division fought 16 major battles with the UPA, expanding its operational base and securing Polish forces against the main attack.^[108] The district commander forbade the killing of Ukrainian women and children and announced that he would punish such conduct.^[109]^[110] The Ukrainian population was driven out of the overrun villages to avoid diversion.^[111]

There were cases of Home Army troops and local self-defense carrying out war crimes on the Ukrainian population. The number of Ukrainians killed in retaliation is estimated at 2,000-3,000.^[112]^[113]^[114]^[115] Such actions were criticized by the Home Army commander.^[116]

Eastern Galicia

In May 1943 an order was issued stating the principles of creating self-defense.^[117] In 1943, Ukrainians suspected of sympathizing with the Ukrainian nationalists were executed.^[118] In February 1944, the Home Army Area Command ordered that, in the event of rising killings, pacification operations were to be employed against Ukrainian settlements.^[119]^[120] Retaliatory operations aimed at intimidating the Ukrainian population contributed to increased support for the UPA.^[121] Also in eastern Galicia there were cases of crimes against Ukrainians. Leaflets were often disseminated, demanding that the Ukrainians leave these lands.^[122] Ukrainian victims of retaliation in eastern Galicia numbered between 1,000 and 2,000.^[113]

The real battle between the Home Army and the UPA took place in Hanaczów, where local self-defense managed to fend off two attacks.^[123]

Lubelszczyzna and Rzeszowszczyzna

In September, leaflets calling on Poles to leave these lands appeared in the Lublin region. At the beginning of 1944, the Banderites formed two SB militias, which in January attacked Poles.^[124] To counteract the escalating terror of the OUN and the UPA, the AK and BCh troops carried out an offensive on March 10, 1944, during which about 1,500 Ukrainians were killed.^[125] The aim of AK and BCh was to intimidate and discourage the Banderites to take larger anti-Polish actions in this area.^[126] The Lublin district AK command distanced itself from the operation (despite its previous agreement to it). Probably an investigation had been initiated. Captain Marian Gołębiewski, one of the operation's organizers, later complained: "I was threatened with trial over the so-called genocide."^[127]

In March 1944, several UPA kurins entered the Lublin area and continued killing Poles. The UPA units came into conflict with Polish partisans, leading to the development of a several-dozen-kilometer-long front. Several thousand partisans were involved in the fighting on the two sides.

From February to April 1945, mainly in Rzeszowszczyzna (the Rzeszów area), Polish units (including affiliates of the Home Army) carried out retaliatory attacks in which about 3,000 Ukrainians were killed.^[128]

Notes

a ^{^} A number of sources note that the Home Army was the largest resistance movement in Nazi-occupied Europe. Norman Davies writes that the "Armia Krajowa (Home Army), the AK,... could fairly claim to be the largest of European resistance [organizations]."^[129] Gregor Dallas writes that the "Home Army (Armia Krajowa or AK) in late 1943 numbered around 400,000, making it the largest resistance organization in Europe."^[130] Mark Wyman writes that the "Armia Krajowa was considered the largest underground resistance unit in wartime Europe."^[131] The numbers of Soviet partisans were very similar to those of the Polish resistance.^[132]

