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Varieties of Presence
The world shows up for us--it is present in our thought and perception. But, as Alva Noë contends in his latest exploration of the problem of consciousness, it doesn't show up for free. The world is not simply available; it is achieved rather than given. As with a painting in a gallery, the world has no meaning--no presence to be experienced--apart from our able engagement with it. We must show up, too, and bring along what knowledge and skills we've cultivated. This means that education, skills acquisition, and technology can expand the world's availability to us and transform our consciousness.
Although deeply philosophical, Varieties of Presence is nurtured by collaboration with scientists and artists. Cognitive science, dance, and performance art as well as Kant and Wittgenstein inform this literary and personal work of scholarship intended no less for artists and art theorists, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and anthropologists than for philosophers.
Noë rejects the traditional representational theory of mind and its companion internalism, dismissing outright the notion that conceptual knowledge is radically distinct from other forms of practical ability or know-how. For him, perceptual presence and thought presence are species of the same genus. Both are varieties of exploration through which we achieve contact with the world. Forceful reflections on the nature of understanding, as well as substantial examination of the perceptual experience of pictures and what they depict or model are included in this far-ranging discussion.
188 pages, Hardcover
First published February 6, 2012
About the author
Alva Noë
17 books107 followersAlva Noë (born 1964) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. The focus of his work is the theory of perception and consciousness. In addition to these problems in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, he is interested in phenomenology, the theory of art, Wittgenstein, and the origins of analytic philosophy.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
July 17, 2021
140804: reading this more or less at the same time as book introducing Heidegger, book on Habermas- this one most difficult, mostly because I have read a lot on hd and can follow it, and hb is political philosophy so do not expect to understand... this is more the practice of (analytic?) philosophy. this is often connecting it to what already feels familiar to me, of all the other continental Phil. his idea of senses as 'achievement' and of 'sensorimotor' sounds familiar. could follow some, but when he refers to 'the tradition' or names certain other philosophers... I know this is not my reading 'tradition'. leads often to the same places, but I get there by phenomenologists etc.... easier to read if I just ignore connections, similarities, arguments that seem to me always already resolved... there is some use, mostly of merleau-ponty, but not all the work on m-p have read... this could of course mean simply I have not read enough. fun, anyway. will read more noe. not really in a position to argue because for one thing, I have no footnotes...
reading an interesting Buddhism/philosophy intro, interesting as we are approaching Buddhism through Process Philosophy, rather than my experience the other way- and this makes me think of what strikes me as the mistaken aspect of 'achievement' of sense, seems rather that 'sense' is given as immediate data of consciousness and all we should do is get out of the way conceptually... it is an 'achievement' to view the world 'objectively' but then a mistake to apply that model to our subjective and therefor true senses.. Or something like that...
reading an interesting Buddhism/philosophy intro, interesting as we are approaching Buddhism through Process Philosophy, rather than my experience the other way- and this makes me think of what strikes me as the mistaken aspect of 'achievement' of sense, seems rather that 'sense' is given as immediate data of consciousness and all we should do is get out of the way conceptually... it is an 'achievement' to view the world 'objectively' but then a mistake to apply that model to our subjective and therefor true senses.. Or something like that...
March 21, 2024
I first read this book 7 years ago. It moved me more than anything else I had read. It served as the springboard for my undergraduate thesis and has inspired me since. I didn't write up my thoughts of it at the time. On my second read now, here are my thoughts.
Noë proposes that experience should be understood in terms of the presences of objects and the skills we have for engaging with these objects, which are responsible for their presence. According to Noë, when we perceive the world, the sensorimotor or perceptual skills used are just one means for doing this. Thought- or understanding-based skills are likewise means for encountering the world. Of course, objects perceived and objects thought about have differences. I’m not inclined to take the hand of a person whom I merely imagine, while I’m inclined to do so when I perceive my friend. Noë explains such differences by appeal to the nature of the relationships we have to perceived, imagined, or thought-up objects. These relationships vary according to movement- and object-dependence.
