This is primarily a social and political history of the Hoover Dam. The book opens with a longish discussion of the motivation and the political wrangThis is primarily a social and political history of the Hoover Dam. The book opens with a longish discussion of the motivation and the political wrangling, starting with the flooding of the Salton Sink.
We hear a bit about the design, but the author's main topic is the organization and working conditions at the site. Turns out the builders were ferocious robber-barons, who refused to fund safety and gouged the workers as much as they could. The contracts for the dam were let by the Hoover administration on the eve of the depression and so many of the labor rules of the New Deal did not apply.
Merged review:
This is primarily a social and political history of the Hoover Dam. The book opens with a longish discussion of the motivation and the political wrangling, starting with the flooding of the Salton Sink.
We hear a bit about the design, but the author's main topic is the organization and working conditions at the site. Turns out the builders were ferocious robber-barons, who refused to fund safety and gouged the workers as much as they could. The contracts for the dam were let by the Hoover administration on the eve of the depression and so many of the labor rules of the New Deal did not apply....more
The Six-Day War started on June 5, 1967 with the most successful surprise attack in the history of warfare. Within the first fifteen minutes of the waThe Six-Day War started on June 5, 1967 with the most successful surprise attack in the history of warfare. Within the first fifteen minutes of the war, the Israelis destroyed half the Egyptian air force on the ground. Within a few hours, they had eliminated the rest, and then methodically did the same to Syria and Jordan. By the end of the day, Israel was the only combatant with any air power left.
This book describes that day in more or less total detail, plane by plane, minute by minute. This might be of historical value, but I didn't find it especially readable. However, the introductory chapters gave me a much better understanding of the planning context. Aloni makes Focus seem natural and logical, rather than some brilliant master plan.
Many accounts of the war (including Oren's) make it sound like this was a planned attack, specifically as part of the war strategy. It wasn't. Since basically the foundation of the Israeli Air Force, the national strategic doctrine had been to seize air superiority straightaway, and the simplest way to do that was to destroy the enemy's bases and planes on the ground. So the IAF had been planning and practicing for airbase attacks for years and had prepared to do this to all their potential enemies. The Israelis also understood that fast turnaround time would make up for limited numbers, and so they had emphasized that. And they had built a command-and-control setup so that they could, on a timescale of minutes, assign planes to targets. And they understood that flying low, in radio silence, would impair enemy reaction.
Focus wasn't so much a detailed plan as a standing doctrine and a set of tactics meant to facilitate it. Some accounts suggest that the Israelis carefully timed their attack to land after the Egyptian dawn patrols landed. Aloni offers a different version -- the Israelis wanted to start as early as they could, but needed daylight to marshal and launch their strike in radio silence, and also wanted to avoid a natural "clock" time.
There wasn't some detailed plan for the whole day's air operations, nor was any of this planned in detail long in advance. It couldn't have been, since the Israelis couldn't have known in advance exactly how many planes were flyable that day. In the week or two before the start of the war, they formulated a plan for the first wave of strikes, basically just "some attackers for every nearby Egyptian base, matching up attack squadrons to bases in their range envelope." And then onwards, they relied on battle damage assessment to pick targets, and sent out the next waves of planes as they were ready....more
Bujold has not written a bad book yet. This one is about crime and punishment and redemption. In general, the charm of this series is that it is aboutBujold has not written a bad book yet. This one is about crime and punishment and redemption. In general, the charm of this series is that it is about religion and clergy, and it takes both utterly seriously. ...more
Hobbes is one of the wickedest and funniest writers on government and religion that I have ever encountered.
I know that Aristotle in the first book o
Hobbes is one of the wickedest and funniest writers on government and religion that I have ever encountered.
I know that Aristotle in the first book of his Politics, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by nature, some more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy; others to serve, meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he; as master and servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit: which is not only against reason, but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish that had not rather govern themselves than be governed by others: nor when the wise, in their own conceit, contend by force with them who distrust their own wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost at any time, get the victory.
A few big things I notice.
- Hobbes has basically no citations to any prior authority. Every reference to any previous writer is a sneer. - it’s pretty impious. He will say something dismissive about religion with a weak unpersuasive “except the true one.” - it’s overly pessimistic about human society in part because Hobbes doesn’t focus much on families. Clans and tribes are larger and more stable than he lets on. - It’s an observed fact that most societies do not resemble his state of nature. Even though many of them have had much looser sovereignty than he demands....more
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