References

Notes

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^ Strzembosz, Tomasz (1983). Akcje zbrojne podziemnej Warszawy 1939–1944. Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy. ISBN 83-06-00717-4.
^ Andrzej Kunert: Żegota. Rada Pomocy Żydom 1942 – 1945. Warszawa: 2002, s. 34. Cytat: – Andrzej Friszke: Czy skala wyroków śmierci wydawanych w tych sprawach przez sądy Polski Podziemnej była na tyle znaczna, by mogła odstraszyć szmalcowników? – Władysław Bartoszewski: Nie, ale to była bardzo trudna sprawa. Mimo że w żadnym kraju okupowanej Europy podziemie nie wydało tylu wyroków, co u nas, to jednak trzeba zauważyć, że była to sprawa wyjątkowo trudna. Jak wytropić szmalcownika? Muszą być grupy, które obserwują i łapią. Gdzie? Na ulicy. I na gorącym uczynku. Bo przecież ofiara szantażu nigdy go nie znajdzie..
^ [4] “Barwy Białe” on their Way to Aid Fighting Warsaw. The Crimes of the Home Army against the Jews, Holocaust Studies and Materials
^ ^a ^b ^c Holocaust: Responses to the persecution and mass murder of the Jews. Holocaust: critical concepts in historical studies. Vol. 5. David Cesarani, Sarah Kavanaugh (eds.). London ; New York: Routledge. 2004. ISBN 978-0-415-27509-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: others (link) ^{[page needed]}
^ Rashke, Richard (1995) [1983]. Escape from Sobibor (second ed.). University of Illinois Press. p. 416. ISBN 978-0252064791.
^ Richard Conrad Lukas (28 August 2012). The Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles Under German Occupation 1939–1944. Hippocrene Books, Incorporated. p. 175. ISBN 978-0-7818-1302-0.
^ [Scypion], Waldemar Sadaj. "Okręg Warszawa AK". www.dws-xip.pl. Retrieved 30 May 2018.
^ Monika Koszyńska, Paweł Kosiński, Pomoc Armii Krajowej dla powstańców żydowskich w getcie warszawskim (wiosna 1943 r.), 2012, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej
^ [5] Zimmerman: Podziemie polskie a Żydzi. Solidarność, zdrada i wszystko pomiędzy ResPublica
^ -"The Stroop report," Pantheon 1986 ISBN 0-394-73817-9
^ The Stroop Report: The Jewish Quarter of Warsaw is No More, Secker & Warburg, 1980.
^ Bauer, Yehuda (1989). "Jewish Resistance and Passivity in the Face of the Holocaust". Unanswered questions: Nazi Germany and the genocide of the Jews (1st American ed.). New York: Schocken Books. pp. 235–251. ISBN 978-0-8052-4051-1. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
^ Connelly, John (14 November 2012). "The Noble and the Base: Poland and the Holocaust". The Nation. ISSN 0027-8378. Retrieved 22 April 2018.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^o Tadeusz Piotrowski, Poland's Holocaust, McFarland & Company, 1997, ISBN 0-7864-0371-3
^ Eliach, Yaffa (2009) [1996]. "The Pogrom at Eishyshok". New York Times. Retrieved 27 September 2009.
^ ^a ^b Gunnar S. Paulsson (2002). Secret City: The Hidden Jews of Warsaw, 1940–1945. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-09546-3.
^ Żołnierze akcji „Antyk” kontra komuniści Polska Zbrojna 26.10.2017
^ "Statistics - The Righteous Among The Nations - Yad Vashem". yadvashem.org.
^ "Polish Righteous Among the Nations list - The Righteous Among the Nations Department" (PDF). yadvashem.org. 2014.
^ Template:Lt icon Arūnas Bubnys. Lietuvių ir lenkų pasipriešinimo judėjimai 1942–1945 m.: sąsajos ir skirtumai (Lithuanian and Polish resistance movements 1942–1945), 30 January 2004
^ Petersen, Roger (2002). Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-century Eastern Europe. Cambridge University. p. 152. ISBN 0-521-00774-7.
^ ^a ^b Snyder, Timothy (2003). The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999. Yale University Press. p. 84. ISBN 0-300-10586-X.
^ ^a ^b Piskunowicz, Henryk (1996). "Armia Krajowa na Wileńszczyżnie". In Krzysztof Komorowski (ed.). Armia Krajowa: Rozwój organizacyjny (in Polish). Wydawnictwo Bellona. pp. 213–214. ISBN 83-11-08544-7.
^ Template:Pl icon Henryk Piskunowicz, Działalnośc zbrojna Armi Krajowej na Wileńszczyśnie w latach 1942–1944 in Zygmunt Boradyn; Andrzej Chmielarz; Henryk Piskunowicz (1997). Tomasz Strzembosz (ed.). Armia Krajowa na Nowogródczyźnie i Wileńszczyźnie (1941–1945). Warsaw: Institute of Political Sciences, Polish Academy of Sciences. pp. 40–45. ISBN 83-907168-0-3. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: checksum (help); Unknown parameter |ignore-isbn-error= ignored (|isbn= suggested) (help)
^ Template:Pl icon Gazeta Wyborcza, 2004-09-01, W Wilnie pojednają się dziś weterani litewskiej armii i polskiej AK Archived 11 March 2007 at the Wayback Machine (Today in Vilnius veterans of Lithuanian army and AK will forgive each other). Retrieved 7 June 2006.
^ Dovile, Budryte (30 September 2005). Taming Nationalism?. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. ISBN 0-7546-4281-X. p.187
^ ^a ^b Review of Sowjetische Partisanen in Weißrußland Archived 18 July 2012 at the Wayback Machine, by Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, in Sarmatian Review, April 2006
^ Judith Olsak-Glass, Review of Piotrowski's Poland's Holocaust in Sarmatian Review, January 1999.
^ Marples, David R. (2007). Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine. Central European University Press. pp. 285–286. ISBN 9637326987.
^ Rudling, Per A. (November 2011). "The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths". Number 2107. University of Pittsburgh: The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies. p. 3 (6 of 76 in PDF). ISSN 0889-275X. From the moment of its founding, fascists were integral to, and played a central role in, the organization. The OUN avoided designating itself as fascist in order to emphasize the "originality" of Ukrainian nationalism.⁷ In 1941 the organization split between a more radical wing, the OUN(b), named after its leader, Stepan Bandera, and a more conservative wing, the OUN(m), led by Andrii Mel'nyk. Both were totalitarian, anti-Semitic, and fascist. {{cite journal}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
^ ^a ^b Cooke, Philip; Shepherd, Ben (2014). Hitler's Europe Ablaze: Occupation, Resistance, and Rebellion during World War II. Skyhorse Publishing. pp. 336–337. ISBN 1632201593. Jews who had escaped the Holocaust, and a large Polish minority, passionately hated UPA because it engaged in thorough ethnic cleansing, killing all the Jews it could find, about 50,000 Poles in Volhynia and between 20,000 and 30,000 Poles in Galicia.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k Timothy Snyder, "To Resolve the Ukrainian Question Once and for All: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947," Journal of Cold War Studies, Spring 1999 Vol. 1 Issue 2, pp. 86–120
^ Jurij Kiriczuk, Jak za Jaremy i Krzywonosa, Gazeta Wyborcza 23 April 2003. Retrieved 5 March 2008.
^ Grzegorz Motyka, Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji "Wisła". Konflikt polsko-ukraiński 1943- 1947. Kraków 2011, p.447-448
^ "The Effects of the Volhynian Massacres". 1943 Volhynia Massacres. Truth and Remembrance. Institute of National Remembrance. Retrieved 18 November 2019.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
^ J. P. Himka. Interventions: Challenging the Myths of Twentieth-Century Ukrainian history. University of Alberta. 28 March 2011. p. 4
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942- 1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 413. ISBN 83-7399-163-8.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2016). Wołyń'43 Ludobójcza czystka - fakty, analogie, polityka historyczna. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie. p. 120. ISBN 978-83-08-06207-4.
^ Grzegorz Motyka, Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji "Wisła", Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2011, p. 448.
^ Anna Kondek, Ukaże się nowa publikacja o konflikcie polsko-ukraińskim, PAP, 2011-02-20. Retrieved 2015-05-13.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 324.
^ Piotrowski, Tadeusz (2000-01-01). Genocide and Rescue in Wołyń: Recollections of the Ukrainian Nationalist Ethnic Cleansing Campaign Against the Poles During World War II. McFarland. ISBN 9780786407736.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 327.
^ W. Romanowski, ZWZ-AK na Wołyniu 1939–1944, Lublin 1993.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz. Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Warsaw. p. 348.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 349.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz. Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. pp. 358–360.
^ Klimecki, Michał (12 August 2016). "Combat involvement of Poland's 27th Infantry Division of the Volhynia Home Army against the UPA in the light of the 27th's entire combat trail" (PDF). 1943 Volhynia Massacres. Truth and Remembrance. Institute of National Remembrance. Archived from the original (PDF) on 12 August 2016.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 358.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 359.
^ Turowski, Józef (1990). Pożoga. Walki 27 Wołyńskiej Dywizji Piechoty AK. Warsaw. pp. 512–513.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
^ ^a ^b Massacre, Volhynia. "The Effects of the Volhynian Massacres". Volhynia Massacre. Retrieved 20 June 2018.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 412.
^ Kęsik, Jan (2002). "Ogólny bilans strat ludności w wyniku ukraińsko-polskiego konfliktu narodowościowego w latach II wojny światowej". Polska-Ukraina. Trudne pytania. Tom 9. Warsaw. p. 41.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 5, p. 266 Written by Ihor Ilyushin.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 390.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 391.
^ Grzegorz, Motyka (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 391.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2016). Wołyń'43 ludobójcza czystka- fakty, analogei, polityka historyczna. Wydawnictwo Literackie. p. 109. ISBN 978-83-08-06207-4.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2016). Wołyń'43 ludobójcza czystka- fakty, analogei, polityka historyczna. Wydawnictwo Literackie. p. 110. ISBN 978-83-08-06207-4.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 392.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. pp. 382, 387.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. pp. 395–396.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 396.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2016). Wołyń'43 Ludobójcza czystka - fakty, analogie, polityka historyczna. Wydawnictwo Literackie. p. 114. ISBN 978-83-08-06207-4.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2016). Wołyń'43 Ludobójcza czystka- fakty, analogie, polityka historyczna. Wydawnictwo Literackie. p. 113. ISBN 978-83-08-06207-4.
^ Motyka, Grzegorz. Ukraińska partyzantka 1942- 1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 578. ISBN 83-7399-163-8.
^ Norman Davies (28 February 2005). God's Playground: 1795 to the present. Columbia University Press. p. 344. ISBN 978-0-231-12819-3. Retrieved 30 May 2012.
^ Gregor Dallas (2005). 1945: The War that Never Ended. Yale University Press. p. 79. ISBN 978-0-300-10980-1.
^ Mark Wyman (18 June 1998). DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945–51. Cornell University Press. p. 34. ISBN 0-8014-8542-8.
^ See, for example, Leonid D. Grenkevich, The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–44: A Critical Historiographical Analysis, p. 229, and Walter Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990, p. 233.