When an object is accessed by perceptual or sensorimotor skills, it scores highly on these dimensions. For example, I access my friend by perceiving him. When I step towards him, his visual appearance changes. When he approaches me, and I stand still, similarly his visual appearance changes. In contrast, when an object is accessed by thought-based skills, it fails to be responsive in these ways. I can walk around Berkeley while thinking about a polar bear in Antarctica. Regardless of how quickly I walk, or which direction I take, the appearance of this bear, from my perspective, does not change. Similarly, when this bear goes about his life in Antarctica, his movements have no impact upon how he visually appears in my experience, as I think about him.
Noë’s insight is that the presences of the bear and my friend amount to the same mental phenomenon. They are varieties of presence. Consider that in perceiving my friend, I don’t perceive every part of him. His hands are in his pockets, for example, and so are hidden from me. Yet I behold the presence of his whole being. Similarly, in thinking about the polar bear, I don’t perceive parts of the bear, and yet I behold the presence of the bear. Virtual aspects, or the presences of absences, mark perceptual encounters, just as they do for thought-based encounters. The fact that this virtuality is found in even the most concrete, perceptual experiences suggests that it need not be understood in terms of the virtual. It may be understood in terms of presence. The world is present to us, even when it is absent.
Noë’s framework is powerful. It explains empty referring terms (2012, 41): When it turns out that something does not exist, it can still be present to us, as long as we have the skills for making it present. The commonplaceness of mistaken reference is no surprise. Testimony is often misleading, and thought-accessed objects score very low on movement- and object-dependence, so we can’t receive feedback regarding the potential nonexistence of these objects. Noë’s framework can also explain our experiences of pictures. Photographs serve as models for objects in the world and scaffold our skills used in accessing those objects. Paintings hold many possible things that could become present to us, and that which we end up seeing depends upon the skills we have.
Noë’s framework leads us to a striking idea: Perception and thought are continuous. This is groundbreaking for major issues in the history of philosophy of mind, such as understanding the seeming oppositions between body and mind, and experience and intellect.
I have some lingering questions. First, consider the following three categories of apparent objects: (1) Objects perceived in our vicinity, (2) Objects accessed by thought, presented as actual, and susceptible to the possibility that they are illusory, and (3) Apparent object which we make-believe and are presented as unreal. We make them up for amusement or art, not for accessing the world. So they must be unreal, and we must know that they are unreal. The presences of instances across these categories differ. When I smell coffee nearby I’ll be motivated to look for it, while when I think about the smell of coffee, I won’t be motivated in the same way. If I pretend that the smell of my friend is really the smell of coffee, I also won’t be motivated in this way. Noë holds that, in spite of these differences, the presences between these three are varieties of one and the same presence.
We should tread carefully here. Consider that in order for some object to be a candidate for varying upon object- or movement-dependence, this object must be sensed as something that we could stand in relation to. Do instances of (1), (2), and (3) satisfy this prerequisite for scoring on object- or movement-dependence? Whenever make-believe objects are present, we know they can’t possibly exist. This stands in contrast to apparent objects of (2), where we believe that they do, could, or once existed. I know that somebody made up Snoopy, and his presence is a matter of our enjoying this character as entertainment, not as some real-life individual. While I know that there could be real-life individuals who wear Snoopy costumes, or real-life TV screens depicting Snoopy, these real-life things aren’t Snoopy itself, a character. If I were drugged and believed that Snoopy were real, Snoopy would be no longer be present as make-believe, but rather as an instance of (2), an apparently or potentially real individual. Knowledge of the nonexistence of make-believe objects is necessary to their very identities. We know that make-believe objects can’t possibly exist.
Let’s suppose that object- and movement-dependence applied to make-believe objects, or (3). Then, we might say that Snoopy scores on the lowest end of the dimensions, But on this supposition, we must give up on the prerequisite for assessing an object along these dependencies—namely, that we could stand in relation to the object under consideration. We can’t possibly stand in relation to make-believe objects. Built into the identity of any make-believe object is the fact that we made it up, and we know that it is made-up.
How bad is it to give up on this prerequisite? It is bad. The idea that we can be joined in object- or movement-dependence with objects we know can’t possibly exist seems to involve contradiction. On the one hand, the very concepts of these dependencies imply that we could stand in relation to an object which is independent of us and found in the world. On the other hand, when we know that some apparent object couldn’t possibly exist, this implies that we cannot stand in relation to this apparent object.