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Bibliography

Strzembosz, Tomasz (1983). "Akcje zbrojne podziemnej Warszawy 1939–1944" (eng. Armed actions of underground Warsaw 1939-1944) (in Polish). Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy. ISBN 8306007174.
Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, Secret Army, New York, Macmillan Company, 1951, ISBN 0-89839-082-6.
Norman Davies, Rising '44, Macmillan, 2003.
Richard C. Lukas, Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles under German Occupation, 1939–1944, New York, 1997.
Roger Moorhouse, Killing Hitler, Jonathan Cape, 2006, ISBN 0-224-07121-1.
Marek Ney-Krwawicz, The Polish Home Army, 1939–1945, London, 2001.
Michael Alfred Peszke, The Polish Underground Army, the Western Allies, and the Failure of Strategic Unity in World War II, McFarland & Company, 2004, ISBN 0-7864-2009-X. Google Print^{[permanent dead link]}
Michael Alfred Peszke, The Armed Forces of Poland in the West, 1939–46: Strategic Concepts, Planning, Limited Success but No Victory!, Helion Studies in Military History, no. 13, Solihull, England, Helion & Company, Ltd, 2013, ISBN 978-1-90891-654-9.
Jonathan Walker, Poland Alone: Britain, SOE and the Collapse of the Polish Resistance, 1944, The History Press, 2008, ISBN 978-1-86227-474-7.

External links

Armia Krajowa Museum in Krakow
Polish resistance – AK – Site edited by the London Branch of the Polish Home Army Ex-Servicemen Association
Warsaw Uprising Museum
Template:Pl icon Archiwum Pomorskie Armii Krajowej
The Home Army After July 1944 Polish Underground Soldiers 1944–1963 – The Untold Story

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[24] Żołnierze Batalionu Armii Krajowej "Zośka" represjonowani w latach 1944–1956," Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warszawa 2008, ISBN 978-83-60464-92-2

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[50] Powstanie warszawskie w walce i dyplomacji - page 23 Janusz Kazimierz Zawodny, Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert 2005

[Krakowski_2003-51] Shmuel Krakowski. The Attitude of the Polish Underground to the Jewish Question during the Second World War. In: Joshua D. Zimmerman, ed. Contested Memories: Poles and Jews during the Holocaust and its Aftermath. Rutgers University Press, 2003. Pages 102.

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[58] "Henryk Wolinski". www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org.

[59] John Wolffe; Open University (2004). Religion in History: Conflict, Conversion and Coexistence. Manchester University Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-7190-7107-2.

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[CherryOrla-Bukowska2007-61] Robert Cherry; Annamaria Orla-Bukowska (7 June 2007). Rethinking Poles and Jews: Troubled Past, Brighter Future. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 119–120. ISBN 978-1-4616-4308-1.

[62] Strzembosz, Tomasz (1983). Akcje zbrojne podziemnej Warszawy 1939–1944. Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy. ISBN 83-06-00717-4.

[63] Andrzej Kunert: Żegota. Rada Pomocy Żydom 1942 – 1945. Warszawa: 2002, s. 34. Cytat: – Andrzej Friszke: Czy skala wyroków śmierci wydawanych w tych sprawach przez sądy Polski Podziemnej była na tyle znaczna, by mogła odstraszyć szmalcowników? – Władysław Bartoszewski: Nie, ale to była bardzo trudna sprawa. Mimo że w żadnym kraju okupowanej Europy podziemie nie wydało tylu wyroków, co u nas, to jednak trzeba zauważyć, że była to sprawa wyjątkowo trudna. Jak wytropić szmalcownika? Muszą być grupy, które obserwują i łapią. Gdzie? Na ulicy. I na gorącym uczynku. Bo przecież ofiara szantażu nigdy go nie znajdzie..

[64] [4] “Barwy Białe” on their Way to Aid Fighting Warsaw. The Crimes of the Home Army against the Jews, Holocaust Studies and Materials

[Cesarani_&_Kavanaugh-65] Holocaust: Responses to the persecution and mass murder of the Jews. Holocaust: critical concepts in historical studies. Vol. 5. David Cesarani, Sarah Kavanaugh (eds.). London ; New York: Routledge. 2004. ISBN 978-0-415-27509-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: others (link) ^{[page needed]}

[66] Rashke, Richard (1995) [1983]. Escape from Sobibor (second ed.). University of Illinois Press. p. 416. ISBN 978-0252064791.

[67] Richard Conrad Lukas (28 August 2012). The Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles Under German Occupation 1939–1944. Hippocrene Books, Incorporated. p. 175. ISBN 978-0-7818-1302-0.

[68] [Scypion], Waldemar Sadaj. "Okręg Warszawa AK". www.dws-xip.pl. Retrieved 30 May 2018.

[69] Monika Koszyńska, Paweł Kosiński, Pomoc Armii Krajowej dla powstańców żydowskich w getcie warszawskim (wiosna 1943 r.), 2012, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej

[70] [5] Zimmerman: Podziemie polskie a Żydzi. Solidarność, zdrada i wszystko pomiędzy ResPublica

[71] -"The Stroop report," Pantheon 1986 ISBN 0-394-73817-9

[72] The Stroop Report: The Jewish Quarter of Warsaw is No More, Secker & Warburg, 1980.

[Bauer_1989-73] Bauer, Yehuda (1989). "Jewish Resistance and Passivity in the Face of the Holocaust". Unanswered questions: Nazi Germany and the genocide of the Jews (1st American ed.). New York: Schocken Books. pp. 235–251. ISBN 978-0-8052-4051-1. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)

[Connelly_2012-74] Connelly, John (14 November 2012). "The Noble and the Base: Poland and the Holocaust". The Nation. ISSN 0027-8378. Retrieved 22 April 2018.

[Piotrowski-75] ^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^o Tadeusz Piotrowski, Poland's Holocaust, McFarland & Company, 1997, ISBN 0-7864-0371-3

[Eliach-76] Eliach, Yaffa (2009) [1996]. "The Pogrom at Eishyshok". New York Times. Retrieved 27 September 2009.

[Paulsson_2002-77] Gunnar S. Paulsson (2002). Secret City: The Hidden Jews of Warsaw, 1940–1945. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-09546-3.

[78] Żołnierze akcji „Antyk” kontra komuniści Polska Zbrojna 26.10.2017

[79] "Statistics - The Righteous Among The Nations - Yad Vashem". yadvashem.org.

[80] "Polish Righteous Among the Nations list - The Righteous Among the Nations Department" (PDF). yadvashem.org. 2014.

[81] Template:Lt icon Arūnas Bubnys. Lietuvių ir lenkų pasipriešinimo judėjimai 1942–1945 m.: sąsajos ir skirtumai (Lithuanian and Polish resistance movements 1942–1945), 30 January 2004

[Petersen_2002-82] Petersen, Roger (2002). Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-century Eastern Europe. Cambridge University. p. 152. ISBN 0-521-00774-7.

[Snyder_2003-83] Snyder, Timothy (2003). The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999. Yale University Press. p. 84. ISBN 0-300-10586-X.

[Piskunowicz_1996-84] Piskunowicz, Henryk (1996). "Armia Krajowa na Wileńszczyżnie". In Krzysztof Komorowski (ed.). Armia Krajowa: Rozwój organizacyjny (in Polish). Wydawnictwo Bellona. pp. 213–214. ISBN 83-11-08544-7.

[Boradyn-85] Template:Pl icon Henryk Piskunowicz, Działalnośc zbrojna Armi Krajowej na Wileńszczyśnie w latach 1942–1944 in Zygmunt Boradyn; Andrzej Chmielarz; Henryk Piskunowicz (1997). Tomasz Strzembosz (ed.). Armia Krajowa na Nowogródczyźnie i Wileńszczyźnie (1941–1945). Warsaw: Institute of Political Sciences, Polish Academy of Sciences. pp. 40–45. ISBN 83-907168-0-3. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: checksum (help); Unknown parameter |ignore-isbn-error= ignored (|isbn= suggested) (help)

[GW_2004-86] Template:Pl icon Gazeta Wyborcza, 2004-09-01, W Wilnie pojednają się dziś weterani litewskiej armii i polskiej AK Archived 11 March 2007 at the Wayback Machine (Today in Vilnius veterans of Lithuanian army and AK will forgive each other). Retrieved 7 June 2006.

[Dovile-87] Dovile, Budryte (30 September 2005). Taming Nationalism?. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. ISBN 0-7546-4281-X. p.187

[Chod-88] Review of Sowjetische Partisanen in Weißrußland Archived 18 July 2012 at the Wayback Machine, by Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, in Sarmatian Review, April 2006

[Glass_1999-89] Judith Olsak-Glass, Review of Piotrowski's Poland's Holocaust in Sarmatian Review, January 1999.

[Marples286-90] Marples, David R. (2007). Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine. Central European University Press. pp. 285–286. ISBN 9637326987.

[Rudling3-91] Rudling, Per A. (November 2011). "The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths". Number 2107. University of Pittsburgh: The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies. p. 3 (6 of 76 in PDF). ISSN 0889-275X. From the moment of its founding, fascists were integral to, and played a central role in, the organization. The OUN avoided designating itself as fascist in order to emphasize the "originality" of Ukrainian nationalism.⁷ In 1941 the organization split between a more radical wing, the OUN(b), named after its leader, Stepan Bandera, and a more conservative wing, the OUN(m), led by Andrii Mel'nyk. Both were totalitarian, anti-Semitic, and fascist. {{cite journal}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Cite journal requires |journal= (help)

[Cooke-92] Cooke, Philip; Shepherd, Ben (2014). Hitler's Europe Ablaze: Occupation, Resistance, and Rebellion during World War II. Skyhorse Publishing. pp. 336–337. ISBN 1632201593. Jews who had escaped the Holocaust, and a large Polish minority, passionately hated UPA because it engaged in thorough ethnic cleansing, killing all the Jews it could find, about 50,000 Poles in Volhynia and between 20,000 and 30,000 Poles in Galicia.

[Snyder_1999-93] ^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k Timothy Snyder, "To Resolve the Ukrainian Question Once and for All: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947," Journal of Cold War Studies, Spring 1999 Vol. 1 Issue 2, pp. 86–120

[Kiriczuk_2003-94] Jurij Kiriczuk, Jak za Jaremy i Krzywonosa, Gazeta Wyborcza 23 April 2003. Retrieved 5 March 2008.

[95] Grzegorz Motyka, Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji "Wisła". Konflikt polsko-ukraiński 1943- 1947. Kraków 2011, p.447-448

[96] "The Effects of the Volhynian Massacres". 1943 Volhynia Massacres. Truth and Remembrance. Institute of National Remembrance. Retrieved 18 November 2019.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)

[97] J. P. Himka. Interventions: Challenging the Myths of Twentieth-Century Ukrainian history. University of Alberta. 28 March 2011. p. 4

[98] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942- 1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 413. ISBN 83-7399-163-8.

[99] Motyka, Grzegorz (2016). Wołyń'43 Ludobójcza czystka - fakty, analogie, polityka historyczna. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie. p. 120. ISBN 978-83-08-06207-4.

[:2-100] Grzegorz Motyka, Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji "Wisła", Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2011, p. 448.

[101] Anna Kondek, Ukaże się nowa publikacja o konflikcie polsko-ukraińskim, PAP, 2011-02-20. Retrieved 2015-05-13.

[102] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 324.

[103] Piotrowski, Tadeusz (2000-01-01). Genocide and Rescue in Wołyń: Recollections of the Ukrainian Nationalist Ethnic Cleansing Campaign Against the Poles During World War II. McFarland. ISBN 9780786407736.

[104] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 327.

[105] W. Romanowski, ZWZ-AK na Wołyniu 1939–1944, Lublin 1993.

[106] Motyka, Grzegorz. Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Warsaw. p. 348.

[107] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 349.

[108] Motyka, Grzegorz. Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. pp. 358–360.

[109] Klimecki, Michał (12 August 2016). "Combat involvement of Poland's 27th Infantry Division of the Volhynia Home Army against the UPA in the light of the 27th's entire combat trail" (PDF). 1943 Volhynia Massacres. Truth and Remembrance. Institute of National Remembrance. Archived from the original (PDF) on 12 August 2016.

[110] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 358.

[111] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 359.

[112] Turowski, Józef (1990). Pożoga. Walki 27 Wołyńskiej Dywizji Piechoty AK. Warsaw. pp. 512–513.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)

[:1-113] Massacre, Volhynia. "The Effects of the Volhynian Massacres". Volhynia Massacre. Retrieved 20 June 2018.

[114] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 412.

[115] Kęsik, Jan (2002). "Ogólny bilans strat ludności w wyniku ukraińsko-polskiego konfliktu narodowościowego w latach II wojny światowej". Polska-Ukraina. Trudne pytania. Tom 9. Warsaw. p. 41.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)

[116] Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 5, p. 266 Written by Ihor Ilyushin.

[117] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 390.

[118] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 391.

[119] Grzegorz, Motyka (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 391.

[120] Motyka, Grzegorz (2016). Wołyń'43 ludobójcza czystka- fakty, analogei, polityka historyczna. Wydawnictwo Literackie. p. 109. ISBN 978-83-08-06207-4.

[121] Motyka, Grzegorz (2016). Wołyń'43 ludobójcza czystka- fakty, analogei, polityka historyczna. Wydawnictwo Literackie. p. 110. ISBN 978-83-08-06207-4.

[122] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 392.

[123] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. pp. 382, 387.

[124] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. pp. 395–396.

[125] Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 396.

[126] Motyka, Grzegorz (2016). Wołyń'43 Ludobójcza czystka - fakty, analogie, polityka historyczna. Wydawnictwo Literackie. p. 114. ISBN 978-83-08-06207-4.

[127] Motyka, Grzegorz (2016). Wołyń'43 Ludobójcza czystka- fakty, analogie, polityka historyczna. Wydawnictwo Literackie. p. 113. ISBN 978-83-08-06207-4.

[128] Motyka, Grzegorz. Ukraińska partyzantka 1942- 1960. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. p. 578. ISBN 83-7399-163-8.

[Davies2005-129] Norman Davies (28 February 2005). God's Playground: 1795 to the present. Columbia University Press. p. 344. ISBN 978-0-231-12819-3. Retrieved 30 May 2012.

[Dallas2005-130] Gregor Dallas (2005). 1945: The War that Never Ended. Yale University Press. p. 79. ISBN 978-0-300-10980-1.

[Wyman1998-131] Mark Wyman (18 June 1998). DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945–51. Cornell University Press. p. 34. ISBN 0-8014-8542-8.

[132] See, for example, Leonid D. Grenkevich, The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–44: A Critical Historiographical Analysis, p. 229, and Walter Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990, p. 233.