If my reasoning is right, it turns out there are two kinds of presence, which are not varieties of some greater presence. While objects we believe do, could, or have once existed may differ in their styles of presence, these are varieties of the same kind of presence. Make-believe objects cannot be understood in this way. Snoopy is not present for me in the way by which present, past, an potentially existing objects are.
Noë proposes that experience should be understood in terms of the presences of objects and the skills we have for engaging with these objects, which are responsible for their presence. According to Noë, when we perceive the world, the sensorimotor or perceptual skills used are just one means for doing this. Thought- or understanding-based skills are likewise means for encountering the world. Of course, objects perceived and objects thought about have differences. I’m not inclined to take the hand of a person whom I merely imagine, while I’m inclined to do so when I perceive my friend. Noë explains such differences by appeal to the nature of the relationships we have to perceived, imagined, or thought-up objects. These relationships vary according to movement- and object-dependence.
When an object is accessed by perceptual or sensorimotor skills, it scores highly on these dimensions. For example, I access my friend by perceiving him. When I step towards him, his visual appearance changes. When he approaches me, and I stand still, similarly his visual appearance changes. In contrast, when an object is accessed by thought-based skills, it fails to be responsive in these ways. I can walk around Berkeley while thinking about a polar bear in Antarctica. Regardless of how quickly I walk, or which direction I take, the appearance of this bear, from my perspective, does not change. Similarly, when this bear goes about his life in Antarctica, his movements have no impact upon how he visually appears in my experience, as I think about him.
Noë’s insight is that the presences of the bear and my friend amount to the same mental phenomenon. They are varieties of presence. Consider that in perceiving my friend, I don’t perceive every part of him. His hands are in his pockets, for example, and so are hidden from me. Yet I behold the presence of his whole being. Similarly, in thinking about the polar bear, I don’t perceive parts of the bear, and yet I behold the presence of the bear. Virtual aspects, or the presences of absences, mark perceptual encounters, just as they do for thought-based encounters. The fact that this virtuality is found in even the most concrete, perceptual experiences suggests that it need not be understood in terms of the virtual. It may be understood in terms of presence. The world is present to us, even when it is absent.
Noë’s framework is powerful. It explains empty referring terms (2012, 41): When it turns out that something does not exist, it can still be present to us, as long as we have the skills for making it present. The commonplaceness of mistaken reference is no surprise. Testimony is often misleading, and thought-accessed objects score very low on movement- and object-dependence, so we can’t receive feedback regarding the potential nonexistence of these objects. Noë’s framework can also explain our experiences of pictures. Photographs serve as models for objects in the world and scaffold our skills used in accessing those objects. Paintings hold many possible things that could become present to us, and that which we end up seeing depends upon the skills we have.
Noë’s framework leads us to a striking idea: Perception and thought are continuous. This is groundbreaking for major issues in the history of philosophy of mind, such as understanding the seeming oppositions between body and mind, and experience and intellect.
I have some lingering questions. First, consider the following three categories of apparent objects: (1) Objects perceived in our vicinity, (2) Objects accessed by thought, presented as actual, and susceptible to the possibility that they are illusory, and (3) Apparent object which we make-believe and are presented as unreal. We make them up for amusement or art, not for accessing the world. So they must be unreal, and we must know that they are unreal. The presences of instances across these categories differ. When I smell coffee nearby I’ll be motivated to look for it, while when I think about the smell of coffee, I won’t be motivated in the same way. If I pretend that the smell of my friend is really the smell of coffee, I also won’t be motivated in this way. Noë holds that, in spite of these differences, the presences between these three are varieties of one and the same presence.
We should tread carefully here. Consider that in order for some object to be a candidate for varying upon object- or movement-dependence, this object must be sensed as something that we could stand in relation to. Do instances of (1), (2), and (3) satisfy this prerequisite for scoring on object- or movement-dependence? Whenever make-believe objects are present, we know they can’t possibly exist. This stands in contrast to apparent objects of (2), where we believe that they do, could, or once existed. I know that somebody made up Snoopy, and his presence is a matter of our enjoying this character as entertainment, not as some real-life individual. While I know that there could be real-life individuals who wear Snoopy costumes, or real-life TV screens depicting Snoopy, these real-life things aren’t Snoopy itself, a character. If I were drugged and believed that Snoopy were real, Snoopy would be no longer be present as make-believe, but rather as an instance of (2), an apparently or potentially real individual. Knowledge of the nonexistence of make-believe objects is necessary to their very identities. We know that make-believe objects can’t possibly exist.