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@@ Line 37: / Line 37: @@
 Because the Home Army was loyal to the Polish Government-in-Exile, the Soviet Union saw it as an obstacle to [[Communism in Poland]]. Consequently, over the course of the war, conflict grew between the Home Army and Soviet forces. During the Soviet occupation of Poland thousands of former Home Army operatives were deported to [[Gulag]]s and Soviet prisons, while others - including senior commanders like [[Leopold Okulicki]] and [[Emil August Fieldorf]] - were executed.
-Following the war, the official propaganda line in communist Poland was that the Home Army was an oppressive and reactionary force, at least in the 1950s and 1960s. Following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe the image of the Home Army has been more positive.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5703/shofar.29.1.73?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents|title=An Inconvenient Past: Post-Communist Holocaust Memorialization on JSTOR}}</ref>
+Following the war, the view in communist Poland was that the Home Army was an oppressive and reactionary force. Following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe the image of the Home Army has been more positive.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5703/shofar.29.1.73?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents|title=An Inconvenient Past: Post-Communist Holocaust Memorialization on JSTOR}}</ref>
 ==History and operations==
@@ Line 47: / Line 47: @@
 [[File:Polish Boy Scouts fighting in the Warsaw Uprising.jpg|thumb|Young [[Radosław Group]] soldiers, 2 September 1944, a month into the [[Warsaw Uprising]]. They had just marched several hours through Warsaw sewers.]]
-The [[Polish government-in-exile]] envisioned the Home Army as an apolitical, nationwide resistance organization.<ref name="Enc. WIEM: AK"/> The supreme command defined the Home Army's chief tasks as partisan warfare against the German occupiers, re-creation of armed forces underground and, near the end of the German occupation, a general armed rising to be prosecuted until victory.<ref name="MNK"/><ref name="Enc. PWN: AK"/><ref name="Enc. WIEM: AK"/> Home Army plans envisioned, at war's end, the seizure of [[power (sociology)|power]] in Poland by the [[Government Delegation for Poland]] (the ''Delegatura'') and by the Government in Exile itself, which expected to return to Poland.
+The [[Polish government-in-exile]] envisioned the Home Army as an apolitical, nationwide resistance organization.<ref name="Enc. WIEM: AK">{{pl icon}} [http://portalwiedzy.onet.pl/59129,,,,armia_krajowa,haslo.html Armia Krajowa]. [[Enc. WIEM]]. Retrieved 2 April 2008.</ref> The supreme command defined the Home Army's chief tasks as partisan warfare against the German occupiers, re-creation of armed forces underground and, near the end of the German occupation, a general armed rising to be prosecuted until victory.<ref name="MNK"/><ref name="Enc. PWN: AK"/><ref name="Enc. WIEM: AK"/> Home Army plans envisioned, at war's end, the seizure of [[power (sociology)|power]] in Poland by the [[Government Delegation for Poland]] (the ''Delegatura'') and by the Government in Exile itself, which expected to return to Poland.
 In addition to the Polish government in London, a political organization operated in Poland itself - a deliberative body of the resistance and of the [[Polish Underground State]]. The [[Political Consultative Committee]] (''Polityczny Komitet Porozumiewawczy'')  formed in 1940 pursuant to an agreement between several major political parties:  the [[Polish Socialist Party|Socialist Party]], [[People's Party (Poland)|People's Party]], [[National Party (Poland)|National Party]] and [[Labor Party (Stronnictwo Pracy)|Labor Party]].  In 1943 it was renamed to [[Home Political Representation]] (''Krajowa Reprezentacja Polityczna'') and in 1944 to [[Council of National Unity]] (''Rada Jedności Narodowej'').{{r|Leslie|pp=235-236}}
@@ Line 60: / Line 60: @@
 [[File:The Third Reich - polish resistance poster, German-occupied Poland, 1943.jpg|thumb|''Der Klabautermann'' (an [[Operation N]] magazine), 3 January 1943 issue, satirizing [[Third Reich]] Nazi terror and genocide. ''At right, emerging from the ''III'' ("Three", of "Third Reich")'': [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] and [[Heinrich Himmler|Himmler]].]]
-The Home Army supplied valuable [[intelligence (information gathering)|intelligence]] to the Allies; 43% of all reports received by the [[British secret services]] from continental Europe in between 1939 and 1945 came from Polish sources.<ref name="Pan 2006"/> For the Western Allies, the intelligence provided by the Home Army was considered to be the best source of information on the Eastern Front.<ref name="Ney-Krwawicz2001-98">{{cite book|author=Marek Ney-Krwawicz|title=Polish Home Army, 1939-1945|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DtohAQAAIAAJ|year=2001|publisher=PUMST|isbn=978-0-9501348-9-5|page=98}}</ref>
+The Home Army supplied valuable [[intelligence (information gathering)|intelligence]] to the Allies; 43% of all reports received by the [[British secret services]] from continental Europe in between 1939 and 1945 came from Polish sources.<ref name="Pan 2006"/>
-[[Home Army intelligence]] provided the Allies with information on [[German concentration camps]] and [[The Holocaust in Poland]] (including [[Karski's reports|the first reports]] on this topic received by the Allies<ref name="Zimmerman2015-54">{{cite book|author=Joshua D. Zimmerman|title=The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939–1945|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=w4dsCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA54|date=5 June 2015|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-01426-8|page=54}}</ref><ref name="Engel">{{Cite journal|last=Engel|first=David|date=1983|title=An Early Account of Polish Jewry under Nazi and Soviet Occupation Presented to the Polish Government-In-Exile, February 1940|journal=Jewish Social Studies|volume=45|issue=1|pages=1–16|issn=0021-6704|jstor=4467201}}</ref>), on German submarine operations, and most famously, on [[Home Army and V1 and V2|the V-1 flying bomb and V-2 rocket]].<ref name="MNK"/><ref name="Ney-Krwawicz2001-98"/> In one [[Project Big Ben]] mission ([[Operation Most III|Operation Wildhorn III]];<ref name="Wildhorn"/> Polish [[cryptonym]]: ''Most III'', "Bridge III"), a stripped-for-lightness RAF twin-engine [[Douglas Dakota|Dakota]] flew from [[Brindisi]] in [[Italy]] to an abandoned German airfield in Poland to pick up intelligence prepared by Polish aircraft-designer [[Antoni Kocjan]], including {{convert|100|lb|abbr=on}} of [[V-2 rocket]] wreckage from a [[Peenemünde]] launch, a ''Special Report 1/R, no. 242'', photographs, eight key V-2 parts, and drawings of the wreckage.<ref name="Kocjan"/>
+[[Home Army intelligence]] provided the Allies with information on [[German concentration camps]] and on [[Home Army and V1 and V2|the V-1 flying bomb and V-2 rocket]].<ref name="MNK"/> In one [[Project Big Ben]] mission ([[Operation Most III|Operation Wildhorn III]];<ref name="Wildhorn"/> Polish [[cryptonym]]: ''Most III'', "Bridge III"), a stripped-for-lightness RAF twin-engine [[Douglas Dakota|Dakota]] flew from [[Brindisi]] in [[Italy]] to an abandoned German airfield in Poland to pick up intelligence prepared by Polish aircraft-designer [[Antoni Kocjan]], including {{convert|100|lb|abbr=on}} of [[V-2 rocket]] wreckage from a [[Peenemünde]] launch, a ''Special Report 1/R, no. 242'', photographs, eight key V-2 parts, and drawings of the wreckage.<ref name="Kocjan"/>
+Sabotage was coordinated by the [[Union of Retaliation]] and later by ''[[Wachlarz]]'' and ''[[Kedyw]]'' units.<ref name="Enc. PWN: AK"/>
-It has been argued that "the work performed by Home Army intelligence undoubtedly supported the Allied armed effort much more effectively than subversive and guerilla activities."<ref name="StirlingNałęcz2005">{{cite book|author1=Tessa Stirling|author2=Daria Nałęcz|author3=Tadeusz Dubicki|coauthors=Anglo-Polish Historical Committee|title=Intelligence Co-operation Between Poland and Great Britain During World War II: Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uQtnAAAAMAAJ|year=2005|publisher=Vallentine Mitchell|isbn=978-0-85303-656-2|page=410}}</ref>
-==== Subversive activities and propaganda ====
 The Home Army also conducted [[psychological warfare]]. Its "[[Operation N]]" created the illusion of a German movement of opposition to Hitler within Germany itself.<ref name="MNK"/>
+==== Information and propaganda ====
 The Home Army published a weekly ''[[Biuletyn Informacyjny]]'' (Information Bulletin), with a top circulation (in November 1943) of 50,000.<ref>{{cite journal|url=http://mbc.cyfrowemazowsze.pl/dlibra/publication/6932?tab=1|title=Biuletyn Informacyjny : wydanie codzienne|date=15 October 2018|publisher=}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/122558-biuletyn-informacyjny-wychodzil-w-konspiracji-co-tydzien-przez-piec-lat-rekordowy-naklad-50-tys-egzemplarzy|title="Biuletyn Informacyjny" wychodził w konspiracji co tydzień przez pięć lat. Rekordowy nakład - 50 tys. egzemplarzy|publisher=}}</ref>
@@ Line 73: / Line 74: @@
 ====Major operations====
 [[File:26PPAK relief Warsaw Uprising.jpg|thumb|Home Army 26th Infantry Regiment marching from [[Kielce]]-[[Radom]] area in an attempt to join the [[Warsaw Uprising]]]]
-Sabotage was coordinated by the [[Union of Retaliation]] and later by ''[[Wachlarz]]'' and ''[[Kedyw]]'' units.<ref name="Enc. PWN: AK"/>
 Major Home Army military and sabotage operations included:
@@ Line 87: / Line 87: @@
 The largest and best-known of the Operation Tempest battles, the [[Warsaw Uprising]], constituted an attempt, beginning on 1 August 1944, to liberate Poland's capital.  Polish forces took control of substantial parts of the city and resisted the German-led forces until 2 October (a total of 63 days).  With the Poles receiving no aid from the approaching Red Army, the Germans eventually defeated the insurrectionists and burned the city, finally quelling the Uprising on 2 October 1944.<ref name="MNK"/> Other major Home Army city risings included [[Operation Ostra Brama]], in [[Wilno]], and the [[Lwów Uprising]].  The Home Army also prepared for a [[Kraków Uprising (1944)|rising in Kraków]], but due to various circumstances it was canceled. While the Home Army managed to liberate a number of places from German control—for example in the [[Lublin]] area, where regional structures were able to set up a functioning government—ultimately, due to Soviet hostility, the Home Army failed to secure sufficient territory to enable the Government in Exile to return to Poland.<ref name="MNK"/><ref name="Enc. PWN: AK"/><ref name="Enc. PWN: Burza"/>
+The Home Army primarily focused on [[sabotage]] of German rail- and road-transports to the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] in the Soviet Union.<ref name="Crampton 1994"/> It is estimated{{by whom|date=November 2015}} that an eighth of all German transports to the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] were destroyed or substantially delayed due to Home Army  operations.<ref name="Crampton 1994"/>
-Estimates of Axis fatalities due to operations by the Polish underground, of which the Home Army formed the bulk, range up to 150,000<ref name="Taras2018"/> (however, estimates of [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]]-inflicted casualties often have a wide margin of error<ref name="Laqueur"/>).
-The Home Army also carried out [[sabotage]] of German rail- and road-transports to the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] in the Soviet Union.<ref name="Crampton 1994"/> [[Richard J. Crampton]] estimated that an eighth of all German transports to the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] were destroyed or substantially delayed due to Home Army  operations.<ref name="Crampton 1994"/>
-::{| # !! style="width:80%;" align="center" class="wikitable collapsible sortable state=collapsed"
-|+ Confirmed sabotage and covert operations of the Armed Resistance (''ZWZ'') and Home Army (''AK'') <br/>from 1 January 1941 to 30 June 1944, listed by type<ref name="Ney-Krwawicz2001">{{cite book|author=Marek Ney-Krwawicz|title=Polish Home Army, 1939-1945|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DtohAQAAIAAJ|year=2001|publisher=PUMST|isbn=978-0-9501348-9-5|page=166}}</ref><ref name="Ney-Krwawicz1993">{{cite book|author=Marek Ney-Krwawicz|title=Armia Krajowa: siła zbrojna Polskiego Państwa Polskiego|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=c9WAAAAAIAAJ|year=1993|publisher=Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne|isbn=978-83-02-05061-9|page=214}}</ref>
-!Sabotage / covert-operation type
-!Total numbers
-|-
-|Damaged locomotives
-|align=right |6,930
-|-
-|Damaged railway wagons
-|align=right |19,058
-|-
-|Delayed repairs to locomotives
-|align=right |803
-|-
-|Derailed transports
-|align=right |732
-|-
-|Transports set on fire
-|align=right |443
-|-
-|Blown-up railway bridges
-|align=right |38
-|-
-|Disruptions to electricity supply in the Warsaw grid
-|align=right |638
-|-
-|Damaged or destroyed army vehicles
-|align=right |4,326
-|-
-|Damaged aeroplanes
-|align=right |28
-|-
-|Destroyed fuel-tanks
-|align=right |1,167
-|-
-|Destroyed fuel (in tonnes)
-|align=right |4,674
-|-
-|Blocked oil wells
-|align=right |5
-|-
-|Destroyed [[wood wool]] wagons
-|align=right |150
-|-
-|Burned down military stores
-|align=right |130
-|-
-|Disruptions in factory production
-|align=right |7
-|-
-|Built-in flaws in aircraft engines parts
-|align=right |4,710
-|-
-|Built-in flaws in cannon muzzles
-|align=right |203
-|-
-|Built-in flaws in artillery projectiles
-|align=right |92,000
-|-
-|Built-in flaws in air-traffic radio stations
-|align=right |107
-|-
-|Built-in flaws in condensers
-|align=right |70,000
-|-
-|Built-in flaws in electro-industrial lathes
-|align=right |1,700
-|-
-|Damage to important factory machinery
-|align=right |2,872
-|-
-|Acts of sabotage
-|align=right |25,145
-|-
-|Assassinations of Nazi Germans
-|align=right |5,733
-|}
 ===Assassinations of Nazi leaders===
@@ Line 184: / Line 104: @@
 [[File:Moscow Trial 1945.jpg|thumb|June 1945 [[Moscow]] [[Trial of the Sixteen|show trial of 16 Polish civil and Home Army leaders]]. They were convicted of "planning military action against the U.S.S.R." In March 1945 they had been invited to help organize a Polish Government of National Unity and were arrested by the [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] [[NKVD]]. Despite the court's lenience, 6 years later only two of the men were alive.]]