Let’s suppose that object- and movement-dependence applied to make-believe objects, or (3). Then, we might say that Snoopy scores on the lowest end of the dimensions, But on this supposition, we must give up on the prerequisite for assessing an object along these dependencies—namely, that we could stand in relation to the object under consideration. We can’t possibly stand in relation to make-believe objects. Built into the identity of any make-believe object is the fact that we made it up, and we know that it is made-up.
How bad is it to give up on this prerequisite? It is bad. The idea that we can be joined in object- or movement-dependence with objects we know can’t possibly exist seems to involve contradiction. On the one hand, the very concepts of these dependencies imply that we could stand in relation to an object which is independent of us and found in the world. On the other hand, when we know that some apparent object couldn’t possibly exist, this implies that we cannot stand in relation to this apparent object.
If my reasoning is right, it turns out there are two kinds of presence, which are not varieties of some greater presence. While objects we believe do, could, or have once existed may differ in their styles of presence, these are varieties of the same kind of presence. Make-believe objects cannot be understood in this way. Snoopy is not present for me in the way by which present, past, an potentially existing objects are.
June 3, 2021
Varieties of Presence é, de forma geral, um conjunto de reflexões amadurecidas de Noë a respeito das relações entre pensamento e experiência (sempre, claro, partindo da abordagem enativista sensório-motora). Talvez a tese mais geral do livro seja a seguinte: pensamento (crenças, etc.) e experiência perceptual são espécies de um mesmo gênero, a saber, o gênero denominado "acesso" ao mundo. Não partimos da experiência e vamos ao pensamento (por ex., crenças justificadas). Pensar e perceber o mundo são modalidades diferentes de acesso à realidade, de maneira análoga à ideia de que um livro, um filme e uma fotografia sobre Bertrand Russell são "modalidades" de acesso ao próprio Russell. Cada qual tem Russell como seu referente, mas cada qual acessa Russell a partir de ferramentas, mecanismos e lógicas distintas (é óbvio que conhecer Russell por livro envolve um conjunto de habilidades relativamente diferentes de conhecer Russell, por exemplo, por um filme). Donde o título "Varieties of Presence". Lembrando que é *apenas* uma metáfora.
Uma passagem que ilustra bem essa tese é a seguinte:
"From the standpoint of what we can think of as the general theory of access, thought and perception differ merely as modalities of access. The space of thought, like the space of perceptual consciousness, is an access space. And what grounds the differences here are differences in the relevant skills".
Noë, por meio da sua abordagem enativista sensório-motora, possui propostas muito interessantes para esclarecer o clássico problema epistemológico sobre como percepção e juízos se relacionam. Ambas são cognitivamente relevantes para o nosso entendimento (ou melhor, acesso) ao mundo, mas são diferentes capacidades cognitivas que envolvem diferentes habilidades (skills of access, no vocabulário de Noë). Por exemplo, nossa faculdade perceptiva envolve o tipo de habilidade denominada de "entendimento sensório-motor" (um conjunto de entendimentos implícitos sobre como nossa atividade corporal impacta o fluxo de estímulos sensoriais possíveis), enquanto que nossa faculdade do juízo envolve o tradicional entendimento de conceitos. Uma teoria do conhecimento, numa perspectiva enativista, deveria ser entendida como uma teoria geral do acesso (como acessamos a realidade por meio de quaisquer ferramentas que possuímos).
Encerro com duas passagens que considero marcantes dessa ideia geral:
(1) "From this standpoint, thought, no less than perception, is a kind of skillful probing of what there is. And the line between perception and thought is not one that can be drawn sharply. Dominic’s [a friend of Noë] presence to my mind in thought is different not in kind but only in degree from the sort of presence he might possess in my perceptual experience. Indeed, from this standpoint one can say that perception is a kind of thought and thought, at least sometimes, is a kind of extended perception".
(2) "Perceptual consciousness is a special style of access to the world. But access is not something bare, brute or found. The ground of access is our possession of knowledge, understanding and skills. Without understanding, there is no access and so no perception. My emphasis here is on a special kind of understanding which distinctively underwrites our perceptual access to objects and properties, namely, sensorimotor understanding […] Sensorimotor understanding brings the world into focus for perceptual consciousness".