+At the end of the war, the Home Army was dissolved by the London government in exile. However, some desperate units returned underground and conducted [[terrorist attacks]] against the Communist administration. In some parts of the country, this escalated to a civil war. Police, civilian officials, and Jewish survivors were killed. These terrorist attacks continued until 1948, and in fact served the goals of the Communists as they allowed the planned elections in Poland to be postponed.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=xsmhdpARfGoC&pg=PA322&dq=%22Home+Army%22+%22terrorist+attacks%22&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjpxZiJ857mAhXqYN8KHR6_C3IQ6AEwBXoECAgQAg#v=onepage&q=%22Home%20Army%22%20%22terrorist%20attacks%22&f=false], A History of the World from the 20th to the 21st Century, Routledge, pp 322-323, ISBN 9780415289559</ref>
-The Home Army was officially disbanded on 19 January 1945 to avoid civil war and armed conflict with the Soviets. However, many former Home Army units decided to continue operations. The Soviet Union, and the [[Polish communist|Polish Communist Government]] that it controlled, viewed the underground, still loyal to the [[Polish government-in-exile]], as a force to be extirpated before they could gain complete control of Poland. Future [[Secretary General]] of the [[Polish United Workers' Party]], [[Władysław Gomułka]], is quoted as saying: "Soldiers of the AK are a hostile element which must be removed without mercy." Another prominent Polish communist, [[Roman Zambrowski]], said that the Home Army had to be "exterminated."<ref name="Rzecz"/>{{Better source|reason=not scholarly / not English|date=November 2019}}
-The first Home Army structure designed primarily to deal with the Soviet threat had been ''[[NIE (resistance)|NIE]]'', formed in mid-1943. Its aim was not to engage Soviet forces in combat, but to observe them and to gather intelligence while the Polish Government-in-Exile decided how to deal with the Soviets; at that time, the exiled government still believed in the possibility of constructive negotiations with the Soviets. On 7 May 1945 ''NIE'' ("NO") was disbande and transformed into an [[Armed Forces Delegation for Poland]] (''Delegatura Sił Zbrojnych na Kraj''); but this organization lasted only until 8 August 1945, when it was decided to disband it and to stop partisan resistance.<ref name="Rzecz"/>{{Better source|reason=not scholarly / not English|date=November 2019}}
-The first Polish communist government, the [[Polish Committee of National Liberation]], formed in July 1944, declined to accept jurisdiction over Home Army soldiers, therefore for over a year [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] agencies such as the [[NKVD]] took responsibility for disarming the Home Army. By war's end, some 60,000 Home Army soldiers had been arrested, 50,000 of whom were deported to Soviet [[Gulag]]s and prisons; most of these soldiers had been taken captive by the Soviets during, or in the aftermath of, [[Operation Tempest]], when many Home Army units tried to work together with the Soviets in a nationwide uprising against the Germans. Other Home Army veterans were arrested when they approached Polish communist government officials after having been promised [[amnesty]]. After a number of such broken promises during the first few years of communist control, Home Army soldiers stopped trusting the government.<ref name="Rzecz"/>{{Better source|reason=not scholarly / not English|date=November 2019}}
-The third post-Home Army organization was ''[[Wolność i Niezawisłość]]'' (''WiN'':  Freedom and Independence).  Its primary goal was not combat, either. Rather, it was designed to help Home Army soldiers transition from partisan to civilian life; while secrecy was necessary in the light of increasing persecution of Home Army veterans by the communist government.<ref name="Korboński">{{cite book |author=[[Stefan Korboński]] |title=Warsaw in Chains |year=1959 |editor= |pages=112–123 |chapter= | chapterurl = |publisher=Macmillan Publishing |location=New York |id= |url= |accessdate=}}</ref> ''WiN'' was, however, in great need of funds, necessary to pay for false documents and to provide resources for the partisans, many of whom had lost their homes and life's savings in the war. Viewed as enemies of the state, starved of resources, and with a vocal faction advocating armed resistance against the Soviets and their Polish proxies, ''WiN'' was far from efficient. A major victory for the Soviet [[NKVD]] and the newly created Polish secret police, ''[[Urząd Bezpieczeństwa]]'' (''UB''), came in the second half of 1945, when they managed to convince several Home Army and ''WiN'' leaders that they truly wanted to offer [[amnesty]] to Home Army members. Over a few months they gained information about great numbers of Home Army and ''WiN'' people and resources. By the time the (imprisoned) Home Army and ''WiN'' leaders realized their mistake, the organizations had been crippled, with thousands of their members arrested. ''WiN'' was finally disbanded in 1952. By 1947 a colonel of the communist forces declared that "The terrorist and political underground has ceased to be a threatening force, though there are still men of the forests" to be dealt with.<ref name="Rzecz"/>{{Better source|reason=not scholarly / not English|date=November 2019}}
-[[File:Krzyz AK 64081946chl.jpg|thumb|[[Armia Krajowa Cross|Home Army Cross]], awarded to Home Army veterans by the [[Polish Government-in-Exile]]]]
-The persecution of the Home Army was only part of the [[Stalinism|Stalinist]] repressions in Poland. In the period 1944–56, some 2 million people were arrested, over 20,000, including the hero of [[Auschwitz]], [[Witold Pilecki]], were executed in communist prisons, and 6 million Polish citizens (every third adult Pole) were classified as  "reactionary" or "criminal elements" and subjected to spying by state agencies.<ref name="Rzecz"/>{{Better source|reason=not scholarly / not English|date=November 2019}}
 Most Home Army soldiers were captured by the [[NKVD]] or by Poland's ''[[Urzad Bezpieczenstwa|UB]]'' political police. They were interrogated and imprisoned on various charges such as "fascism".<ref name="Paczkowski"/><ref>Michał Zając, ''[http://www.polskieradio.pl/zagranica/dokument.aspx?iid=39960 Warsaw Uprising: 5 pm, 1 August 1944]'', Retrieved on 4 July 2007.</ref> Many were sent to [[Gulag]]s, executed or "disappeared."<ref name="Paczkowski"/> Thus, between 1944 and 1956 all the members of ''[[Batalion Zośka]]'', which had fought in the [[Warsaw Uprising]], were locked up in communist prisons.<ref>Żołnierze Batalionu Armii Krajowej "Zośka" represjonowani w latach 1944–1956," Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warszawa 2008, {{ISBN|978-83-60464-92-2}}</ref> In 1956 an amnesty released 35,000 former Home Army soldiers from prisons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Persak|first=Krzysztof|date=December 2006|title=The Polish – Soviet Confrontation in 1956 and the Attempted Soviet Military Intervention in Poland.|url=|journal=Europe-Asia Studies|volume=58|issue=8|pages=1285|via=EBSCOhost}}</ref>
@@ Line 421: / Line 331: @@
 In the end, despite all the efforts, most Home Army forces had inadequate weaponry. In 1944, when the Home Army was at its peak strength (200,000–600,000, according to various estimates), the Home Army had enough weaponry for only some 32,000 soldiers."{{r|Leslie|p=234}} On 1 August 1944, when the [[Warsaw Uprising]] began, only a sixth of Home Army fighters in Warsaw were armed.{{r|Leslie|p=234}}
-==Relations with other factions==
+==Relations with other groups==
 ===Relations with Jews===
 {{see also|Rescue of Jews by Poles during the Holocaust|History of the Jews in Poland}}
-Home Army members' attitudes toward Jews varied widely from unit to unit, and the topic remains controversial.<ref name="Wdowiński"/><ref name="Radzilowski"/><ref>{{cite book|author1=Robert D. Cherry|author2=Annamaria Orla-Bukowska|title=Rethinking Poles and Jews: Troubled Past, Brighter Future|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vkLTSB7NHwgC&pg=PA105|date=1 January 2007|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=978-0-7425-4666-0|page=105}}</ref><ref name="Zimmerman2015-418">{{cite book|author=Joshua D. Zimmerman|title=The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939–1945|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=w4dsCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA418|date=5 June 2015|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-01426-8|page=418}}</ref>
+Home Army members' attitudes toward Jews varied widely from unit to unit, and the topic remains controversial.<ref name="Wdowiński"/><ref name="Radzilowski"/><ref>{{cite book|author1=Robert D. Cherry|author2=Annamaria Orla-Bukowska|title=Rethinking Poles and Jews: Troubled Past, Brighter Future|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vkLTSB7NHwgC&pg=PA105|date=1 January 2007|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=978-0-7425-4666-0|page=105}}</ref>
 ==== Daily operations ====
@@ Line 443: / Line 353: @@
 Starting in May 1943 the Home Army started carrying out death sentences for [[szmalcownik]]s in Warsaw.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Akcje zbrojne podziemnej Warszawy 1939–1944|last=Strzembosz|first=Tomasz|publisher=Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy|year=1983|isbn=83-06-00717-4|location=Warsaw|pages=}}</ref> According to [[Władysław Bartoszewski]], despite the fact that the Home Army carried out more death sentences on blackmailers than any other resistance organization in occupied Europe, these death sentences did not have a significant effect on the scale of blackmail and denunciation because of the difficulty of tracking down extortionists.<ref>Andrzej Kunert: ''Żegota. Rada Pomocy Żydom 1942 – 1945''. Warszawa: 2002, s. 34. Cytat: – Andrzej Friszke: Czy skala wyroków śmierci wydawanych w tych sprawach przez sądy Polski Podziemnej była na tyle znaczna, by mogła odstraszyć szmalcowników? – Władysław Bartoszewski: Nie, ale to była bardzo trudna sprawa. Mimo że w żadnym kraju okupowanej Europy podziemie nie wydało tylu wyroków, co u nas, to jednak trzeba zauważyć, że była to sprawa wyjątkowo trudna. Jak wytropić szmalcownika? Muszą być grupy, które obserwują i łapią. Gdzie? Na ulicy. I na gorącym uczynku. Bo przecież ofiara szantażu nigdy go nie znajdzie..</ref>
-Home Army reports from March 1943 described crimes committed by the Germans against the Jewish populace. General Rowecki estimated that 640,000 people had perished in Auschwitz between 1940 and March 1943, including 66,000 ethnic Poles and 540,000 Jews from various countries(this figure was revised later to 500,000){{r|Zimmerman 2015|p=188}}.
+Home Army reports from March 1943 described atrocities committed by the Germans against the Jewish populace. General Rowecki estimated that 640,000 people had perished in Auschwitz between 1940 and March 1943, including 66,000 ethnic Poles and 540,000 Jews from various countries(this figure was revised later to 500,000){{r|Zimmerman 2015|p=188}}.
+The Barwy Białe  detachment, commanded by  Lieutenant Kazimierz Olchowik “Zawisza”, murdered defenseless Jews on a number of occasions in 1944.<ref>[https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=120627] “Barwy Białe” on their Way to Aid Fighting Warsaw. The Crimes of the Home Army against the Jews, Holocaust Studies and Materials</ref>
 [[Antony Polonsky]] observed that "the attitude of the military underground to the genocide is both more complex and more controversial [than its approach towards [[szmalcownik]]s]. Throughout the period when it was being carried out, the Home Army was preoccupied with preparing for ... [the moment when] Nazi rule in Poland collapsed. It was determined to avoid premature military action and to conserve its strength (and weapons) for the crucial confrontation that, it was assumed, would determine the fate of Poland... [However] to the Home Army, the Jews were not a part of 'our nation' and ... action to defend them was not to be taken if it endangered [the Home Army's] other objectives." He continues to observe that "it is probably unrealistic to have expected the Home Army - which was neither as well armed nor as well organized as its propaganda claimed - to have been able to do much to aid the Jews. The fact remains that its leadership did not want to do so."{{r|Cesarani & Kavanaugh|p=68}} General Rowecki's attitudes shifted in the following months as the brutal reality of the Holocaust became more apparent, and the Polish public support for the Jewish resistance increased. Rowecki was willing to provide Jewish fighters with aid and resources when it contributed to "the greater war effort", but had (apparently) concluded that providing large quantities of supplies to the Jewish resistance would be futile. This reasoning was the norm among the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]], who believed that the Holocaust could only be halted by a significant military action.{{r|Baumgarten 2009|p=110-122}}
@@ Line 569: / Line 481: @@
 <ref name="Enc. PWN: Burza">{{pl icon}} [http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo.php?id=3882234 "Burza"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131003160857/http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo.php?id=3882234 |date=3 October 2013 }}. [[Internetowa encyklopedia PWN|Enc. PWN]]. Retrieved 14 March 2008.</ref>
-<ref name="Enc. WIEM: AK">{{pl icon}} [http://portalwiedzy.onet.pl/59129,,,,armia_krajowa,haslo.html Armia Krajowa]. [[Encyklopedia WIEM]]. Retrieved 2 April 2008.</ref>
+ref name="Enc. WIEM: AK">{{pl icon}} [http://portalwiedzy.onet.pl/59129,,,,armia_krajowa,haslo.html Armia Krajowa]. [[Encyklopedia WIEM]]. Retrieved 2 April 2008.</ref>
 <ref name="Glass 1999">[[Judith Olsak-Glass]], [http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~sarmatia/199/glass.html Review of Piotrowski's ''Poland's Holocaust''] in [[Sarmatian Review]], January 1999.</ref>
@@ Line 619: / Line 531: @@
 <ref name="Strzembosz 1996">Tomasz Strzembosz, ''Początki ruchy oporu w Polsce. Kilka uwag.'' In Krzysztof Komorowski (ed.), ''Rozwój organizacyjny Armii Krajowej'', Bellona, 1996, {{ISBN|83-11-08544-7}}</ref>
+<ref name="Taras">Marjorie Castle, [[Ray Taras]], ''Democracy in Poland'', Westview Press, 2002, {{ISBN|0-8133-3935-9}}, [https://books.google.com/books?id=YZlphcFv-LwC&pg=PA26&dq=Armia+Krajowa+inflicted&as_brr=3&ei=IVUSR6nDDpvy6wLt5MXOBw&sig=OW1YwNwrpoOJl5Br4DXqfafqqs8#PPA27,M1 Google Print, p.27]</ref>
-<ref name="Taras2018">{{cite book|author=Raymond Taras|title=Democracy In Poland: Second Edition|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SNJMDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT54|date=19 February 2018|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-0-429-98067-1|page=54|quote=...the Polish resistance movement was arguably the most effective of any estabilished in a Nazi-occupied country. Some 150,000 Germans, including top SS officials, wre killed in Poland.}}</ref>
 <ref name="Wildhorn">Ordway, Frederick I., III. "The Rocket Team." Apogee Books Space Series 36 (pgs 158, 173)</ref>

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