Estou convicto de que a abordagem enativista tem muito a oferecer em relação como podemos compreender nossas capacidades de conhecer a realidade, de uma maneira informada tanto filosófica quanto cientificamente, sem os dualismos e simplificações (no mínimo) toscas presentes em certos debates tradicionais da epistemologia analítica (que chega a absurdos de pensar que a experiência perceptual não ofereceria nenhuma contribuição epistemicamente relevante para nós).
Uma passagem que ilustra bem essa tese é a seguinte:
"From the standpoint of what we can think of as the general theory of access, thought and perception differ merely as modalities of access. The space of thought, like the space of perceptual consciousness, is an access space. And what grounds the differences here are differences in the relevant skills".
Noë, por meio da sua abordagem enativista sensório-motora, possui propostas muito interessantes para esclarecer o clássico problema epistemológico sobre como percepção e juízos se relacionam. Ambas são cognitivamente relevantes para o nosso entendimento (ou melhor, acesso) ao mundo, mas são diferentes capacidades cognitivas que envolvem diferentes habilidades (skills of access, no vocabulário de Noë). Por exemplo, nossa faculdade perceptiva envolve o tipo de habilidade denominada de "entendimento sensório-motor" (um conjunto de entendimentos implícitos sobre como nossa atividade corporal impacta o fluxo de estímulos sensoriais possíveis), enquanto que nossa faculdade do juízo envolve o tradicional entendimento de conceitos. Uma teoria do conhecimento, numa perspectiva enativista, deveria ser entendida como uma teoria geral do acesso (como acessamos a realidade por meio de quaisquer ferramentas que possuímos).
Encerro com duas passagens que considero marcantes dessa ideia geral:
(1) "From this standpoint, thought, no less than perception, is a kind of skillful probing of what there is. And the line between perception and thought is not one that can be drawn sharply. Dominic’s [a friend of Noë] presence to my mind in thought is different not in kind but only in degree from the sort of presence he might possess in my perceptual experience. Indeed, from this standpoint one can say that perception is a kind of thought and thought, at least sometimes, is a kind of extended perception".
(2) "Perceptual consciousness is a special style of access to the world. But access is not something bare, brute or found. The ground of access is our possession of knowledge, understanding and skills. Without understanding, there is no access and so no perception. My emphasis here is on a special kind of understanding which distinctively underwrites our perceptual access to objects and properties, namely, sensorimotor understanding […] Sensorimotor understanding brings the world into focus for perceptual consciousness".
Estou convicto de que a abordagem enativista tem muito a oferecer em relação como podemos compreender nossas capacidades de conhecer a realidade, de uma maneira informada tanto filosófica quanto cientificamente, sem os dualismos e simplificações (no mínimo) toscas presentes em certos debates tradicionais da epistemologia analítica (que chega a absurdos de pensar que a experiência perceptual não ofereceria nenhuma contribuição epistemicamente relevante para nós).
March 27, 2016
Noë gets better w/ each book. More lucid and relaxed...only wish he'd swap out the tomato analogue for a better fruit.
December 21, 2022
Excelente!
April 3, 2023
Presence is availability.
December 30, 2016
After re-reading and teaching his Out of Our Heads this semester I decided to explore another of Noe's books. This one was just okay.
I feel like Noe is in a contemporary form developing some of the ideas in the pragmatist/process tradition without being deeply in that tradition. He is influenced by Putnam, but other than a quote from Dewey here and there, no other major members of that tradition are referenced.
This book I think would actually benefit from the author reading deeply in James and Whitehead. In particular in one essay he says he is a criticizing empiricism. He seems ignorant of radical empiricism, with which I believe he would agree.
I feel like Noe is in a contemporary form developing some of the ideas in the pragmatist/process tradition without being deeply in that tradition. He is influenced by Putnam, but other than a quote from Dewey here and there, no other major members of that tradition are referenced.
This book I think would actually benefit from the author reading deeply in James and Whitehead. In particular in one essay he says he is a criticizing empiricism. He seems ignorant of radical empiricism, with which I believe he would agree.
October 14, 2012
Beautifully written. It's so hard to find such an accessible yet top-notch philosophy writing nowadays.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews